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The aim of this research project is to provide insights into the characteristics 
of Islamic Banks’ Corporate Governance (CG) mechanisms and their relationship, 
if any, with firm performance. 
There are several motivations for this research: 
In first place, Islamic financial institutions have experienced exponential 
growth in recent decades. In particular, Islamic banks have expanded into several 
European countries, such as the UK and Luxembourg but most notably, they have 
registered a sharp increase in two specific areas, namely the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) and South Asian (SA) countries, where now they constitute an 
important block of the banking sector (International Organization for Securities 
Commissions, 2004; Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report, 2014). 
The development and growth of Islamic banks have raised a number of research 
challenges, which, among other issues, include identifying the main determinants 
of this expansion.  
Second, there has been a shift from exclusively financial interests towards 
more inclusive, diverse, environmental and social values. Good examples of this 
change are the new trends on non-financial reporting and the so called “Integrated 
reporting” comprising not only the Annual Accounts but also information about 
diversity, environmental and governance practices. In this vein, Islamic banks 
represent an interesting area to investigate due to their religious and social 
connections. The Maqasid Shariah stipulates that financial institutions are 
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expected to contribute to the fair distribution of wealth and promote social well-
being (Laldin and Furqani, 2013), mainly through three elements: educating 
individuals, establishing social justice and attracting public interest (Amin et al., 
2014).  
Third, there is a need to explore the causes of the global economic crisis that 
struck around 2008. The impact of the economic crisis was felt in many countries, 
often reaching systemic proportions and the sub-prime crisis triggered a lack of 
trust in the mortgages-based financial instruments in the USA (Rosman et al. 
2014). Thus, there is a vital need to investigate healthier financial systems and 
alternative financial instruments. The Islamic financial institutions, despite 
experiencing a severe drop in profitability from 2008-2010 (Grassa and Matoussi, 
2014), did not suffer the same degree of financial turmoil as their conventional 
counterparts. Islamic banks, with their Shariah-derived principles, provide an 
interesting arena of research for several reasons: 
The range of typical financial products differs from that of their 
conventional counterparts. The avoidance of volatile investments and speculation 
imposed by Shariah law, fostered the resilience exhibited by Islamic banks during 
the financial crisis (Beck et al., 2013; Hasan and Dridi, 2010; Rosman et al., 2014; 
Al-Khouri and Arouri, 2016). Nevertheless, their real assets-based transactions 
mean that Islamic financial institutions are vulnerable to real economic downturns 
(Beck et al., 2013; Alqahtani et al., 2016; Olson and Zoubi, 2017). 
Their institutional self-sufficiency, which stops the crisis from spreading to 
other financial entities (Hassan and Aliyu, 2018). 
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Academia has also identified some weaknesses of the Islamic banks. Chong 
and Liu (2009) suggest that Islamic banking in Malaysia is not very different from 
conventional banking, and the alleged benefits of Islamic banking exist in theory 
only. They also point out that the key reason for the rapid growth in Islamic 
banking worldwide during recent decades is unlikely to be associated with the 
attributes of Islamic banking; rather, it is most likely spurred by the worldwide 
Islamic resurgence since the late 1960s, which leads to a heightened demand by 
Muslims for financial products and services that conform to their religion.  
In fourth place, the implementation of Governance Codes among many 
countries at the start of this century (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009) fostered 
a very prolific stream of research.  
While the literature on this topic dates back to the early 1990s, most of the 
related empirical research ignores banks (Adams and Mehran, 2012). However, 
CG of banks has become an important area that calls for further attention at a 
global level. Due to their systemic nature, banking downturns affect not only a 
huge number of stakeholders, but also the stability of other banks through, among 
other factors, the inter-bank market. As De Haan and Vlahu (2015) assert, 
financial institutions are highly interconnected due to globalization, technological 
developments and financial liberalization policies, which inevitably exposes the 
banking sector to greater risk. In this regard, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2006)1 points out: 
                                                 
1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS Enhancing corporate governance for banking 
organisations, 2006, p.4).  
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“effective corporate governance practices are essential to achieving and 
maintaining public trust and confidence in the banking system, which are critical 
to the proper functioning of the banking sector and economy as a whole”.   
Despite this warning, the crisis that hit financial institutions around 2008 
reached systemic levels. Some scholars pointed out that one of the reasons this 
crisis was so long and hard-hitting was the poor CG in the banking system (Berger 
et al., 2014; Peni and Vähämaa, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; Adams and Mehran, 
2012; Ling et al., 2013; Grove et al., 2011) and that banks’ CG was ineffective at 
preventing detrimental lending practices (Grove et al.2011). In the aftermath of 
this financial crisis, regulatory bodies and standard-setters issued certain measures 
such as the implementation of independent compensation committees and stronger 
governance policies (Section 952 of the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010; the 2010 UK 
Governance Code; Good Governance Code of Listed Companies in Spain, 2015). 
Against this backdrop, Islamic banks exhibited greater resilience and stability than 
their conventional counterparts. However, there is scarce literature addressing the 
governance of Islamic financial institutions.  
And last but not least, Islamic banks are unique in that they implement a 
compulsory multi-level governance system where religious elements play a major 
role. Although CG issues related to non-financial companies based in developed 
countries have been the focus of much attention from academia and regulatory 
bodies, there has been scarce research on the Islamic banking industry. However, 
the link between traditional CG mechanisms and performance might differ due to 
the regulatory environment and unique nature of the banking business (Mülbert, 
2009) and, therefore, further investigation would be helpful.  
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This research aims to fill this gap by exploring the impact of several CG 
mechanisms on Islamic banks’ performance. Specifically, we test:  
The impact of the Shariah board characteristics. The Islamic financial 
industry presents a unique multi-layer CG structure that includes not only 
traditional governance but also the Shariah board, whose main role is to ensure 
that the financial services delivered by the bank comply with Shariah Law. 
Although this distinctive governance body of Islamic financial institutions has 
been proven to reduce information asymmetry, moral hazard, agency problems 
and the severe effect of excessive risk-taking (Hamza and Saadaoui, 2013), little 
is known about the impact, if any, of the Shariah board characteristics on Islamic 
banks’ performance. 
Additionally, we also explore the moderating effect of the ownership 
structure on Islamic banks’ performance. Previous studies have argued that the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance is complex 
and empirical studies have reported mixed results (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Iannotta et al., 2007; Haw et al., 2010; 
Busta et al., 2014). In the banking field, some studies have investigated whether 
state banks contribute positively to financial development and economic growth 
although decisive conclusions have been elusive. However, the recent global 
financial crisis has prompted a need for further investigation about the influence 
of ownership characteristics and bank performance. This study aims to shed some 
light on this relevant issue in the Islamic banking industry. 
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To achieve our main research goals, the thesis is structured in six different 
parts: Chapter 1 explains the concept of Islamic finance and the main similarities 
to and differences from conventional finance. Chapter 2 discusses the concept of 
CG and reviews its main characteristics in conventional banking. Then, we explain 
the specific features of CG in Islamic financial institutions to provide a better 
understanding of the role of the Shariah supervisory board as an essential body for 
ensuring good governance in these institutions. Chapter 3 presents an extensive 
review of the relevant literature related to the subject of study, highlighting the 
main theories and findings about the composition of the boards of directors, the 
ownership structure and their impact on the performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks. The research hypotheses are also set out in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 details the methodology used in order to test the research questions. It 
also describes the sample selection process and analyses its composition. Chapter 
5 is devoted to presenting the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 
is dedicated to the conclusions reached, the limitations inherent to the research 
work and potential future research issues. 
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Research on Islamic financial institutions often brings up questions such as 
What is Islamic finance? How does it differ from conventional finance? What 
services are provided by Islamic financial institutions? or How important Islamic 
finance is in the global financial context? 
In this chapter, we aim to answer those questions and thus facilitate an 
understanding of the range of typical financial activities provided by Islamic 
financial institutions, how they are regulated and why. To that end, we first explain 
the concept of Islamic finance. We then present a brief history of the emergence 
of Islamic banks around the world, followed by an overview of the activities of 
the Islamic banks. We end this chapter by illustrating the current state of Islamic 
finance. 
1.2. The concept of Islamic finance  
As the name suggests, religion plays a key role in the concept and 
development of Islamic finance. Islamic finance emerges from the attempt to 
comply with the principles of Islamic faith and it is aimed at providing a variety 
of religiously acceptable financial services to Muslim communities. 
Chapter 1.- Islamic Finance 
8 
Islamic finance refers to the provision of financial services in accordance 
with Islamic Shariah Law (International Monetary Fund, 2017). Shariah involves 
a series of prohibitions as well as prescriptions regarding the practice of finance 
(Gheeraert, 2014). The financial services also need to be in compliance with the 
Muslim holy book (Quran) and the Prophet Mohamed’s actions (Sunnah), which 
provide general guidelines for different concepts in life and therefore cover 
economic activities. Additionally, financial products must comply with the 
jurisprudence or opinions of qualified Muslim scholars (Fatwas). 
Among other issues, Shariah does not allow either the receiving or paying 
of interest (riba), excessive uncertainty (gharar), gambling (maysir) or 
illegitimate transactions considered to be detrimental to society, such as those 
involving alcohol or tobacco (International Monetary Fund, 2017). Therefore, 
speculation and short-sale practices are not allowed (Hussain et al., 2016). 
Additionally, in order to comply with the principles of fairness and justice, 
the Muslim community promotes business transactions that yield rewards and 
profits for both parties (the bank and the customer). Hence, Islamic banks are 
based on the principle of profit-and-loss sharing, where both the shareholders and 
depositors should share the risks of financing business ventures (Johnes et al., 
2014; Di Mauro et al., 2013). 
Moreover, exploitation is unacceptable under Islamic Law; thus, Muslims 
reject the interest-based commercial banking system, where all the pressure is on 
the borrower to pay back the loan with the agreed interest, regardless of the success 
or failure of his project (Beck et al., 2013). They also consider that making profits 
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by demanding customer repayments over a long period is unacceptable 
exploitation (Zaher and Hassan, 2001; Di Mauro et al.2013). 
Nowadays, these principles constitute the basis of the contemporary Islamic 
banking range of Islamic financial products and services (Di Mauro et al.2013; 
Khan, 2010). Therefore, the range of financial operations available is different 
from those delivered by conventional banks. Islamic financial transactions are 
mostly asset-based rather than debt-based (Hassan and Aliyu, 2018). Overall, 
Islamic banks are expected to have long-term sustenance and prosperity that will 
improve social well-being and the environment (Aliyu et al., 2017). 
Below, we briefly describe how Islamic finance and, in particular, the 
Islamic banking industry was established in the two most important geographical 
regions in the Islamic world, that is, the Middle East and South Asia. 
1.3. The emergence of Islamic banks  
According to Wilson (2002), the first Islamic financial institution was 
established by Dr. Ahmed Alnjar in Mit Ghamr in Egypt around 1963. It was a 
local savings bank that provided basic interest-free services to its customers. Since 
then, the growth and spread of Islamic financial institutions around the world has 
been indisputable.  
Below, we attempt to illustrate the emergence of the Shariah-compliant 
financial industry around the world. To that end, we have grouped the countries 
hosting Islamic banks by geographical region: the Middle East, South Asia and 
Europe. 
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1.3.1. The emergence of Islamic banks in Middle Eastern countries 
In early 1970, oil was discovered in the Middle East, which helped Islamic 
banks to spread into different countries. Hence, in the late 1970s, the first—and 
what would turn out to be the most important—Islamic banks were established. 
The 1980s witnessed the opening of more Islamic banks, in Sudan, Iran and 
Pakistan (Khan, 2010; Maali et al., 2006).  
The first Islamic bank in Bahrain, named Bahrain Islamic Bank, was 
established in 1978 and the country is nowadays considered the home of Islamic 
banking practice, regulations, research, innovation and scholarship. Currently, it 
hosts the largest number of Islamic financial institutions and other supporting 
bodies in the world. The Islamic banking assets in Bahrain represent 93% of total 
Islamic banking assets (Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report 2016) 
and its 33 Islamic financial institutions raised a total capital of USD 2.24 billion 
in 2006 (Khan and Bhatti, 2008). 
In Egypt, Faisal Bank was launched in 1979 and it now constitutes one of 
the country’s biggest financial institutions.  
The National Commercial Bank, also known as AlAhli Bank, is the leading 
bank in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the largest bank by assets in the Arab world 
and one of the world pioneers in Islamic banking and finance. It was formed in 
1953 by Royal Decree as a general partnership (Lone and Alshehri, 2015). Later, 
the Islamic Development Bank was launched in 1975. Nowadays, many banks in 
Saudi Arabia are restructuring their operations along Islamic lines. Bank Al Jazira 
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has recently completed its gradual conversion into a fully Islamic entity (Khan and 
Bhatti, 2008). Al Rajhi is the third-largest Saudi bank, and the world's largest 
Islamic financial institution with total assets of USD 33.3 billion recorded at the 
end of 2007 (Tabash and Dhanakar, 2014).  
Dubai Islamic Bank, established in 1975, is the first Shariah-compliant 
Islamic bank in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). At present, it has a network of 
30 branches across the country (Khan and Bhatti, 2008). There are three other fully 
dedicated Islamic banks in the UAE, namely, Sharjah Islamic Bank, Emirates 
Islamic Bank and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank. Sharjah Islamic Bank started serving 
the general public in 1975 and converted to Islamic banking in 2002.  
In Qatar, the Qatar Islamic Bank was founded in 1982. It was established 
with a paid-up capital of QAR 25 million. In 1989, the Qatar Islamic Bank 
introduced its 30%-owned subsidiary, Al Jazeera Finance, thus introducing 
Qatar’s first Islamic non-bank financial institution. Qatar’s second Islamic bank, 
Qatar International Islamic Bank, was established in a period of economic 
slowdown and extensive budget revision by the Qatari government following the 
fall in oil prices in 1986, and it was the only bank established until 1993 (Qatar 
Islamic Finance Report, 2017).  
Kuwait hosts the largest number of Islamic financial institutions. It has been 
ranked third in terms of global Islamic banking assets, holding 10.1% of the total 
in 2016 (World Islamic Banking Competitiveness Report 2016). Its first Islamic 
bank, Kuwait Finance House, was established in 1977, and it is one of the largest 
institutions providing Islamic banking services worldwide. In the first decade of 
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the new millennium, two Islamic banks were opened: Boubyan Bank, opened in 
2004 under Islamic Banking Law No. 33 of 2003; and Bank Warba, established in 
2009. The National Bank of Kuwait and some other conventional banks also offer 
a wide range of Islamic financial products and services (Khan and Bhatti, 2008).  
Jordan Islamic Bank was established in 1978, as a public shareholding 
limited company, to carry out all kinds of banking, financing and investment 
business operations in compliance with the Islamic Shariah. In 1997, another 
Islamic bank, Islamic International Arab Bank, was launched. In 2010, Safwa 
Islamic Bank began operations, in accordance with Islamic Shariah principles and 
the instructions of the Central Bank of Jordan and the Banking Law of Jordan 
(Safwa Islamic Bank, website). 
In Sudan, Faisal Islamic Bank was officially registered in 1977. It is worth 
noting that in 1989, the government decided to change the whole banking system 
to an Islamic Banking system, in line with the Islamic orientation of the entire 
country. The first step was changing the regulation of the Central Bank of Sudan 
to became Islamic. The decision took effect in 1991 when the Bank of Sudan 
issued the Banking Business Act, which stated that all banking finance 
transactions for all banks in Sudan must be managed according to Shariah (Zaher 
and Hassan, 2001). 
In sum, within the Middle East region, two periods seem to be milestones 
in the Islamic finance industry. The first was the late 70s when the first Islamic 
banks were founded in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Egypt and 
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Jordan. The second was the spread of Islamic banks in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries. 
1.3.2. The emergence of Islamic banks in South Asian countries 
The Islamic banking industry is spreading throughout South Asia (SA) and 
has become a vital part of their financial markets. Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore aim to use Islamic banking and finance as a powerful tool to attract 
business and investments from the Middle East and Muslim world (Khan and 
Bhatti, 2008).  
In Malaysia, the presence of Islamic banking and financial services 
responds to the growing Muslim population in this country. The first Islamic 
organization was founded in 1963, when the Malaysian government launched the 
institution called Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji, whose main mission was to 
provide financial support to poor people wishing to make the pilgrimage to Mecca.  
Later, Bank Negara Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaysia) implemented the 
Islamic Banking Act of 1983. The case of the Public Islamic Bank in Malaysia is 
noteworthy in that it was initially launched as a conventional bank, it opened a 
window for Islamic products in 1993, and became a fully Islamic bank in 2008. 
Its total capital rose from 30 million Ringgit (RM) in 1993 to 2.6 billion RM in 
2013 (Venardos, 2005).  
Nowadays more than 10 Islamic banks operate in Malaysia, as reported by 
its central bank (Bank Negara Malaysia, Financial Stability and Payment Systems 
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Report 2015), and it has one of the most developed Islamic financial systems in 
the world (How et al., 2005).  
Although Indonesia has the largest Islamic population in South Asia, with 
around 205 million Muslims, its Islamic banking system is not as well developed 
as Malaysia’s (Khan and Bhatti, 2008). The history of Islamic banking in 
Indonesia dates back to 1990, when the Indonesian Jurist Council conference 
addressed Indonesian Muslims’ demand for an interest-free banking system 
provided by the banks operating in Indonesia. Two years later, the Central Bank 
of Indonesia issued new regulation (Banking Act No. 7/1992) allowing Islamic 
banks to open in the country. Three months later, Bank Muamalat Indonesia was 
opened, supported by the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals and a 
number of Muslim entrepreneurs. The share value of this bank rose exponentially 
between 1992 and 2014, with total assets growing from 12 million Indonesian 
rupiah in 2008 to 62 million in 2014 (Bank Muamalat Annual Report 2008, 2014). 
Since June 1990, commercial banks in Singapore have been able to deliver 
Islamic banking services. In 1998, some conventional banks opened Islamic 
windows (Gerrard and Cunningham, 1997). The Monetary Authority of Singapore 
joined the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) in Malaysia in 2005 and there 
are now six Islamic banks operating in Singapore, with OCBC Bank being the 
biggest.   
In recent years, Singapore has collaborated with Malaysia and Indonesia to 
become the international centre for Islamic financial services in view of the 
Chapter 1.- Islamic Finance 
15 
industry's success in Southeast Asia (Venardos, 2005; Gerrard and Cunningham, 
1997).  
In Brunei, the first Islamic bank, called Tabung Amanah Islam Brunei, was 
established in 1991 by Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah. In 2005, this bank merged 
with the Islamic Development Bank of Brunei to become the country’s largest 
bank and one of its flagship Islamic financial institutions.  
Since there is no central bank in Brunei, the banks are regulated under the 
Banking Act by the Ministry of Finance, through the Brunei Currency Board, the 
institution that monitors banks and financial companies (Ebrahim and Joo, 2001).  
In sum, there are four countries that have a well-developed Islamic financial 
industry, namely, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei, with Malaysia’s 
being the biggest in terms of financial assets. 
1.3.3. The emergence of Islamic Banks in Europe 
Islamic finance has established a link between Arab banks and European 
banks in Europe (Wilson, 2007). In the early 80s, the British government allowed 
some Islamic investments in London, with the first being Islamic Banking 
International Holding. It was not until 2004 that we witnessed the first Islamic 
bank in Europe, Islamic Bank of Britain. It was founded in the UK, with an 
authorised share capital of £5 million. By 2014, this capital had risen to 
£121,218,700 (Islamic Bank of Britain Annual Report 2004, 2014). 
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Later, the British government granted a licence to open Islamic windows in 
conventional banks such as HSBC Amanah, ABC International bank, Deutsch 
Bank and Citi Bank. Nowadays, there are 22 Islamic banks operating in the UK. 
However, this is not the only European country where Islamic financial 
assets have grown in recent years. In Italy, the deposits from Muslims in Islamic 
retail banking reached USD 5.8 billion and generated USD 218.8 million by 2015, 
and this figure is expected to rise to USD 33.4 billion by 2050 (Di Mauro et al., 
2013).   
We also find Islamic banks in other European countries: 3 in France, 4 in 
Switzerland, 2 in Germany, 1 in Luxembourg and 1 in Ireland. In 2013, the 
Research Centre of Studies in Economics and Islamic Finance was opened in 
Spain, with the main goal of opening communication between researchers, 
investors and various institutions interested in Islamic finance (Di Mauro et al., 
2013). 
1.4. Islamic financial activities  
There are five principles in Islamic finance that mark the point where it 
diverges from conventional finance (Chong and Liu, 2009; Azmat et el. 2015; 
Olson and Zoubi, 2017):  
• the prohibition of interest (usury) in all transactions;  
• the prohibition of ghara (excessive uncertainty) under which the details 
of the sale contract cannot be unknown or uncertain;  
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• the prohibition on financing illicit industries  
• the principle of profit-and-loss sharing;  
• all transactions have to be backed by a real economic transaction that 
involves a tangible asset;  
The implementation of these Islamic principles has shaped the economic 
transactions allowed under the Islamic perspective. Islamic financial services 
providers make use of contracts acceptable under traditional Islamic legal doctrine 
and adapt conventional financial contracts so that they are in compliance with the 
tenets of Shariah (Di Mauro et al., 2013). However, this procedure sometimes 
becomes complex and the institutions need the assistance of Shariah scholars 
(Solé, 2007). 
Following, we explain the main financial activities that the Islamic financial 
industry is currently delivering, namely, insurance services, mutual and collective 
investment funds and banking activities: 
• Takaful is the Arabic name for insurance based on Shariah rules; it literally 
means solidarity. An Islamic insurance policy is a collective protection 
scheme and it is an important part of the Islamic financial system (El-
Hawary et al., 2007). The participants in the Takaful pay a sum of money 
(tabarru’ in Arabic) to a mutual cooperative fund, which will be used for 
compensation should this be necessary. The Islamic insurance industry has 
expanded in recent years from USD 18.3 billion in 2013 to USD 23.2 billion 
in 2015 (Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report, 2013; 2015). 
Chapter 1.- Islamic Finance 
18 
• The Shariah guidelines and principles govern several aspects of an Islamic 
mutual fund, including its asset allocation (portfolio screening), investment 
and trading practices, and income distribution (Di Mauro et al., 2013; 
Maysami and Williams, 2006). Thus, the fund cannot be invested in 
conventional bonds, warrants, preferred stock, certificates of deposit and 
certain derivatives (Hoepner et al., 2011).  
• In the same vein, collective investment funds are managed under the 
principles of Shariah law. For instance, a sukuk can be considered an Islamic 
version of a conventional bond but the debt cannot be repaid at a specified 
interest rate given the prohibition on interest (Azmat et al.2017). While 
conventional bond issuers pay interest to investors at regular intervals, 
sukuk issuers avoid this type of interest since they are based on sharing 
profits and losses between the parties in a business transaction (Reboredo 
and Naifar, 2017). Rather, they are similar to a trust certificate with 
proportional or undivided interest in an asset or a pool of assets (Naifar et 
al., 2016). 
1.4.1. Islamic Bank activities 
The main differences between Islamic and conventional banks are rooted in 
the five principles and prohibitions of Shariah law, although some academics 
argue that Islamic and conventional banks are similar in the substance and 
different in the format (Beck et al., 2013).  
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The majority of Islamic banks perform two basic functions, namely, 
investment management and commercial banking (Karim, 2001), through the 
following banking contracts. 
1.4.2. Islamic bank contracts 
Under the principle of profit-and-loss sharing, the typical Islamic banking 
contracts are partnership loans between bank and borrowers, namely Mudarabah 
contracts (profit-sharing) and Musharakah contracts (joint venture). The common 
feature of these contracts is that the bank shares the risk with the depositor.   
Under Mudarabah contracts, the bank provides the entire capital needed 
for financing a project, while the customer offers his labour and expertise. The 
profits from the project are shared between the two (bank and customer), at a 
predetermined ratio; however, in the case of loss, it is exclusively borne by the 
bank (Beck et al., 2013; Khediri et al., 2015; Archer and Karim, 2012). The 
entrepreneur (Mudarib) has the ultimate control over the business, while the 
investment decisions, including the participation of other investors, should be 
approved by the bank (El-Hawary et at. 2004).  
Under Musharakah contracts (similar to a joint venture), the bank is not 
the sole provider of funds but rather more partners will contribute to financing the 
project. Profits and losses are shared between both parties (bank and partners) in 
proportion to the capital contributed. This contract is usually the instrument used 
to finance long-term investment projects (Hasan and Dridi, 2010). There are two 
types of Musharakah contract: the first is the Permanent Musharakah, according 
to which the bank's share in the capital is constant as long as the Musharakah 
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continues; the second is called Diminishing Musharakah, where the bank's share 
decreases gradually as a result of a gradual sale of its shares to the customer against 
the payment of instalments. Hence, the ownership of the project will be transmitted 
to the person or the company involved in this contract (Doumpos et al., 2017). The 
bank makes a profit by selling the share at a price higher than its original value.  
Through the Murabaha contract (mark-up) the bank purchases a single 
good, or a consignment of products, on behalf of a customer, who repays the cost 
plus a mark-up. Repayments, including the mark-up, are usually made according 
to a pre-arranged schedule from the bank (Vinnicombe, 2010).  
The main features of this contract are: (a) the cost and the mark-up must 
both be known to the bank and the client; (b) the bank must assume the ownership 
of the goods prior to reselling them to the client (bearing all the ownership risks 
in the interim); (c) the client’s promise to buy the goods purchased on his order by 
the bank may or may not be binding (in most jurisdictions it is binding); (d) no 
interest is imposed for late payments but the bank could require a collateral 
International Monetary Fund (2017, p.36). 
Istisna consists of a manufacturing contract which allows one party to 
obtain industrial goods with either an upfront cash payment and deferred delivery 
or deferred payment and delivery. The bank acts as intermediary; firstly, the bank 
agrees to receive payments from the client on a longer-term schedule and, 
secondly, the bank (as buyer) agrees to pay all expenses related to this commodity 
sold to the customer for a sum that includes a profit margin (Hussain et al., 2016). 
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The Ijarah contract is the Islamic version of renting and leasing contracts. 
While in both cases the client pays a certain fixed rent, only in the latter is the 
ownership transferred at the end of the specified period (Zaher and Hassan, 2001). 
However, according to International Monetary Fund (2017, p.11), the 
financing items, that is sales and lease-based contracts (Murabaha and Ijarah, 
respectively) account for about 70% of total assets. The profit-and-loss sharing 
contracts only account for 5% of Islamic banks’ aggregate assets and mostly 
comprise Musharakah contracts. However, there are some countries (e.g., 
Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan) with a higher level of profit-and-loss sharing 
contracts (PLS). In Iran and Indonesia, Musharakah contracts account for 29% and 
63%, respectively, while the corresponding figures in Pakistan and Sudan are 11% 
and 13%, respectively. Mudarabah contracts average around 5% of assets in 
Indonesia, Iran, and Sudan.  
1.5. Differences and similarities between Islamic and conventional 
bank operations 
To illustrate the influence of Shariah Law in the provision of banking services, we 
describe below the most common banking transactions in Islamic finance and the 
main differences with their conventional counterparts.  
Since it is not the ultimate goal of this thesis to compare Islamic and conventional 
banks, we do not attempt to present an exhaustive description of the differences 
between all the activities carried out by the two types of institutions. Rather, we 
aim to provide some insights in order to facilitate an understanding of the financial 
products offered by the Islamic banking industry. 
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1.5.1. Deposits 
The most common financial resources for Islamic banks are current 
accounts, investment accounts and issuing shares of common equity.  
The investment accounts are in most cases based on profit-sharing and loss-
bearing (Mudarabah contract). The bank (Mudarib) manages the funds on behalf 
of their holders (Archer and Karim, 2012) and the profits and losses are shared 
between the bank and the investment account holders. Conceptually, this means 
that the investment account holders’ risk is similar to that of the shareholders of 
the Islamic institution who bear the risk of losing their capital as investors. Hence, 
the Islamic bank, as mudarib, owes a fiduciary duty to the investment account 
holders under the Mudarabah contract, which is parallel with their duty to their 
shareholders. In consequence, they must provide investment account holders 
access to all relevant information in relation to their investment accounts. 
Typically, the bank offers several options, such as investing the money in a 
Restricted Investment Account, under the terms of which the depositors stipulate 
the period and the purpose of the investment (type of asset and economic sector). 
With the Mudarabah contract, the Islamic bank invests the funds of Restricted 
Investment Account holders in an asset pool that is separate from the bank’s own 
funds. The Restricted Investment Account holders do not have the right to interfere 
in the management of the funds; another agent is appointed by shareholders to 
manage and monitor their funds (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006).  
The second option is to invest in an Unrestricted Investment Account, where 
the depositors do not have the right to specify the purpose of the investment. The 
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customers authorize the bank to invest the funds under the Mudarabah contract in 
a manner in which the bank deems appropriate, without any restrictions as to 
where, how and for what purpose the funds should be invested. Under this 
arrangement, the bank can commingle the investment account holder’s funds with 
its own funds and with other funds with prior permission from the investors. The 
bank has the right to manage their funds like an agent and share the returns with 
them according to a predetermined ratio. However, with Unrestricted Investment 
Accounts, any losses incurred are borne by the holders, except in the case of 
mismanagement or manipulation on the part of the bank. The account holders have 
the option to withdraw their funds whenever they want, as long as they give notice 
to the bank before the withdrawal date (Kuwait Finance House Bank Annual 
Report, 2013, and Bank Negara Malaysia, 2014).  
The third option is for customers to keep their deposits in a Current Account, 
from which they can withdraw their deposits whenever they want (Iqbal et. al 
2002).  
In short, both Islamic and conventional banks handle their clients’ deposits, 
but there are some differences between them: Firstly, in conventional banks, the 
bank allows overdrafts on the current account and it will charge the depositors 
interest at a fixed rate, while Islamic banks do not offer their depositors overdraft 
facilities on current accounts. If the depositors face financial difficulties that are 
beyond their control, such as illness, the bank will offer them an interest-free loan 
(quard Hassan) (Iqbal et. al 2002). 
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1.5.2. Housing finance 
There are also some differences between Islamic and conventional banks 
when it comes to housing finance (mortgages): The customers that have taken on 
a mortgage with a conventional bank make monthly interest and repayment 
instalments, usually by direct debit from their current accounts into which their 
salaries or incomes are paid. These payments extend over a long period with 
interest charged at a rate that is either fixed for the duration of the loan or variable 
at a premium over interbank rates. The bank usually requires the clients to take 
out mortgage insurance, so that should the borrower dies during the mortgage 
repayment period, the insurance company will cover the full payment. 
In the case of housing finance, the Islamic bank uses the Diminishing 
Musharakah mode, whereby the bank buys the property on behalf of the clients 
and resells it at an agreed price (Iqbal et. al 2002; Wilson, 2007). The clients have 
to pay a percentage of the purchase price in cash and continue to pay the remaining 
amount over a determined period of time. At the end of the contract, the clients 
possess the property. 
1.5.3. Consumer finance 
Both Islamic and conventional banks finance clients’ purchase of durable 
goods (cars, furniture, among others). However, while conventional banks offer 
loans with fixed or variable interest over a short period of time, which the bank 
will take from their current accounts, Islamic banks buy the consumer durables 
and resell them to the clients on a hire-purchase (istisna contract); lease (ijarah 
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contract) basis and mark-up sales (murabaha contract) (Wilson, 2007; Chong and 
Liu, 2009; Iqbal et. al 2002). 
1.5.4. Small business finance  
Conventional banks often expand their investments by financing small 
businesses. The clients borrow the money with fixed or variable interest and they 
present guarantees to cover this loan (properties or other entities’ guarantees). If 
the client fails to pay, the bank will hold the property the client has presented as a 
guarantee until the customer pays the full loan.  
Islamic banks share the success of the enterprise with the clients 
(Musharakah or Mudarabah contract).  The bank strives to ensure the success of 
the venture because it will bear part of the losses (Iqbal et. al 2002). 
1.5.5. Financing of long-term loans 
The conventional bank offers companies or individual investors credit 
facilities over a long period with variable interest, and it gets guarantees from the 
customer. In the case of Islamic banks, this type of operation is rarely used, 
because of the risk and uncertainty related to this type of investment. Instead, the 
Islamic bank shares the investment with the company or individuals through a 
Musharakah, Mudarabah or Istisna contract. Frequently, rather than signing a 
long-term loan, the bank will offer the asset instead of the cash. 
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1.5.6. Savings accounts 
From the Islamic perspective, the savings account is an account in which 
the client (who owes the money) shares the profits of their investments with the 
bank (who is responsible for investing the funds by means consistent with Islamic 
law). The distribution of profits between the bank and the client is made on the 
basis of the rate of profit declared by the bank every six months. Any losses 
incurred are borne by the clients.  
The savings accounts in Islamic banks are designed specifically to meet the 
needs and requirements of the customers who authorize the bank to invest their 
money deposited under a Mudarabah contract (Iqbal et. al 2002).  
The difference between savings accounts in Islamic banks and conventional 
banks is that the clients in Islamic banks have the right to decide whether or not to 
invest their money and can withdraw the money at any time without receiving any 
interest. In conventional banks, on the other hand, the clients receive interest on 
their deposits and they cannot withdraw their deposits at any time; they must give 
the bank notice before withdrawing (some banks require three months’ notice and 
others six months). 
1.5.7. Islamic bonds 
The Islamic bond or Sukuk differs from the conventional bond in that the 
debt cannot be repaid at a specified interest rate given the prohibition on interest 
(Azmat et al., 2017). Sukuk is based on sharing profits and losses between the 
parties in a business transaction (Reboredo and Naifar, 2017) and is defined 
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officially by the Auditing and Accounting Organization of Islamic Financial 
Institutions as ‘‘certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in 
ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services or in ownership of the asset of 
a particular project or special investment activity” (Shariah standard No.17).  
The Auditing and Accounting Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions 
stardard distinguishes sukuk from stocks, bonds and the conventional process of 
securitization, emphasizing that sukuk are not debt certificates with a financial 
claim to cash flow and also underlining that they may not be issued on a pool of 
receivables. Rather, they are similar to a trust certificate with proportional or 
undivided interest in an asset or a pool of assets (Naifar et al.2016). The Islamic 
bonds increased from USD 245.3 USD billion in 2013 to USD 290.6 USD billion 
in 2015 (Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report 2013 and 2015).  
To sum up, by comparing Islamic and conventional banks, we can conclude 
that both institutions have the same goal, which is to generate profits through 
different type of contracts over short or long periods.  
Additionally, in conventional banks, the depositors borrow money 
(typically, short- and long-term loans and overdrafts) from the bank to finance 
their business at a pre-determined interest rate. If clients default on their 
repayments, the bank will charge them, without considering whether the 
depositors’ business is successful. Conversely, the Islamic bank does not offer 
loans; the only loan that they are allowed to offer is an interest-free loan called 
qarad Hassan, for charitable purposes, such as to help people suffering from an 
illness or to help students fund their studies.  
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To summarize the abovementioned activities and illustrate the typical 
transactions of an Islamic Bank, in Figure 1.1 we present the most common items 
included on its Balance Sheet:  
Figure 1. 1: Islamic Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets Equity and Liabilities 
Cash and balance with Central banks 
Islamic financing and Investing assets 
• Mudarabah contracts 
• Musharakah contracts  
• Istisna contracts 
Investment properties  
• Ijarah  
• Murabaha contracts  
Investments in Islamic bonds (Sukuk).  
Ijarah rental receivables 
Liabilities 
Customer deposits:   
• Current accounts 
• Unrestricted investment accounts  
• Restricted investment accounts 
Placements from financial institutions 
Sukuk issued 
Payable Zakat 




• Retained earnings 
 
Islamic banks are investment and retail or consumer banks. They provide 
services to the general public, such as savings or transactional accounts, as well as 
housing and consuming finance (Ijarah and Murabaha contracts). However, they 
also deliver financial services to companies, other banks or governmental 
institutions through Mudarabah and Musharaka contracts.  
The provision of Islamic financial products is offered not only through 
Islamic financial institutions, but also through the “dual-window concept”, which 
is an “Islamic window” opened in a conventional bank (Amin et al., 2011). 
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Another distinguishing feature of Islamic banks is the Zakat. Originally, it 
consisted of the private donations made by Muslims to help poor people meet their 
urgent needs. This Zakat was distributed by the Muslim Money House. It has since 
become an expense deducted from financial operations in Islamic banks. Through 
a special social committee, the Islamic bank allocates the Zakat to the poor and to 
people who have urgent needs (illness, marriage or tuition fees).  
1.6. The current state of the Islamic banking industry 
There has been a rapid expansion of Islamic financial institutions in recent 
decades. Between 2008 and 2014, the total Islamic banking assets of 59 banks in 
11 markets expanded at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 15.4%. 
Figure 1.2. illustrates the growth in assets in Islamic banks from USD 600 
billion in 2008 to approximately USD 1.5 trillion in the first half of 2015 
(1H2015). 
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Figure 1. 2: Islamic Banking Assets Growth Trend (2008–2015) 
 
Source: Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report (2016) 
However, according to the Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability 
Report (2016), the growth rate during this period is uneven. It reached 17.1% 
between 2008 and 2011, falling to 13.8% in the last three years (2011–2014). The 
growth rate between 2013 and 2014 barely reached double digits, at 10%. There 
has, however, been something of a revival in 2015: the first six months of the year 
registered a 7.96% growth in assets.  
The slowdown in asset growth is attributable to several factors, with 
variations across countries, including the exchange rate depreciation in emerging 
markets, the slowdown in global economic growth performance, prolonged low 
energy prices and generally weaker investor and consumer confidence in the 
global economy.  
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Table 1.3 illustrates the growth rate for the period 2014-2016 in different 
economic and geographical regions. 
Table 1. 1: Islamic Banking Assets by Region (2014 – 2016, USD billion) 
Region 2014 2015 2016 
Growth rate 
(2014-16) 
Asia 192.30 209.30 218.60 13.68% 
GCC 490.30 598.80 650.80 32.74% 
MENA 518.30 607.50 540.50 4.28% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 20.60 24.00 26.60 29.13% 
Others 62.20 56.90 56.90 -8.52% 
Total 1,283.70 1,496.50 1,493.40 16.34% 
 
Source: Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report (2014, 2015 and 2016) 
Regarding the distribution among economic regions (Table 1.3), the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries exhibit the highest growth rate with 
32.74%, followed by the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (29.13%) and Asian 
countries. The Middle East and North Africa excluding GCC countries (MENA) 
are fourth in the ranking with a 4.28% growth rate.  
The banking assets distribution by geographical region (Figure 1.4) shows 
that almost half of the banking assets are owned by the GCC countries, followed 
by the MENA region. In Asia, the percentage is also high, with 15% of the total 
assets located in this region. 
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Figure 1. 3: Islamic Banking Assets distribution by region in 2016 
 
Figure 1.5 displays the assets distribution by country in 2016. Iran 
represents the largest share of Islamic banking assets, accounting for 37.3% of the 
global Islamic banking industry. It is followed by Saudi Arabia with almost half 
of Iran’s share (19.0%). Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have 
similar shares, with 9.3% and 8.1%, respectively. They are followed by Kuwait 
(5.9%) and Qatar (5.1%), with the remaining countries responsible for less than 
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Figure 1. 4: Distribution of Islamic Banking Assets by countries in 2016 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
COPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ISLAMIC 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to identify the associations, if any, between 
CG mechanisms in Islamic banks and their performance. Thus, the main aim of 
this chapter is to present a brief review of the CG concept, the main CG structures 
and the monitoring mechanisms in both conventional and Islamic banking firms. 
To that end, we discuss the concept of CG and review the main 
characteristics of CG in conventional banking. Then, we explain the specific 
features of CG in Islamic financial institutions to provide a better understanding 
of the role of the Shariah board as an essential body for ensuring good governance 
in these institutions. 
2.2. Corporate governance definitions 
The term CG has gained prominence in recent decades, but even though a 
substantial volume of literature has become available on the subject (Claessens 
and Yurtoglu, 2013), its ramifications have yet to be fully spelled out.  
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The most widely-used definition of CG is "the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled" (Cadbury Committee, 1992). This definition 
implicitly relates to the existence of conflicts of interest between insiders and 
company management on the one hand, and outsiders, on the other. Such conflicts 
arise from the separation of ownership and control. 
John and Senbet (1998) provide a more comprehensive definition of CG 
when they explain that it is the system under which stakeholders of a corporation 
exercise control over corporate insiders and management such that their interests 
are protected. They include all stakeholders, not just shareholders, even non-
financial stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, customers and other 
interested parties.  
In the same vein, the definition given by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (2004) embraces all parties when it states 
that CG is the “set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, 
its shareholders and other stakeholders”. This definition could be considered as 
“value neutral” because it does not indicate the objective of CG, which is to be 
value oriented.  
Bhatti et al. (2010) recall the definition given by former World Bank 
President James Wolfensohn, which emphasized the ethical aspect of CG by 
indicating that the ultimate goal of such structures is to ensure “fairness” to all 
stakeholders, through greater transparency and accountability. In the case of 
shareholders, fairness may also be taken to imply a “fair” growth in the value of 
their equity. 
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This value-oriented definition of CG is crucial for the understanding of the 
Shariah governance system required in Islamic financial institutions, which we 
present below. 
2.3. The role of Islamic religion in the governance of Islamic 
Financial Institutions 
The Islamic economy emerges in response to the social commitments and 
ethical norms established under Shariah law, which originates from the Muslim 
holy book (Quran) and the actions of the prophet Mohammed (Sunnah). In this 
vein, the main reason for the development and spread of Islamic financial 
institutions around the world is to make it easier for the Muslim population to 
comply with the Quran and the Sunnah. The Shariah, as a code of conduct, 
encourages people to be honest and fair in their business activities (Abu-Tapanjeh, 
2009; Syed and Metcalfe, 2015).  
The main aim of Islamic banks is not only to seek profits for shareholders, 
but also to perform a wealth redistribution role and adhere to the principle of social 
justice that contributes to the improvement and well-being of society. They thus 
strive to achieve a balance between providing sufficient returns to their 
shareholders and depositors on the one hand, and their commitments to their social 
responsibilities and various stakeholders, on the other (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; 
Khan, 2010).  
Thus, an important factor generating major differences between CG in 
conventional and Islamic banks is that while the objective of the former is to 
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maximize shareholder profits, the main goal of the latter is to safeguard the welfare 
of every level of society at the same time as maximizing benefits (Abdullah et 
al.2015). 
Abdullah et al. (2015) conclude that the governance model in the Islamic 
financial system is designed to protect the rights of all parties. 
To achieve this goal, the CG mechanisms in Islamic financial institutions 
monitor the executive managers to ensure that: 
They provide only the ex-ante approved products and services conforming 
to Islamic law; 
They help their employees to adhere to moral principles rather than personal 
interests and greed.  
They promote collective actions from all stakeholders to improve the bank's 
reputation and to benefit all parties 
In addition, the Holy Quran calls for consultation between Muslims to 
identify their needs and problems and to find solutions:  
 “Those who hearken to their Lord, and establish regular Prayer; who 
(conduct) their affairs by mutual Consultation” (Holy Quran, Surah, Alshura: 
verse 38).  
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Hence, under the Shura (consulting) principle, which emphasizes the role 
of the individual in society, all stakeholders in the bank are given full rights and 
responsibility to participate and convey their ideas about how to ensure better CG. 
To achieve those objectives, Islamic banks are subject to a multi-level 
governance system, with religious elements playing a notable role in the 
governance structure. Below, we present the main characteristics of the Shariah 
governance system that is required in every Islamic financial institution. 
2.4. Shariah Governance System  
All Islamic financial institutions must implement a Shariah governance 
system, and the particular structure of this system is a distinguishing feature of 
Islamic business organizations (Quttainah 2013). 
The IFSB has defined the Shariah governance system in the following 
terms: 
“Shariah Governance System refers to the set of institutional and 
organizational arrangements through which an Institution offering Islamic 
financial services ensures that there is effective independent oversight of Shariah 
compliance" 2 
                                                 
2 IFSB-10 (December 2009) Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions offering Islamic 
Financial Services. 
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CG in Islamic institutions is unique (Safieddine, 2009), in that they are 
guided by a particular control body, namely, the Shariah Supervisory Board 
(SSB). 
According to Principle 3 on CG defined by the IFSB: 
“Institutions offering Islamic financial services shall have in place an 
appropriate mechanism for obtaining rulings from Shariah scholars, applying 
fatwa and monitoring Shariah compliance in all aspects of their products, 
operations and activities” 3 . 
The SSB monitors and controls the board of directors and executive 
managers to ensure that they only provide the ex-ante approved products and 
services. The Shariah board helps Islamic banks to adhere to principles of morality 
and ethics rather than personal interests and greed.  Figure 1 depicts a schematic 
representation of the roles, functions and relationships of key organs in Islamic 
financial institutions and illustrates the Shariah governance framework. 
  
                                                 
3 IFSB-3, (December 2006) Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance for Institutions offering only Islamic 
Financial Services, Excluding Islamic Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds.  
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Figure 2. 1: General Model of the Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial 
Institutions 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia (Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions, p.8). 
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The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI), based in the Kingdom of Bahrain, and the IFSB in 
Malaysia are the two main standard-setters for Islamic financial institutions. Both 
of these bodies have compiled a list of guiding principles for Shariah governance. 
These standards refer to the appointment, composition and tasks of the SSB, 
with the main requirements being independence, competence, confidentiality, 
consistency, and disclosure. According to the IFSB (IFSB-10, December 2009) 
and the AAOIFI (AAOIFI No. 1, 1997), the SSB should consist of at least three 
members who are recommended by the board of directors before they are 
appointed by the shareholders of the Islamic bank. 
These members are religious Shariah scholars with experience in the field 
of accounting and finance. They might issue fatwas (legal opinions) according to 
Islamic law on commercial transactions (fiqh al-muamalat)4 within the Islamic 
religion. The SSB meets several times a year. 
Despite the guidelines issued by the AAOIFI and the IFSB, there is a wide 
range of Shariah governance models in terms of both the implementation of those 
governance codes (on a voluntary basis in many countries) and the presence of a 
Shariah authority at national level. We present these different models in the 
following section. 
                                                 
4 Fiqh is knowledge of the legal rule pertaining to conduct, which has been derived from specific evidence in the 
Shariah. Fiqh al-muamalat is a branch of Islamic jurisprudence that deals with commercial and business activities 
in an economy. 
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2.5. Shariah Governance regulation 
The Shariah board can be categorized at the macro and the micro levels. At 
the macro level, in some countries, such as Malaysia, there is a Shariah board 
attached to the central bank or at regulatory authority level. Shariah boards at this 
level play a significant role in terms of harmonization and standardization of 
fatwas. Moreover, they act as the highest Shariah authority for Islamic financial 
institutions. 
At the micro level, it is compulsory for every Islamic financial institution to 
establish a Shariah board. The micro-level Shariah board has responsibilities such 
as participating in product development and structuring activities, reviewing and 
approving matters related with Shariah, issuing fatwa and Shariah auditing. 
Regarding the internal auditing function of the Shariah, according to 
AAOIFI Governance Standard (1999) No. 3, part of Shariah governance involves 
establishing an internal Shariah compliance system: “the internal Shariah review 
shall be carried out by an independent division/department or part of the internal 
audit department, depending on the size of the Islamic financial institution”. 
In the same vein, the IFSB in Malaysia recommends establishing an Internal 
Compliance Department in every Islamic financial institution, in addition to the 
Shariah board. This department is responsible for customers’ day-to-day questions 
about Islamic products, Islamic transactions and matters of religious principles. 
The employees working in this department have experience in finance and are well 
versed in questions of Islamic law. 
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Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) offers a comparison of Islamic CG principles and the 
revised OECD principles5. He concludes that the OECD principles have been 
successfully implemented and are a very effective CG tool compared to Islamic 
CG principles. Conversely, Grassa (2013) finds that national Shariah authorities 
need to play a greater role in monitoring and ensuring a well-adapted CG practice 
in Islamic financial institutions. Additionally, this author asserts that international 
Islamic financial organizations should make further efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of the Shariah governance system and to persuade other 
organizations to adopt it.  
There is a wide variety of Shariah governance models across countries. 
Below, we classify all countries of the sample into two categories: those countries 
with high regulatory intervention and a national Shariah authority (that is, a 
centralized model); and countries where the national Shariah authority is either 
non-existent or is only required to solve disputes among the Shariah boards of 
different Islamic banks (the decentralized model). 
2.5.1. Shariah governance regulation at the national level  
The map of Shariah governance systems presents considerable diversity. 
First, we present and comment on the regulatory specifications in countries where 
the Shariah Committee plays a significant role at the national level.  
  
                                                 
5 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004. 
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Malaysia 
This model is considered the most comprehensive of all the national models. 
In 1997, the Central Bank of Malaysia (Negara Bank) established the national 
Shariah Advisory Council on Islamic banking and other Islamic institutions, such 
as Islamic insurance institutions (Takaful) and Islamic collective investment 
schemes, which are based on Shariah principles. All such activities are supervised 
and regulated by the Negara Bank. 
The Shariah Advisory Council is the highest authority on Islamic finance in 
Malaysia under section 51 of the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009. The 
president of the country appoints this board on the advice of the Minister of finance 
after consultation with the central bank. It consists of 10 members, all of whom 
are qualified Shariah scholars or experts in Shariah and banking, finance and law.  
The Shariah Advisory Council is responsible for validating all Islamic financial 
products to ensure their compatibility with Shariah principles. The courts also 
refer to this Council in disputes involving Shariah issues in Islamic banking and 
financial cases. 
The Shariah Advisory Council operates as an independent body and its 
members are not allowed to work in any Shariah Committee in any Islamic 
financial institutions, in order to avoid conflicts of interest. 
The main role of the Shariah Advisory Council is: 
• To advise the central bank on any Shariah issues relating to Islamic financial 
business, activities or transactions it makes. 
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• To ascertain the Islamic law on any financial matters. 
• To advise to any Islamic financial institutions about Shariah matters. 
• To issue Shariah legal opinions (fatwas). 
Indonesia  
The Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21 of 2008 establishes a national 
Shariah Banking Committee. It is a forum comprising experts in the field of 
Islamic commercial jurisprudence, as well as economic, financial, and banking 
experts. 
The Indonesian Ulema Council issues the fatwas relating to banking 
operations (Grass, 2015) and the Shariah Banking Committee is tasked with 
assisting the Bank of Indonesia in implementing those fatwas. 
The Bank of Indonesia is a member of the AAOIFI in Bahrain and is 
therefore encouraged to refer to AAOIFI pronouncements, but they are not 
compulsory. 
Pakistan 
Following the Regulatory Framework issued in 2016, the State Bank of 
Pakistan has appointed its own Shariah board composed of six members: three 
Shariah scholars; a chartered accountant; a lawyer; and one other member, namely, 
Chapter 2.- Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions 
47 
the Director of the Islamic Banking Department at the State Bank of Pakistan, 
representing the bankers. 
All board members, excluding the ex-officio member, have a term of two 
years and are eligible for reappointment. The main role of this board is as follows 
(Grass, 2015): 
• To review and approve as Shariah compliant the products/services 
developed by the State Bank of Pakistan. 
• To advise the State Bank of Pakistan on regulations developed for the 
Islamic banking sector. 
• To approve proper criteria for the appointment of Islamic financial 
institutions’ Shariah advisors. 
• To advise the State Bank of Pakistan on the Shariah ruling in cases of 
conflict arising from the Shariah audit of Islamic financial institutions’ 
activities. 
• To advise the State Bank of Pakistan on the Shariah rulings in cases of 
conflicting Shariah opinions on Islamic banking products. 
Brunei Darussalam 
In 2006, Negara Brunei Darussalam established the Shariah Financial 
Supervisory Board as the authority tasked with ascertaining Islamic law for the 
purpose of Islamic financial business. The board consists of: 
• the permanent secretary, Minister of Finance ex-officio, who is the 
chairman; 
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• the Mufti of the kingdom ex-officio; and 
• no fewer than six other persons. 
The Sultan appoints the board members on the recommendation of the 
religious council. Of the six appointed members, at least four have to be Shariah 
scholars and experts in Islamic finance, and the other two have to be Muslims 
experienced in banking, economics, finance, law or any other related discipline. 
All members are appointed for a period of three years. 
The board should have no fewer than six meetings during the year (Negara 
Brunei Darussalam, Supplement to Government Gazette, Part II, 2006). This 
board has a mandate to ascertain the Islamic law on any financial matter, to issue 
rulings on matters referred to it, and to advise on any Shariah issues relating to 
Islamic financial business, activities or transactions. 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
Art. 5 Federal Law No. 6 of 1985 of the Central Bank of UAE requires the 
establishment of a Higher Shariah Authority to supervise Islamic banks, financial 
institutions and investment companies. It is the ultimate authority in Shariah 
matters in Islamic banking and finance and is attached to the Ministry of Justice 
and Islamic affairs. 
Recently, the UAE Government, the Central Bank of the UAE and the UAE 
Banks Federation worked together to set up the guidelines for a Higher Shariah 
Authority. As a result, in May 2016, the Government launched the Higher Shariah 
Authority as a national regulator to set standards for Islamic finance products. 
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Sudan 
In 1992, the government established the High Shariah Supervisory Board at 
the central bank to ensure the compatibility of financial practices with Islamic 
principles (Art. 7 of 1992 Act). The Bank of Sudan Act (2003) specifically 
stipulates that the bank will abide by Islamic Shariah principles in the performance 
of its duties and objectives and in the exercise of its functions and supervision of 
the banking systems (Hamza, 2013). 
The body is a centralized national Shariah advisory council and is the sole 
authority in matters pertaining to Islamic finance with the power to issue religious 
opinions (fatwas). 
The High Shariah Supervisory Board oversees the Shariah Supervisory 
Boards of Islamic banks and it has the final decision in cases where there are 
different opinions on an issue specific to banking. It also acts as an intermediary 
in disputes between various Islamic Banks and the Bank of Sudan (The Banking 
Business Act, 2003, Chapter III). 
The High Shariah Supervisory Board includes 11 members, the majority of 
whom are Shariah scholars. All members are appointed by the President of the 
country on the recommendation of the Bank of Sudan’s governor and the Minister 
of Finance. The members are allowed to sit on both the High Shariah Supervisory 
Board and the Shariah boards of Islamic banks. 
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Main functions of the Shariah board at the national level 
Under the centralized approach, there is a Shariah board in the governance 
structure of the Central Bank. Each Islamic Bank has its own Shariah board, but it 
must comply with the rules set by the Shariah board of the Central Bank. 
This model is used in Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Brunei Darussalam, 
UAE and Sudan. 
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Table 2. 1: Shariah Committee regulation at national level 
Country Banking regulation Name Attached 
to 




Qualifications required Functions 
Malaysia Laws of Malaysia, Act 701. 
Central Bank of Malaysia Act 






The President of 
the country on 
the advice of the 
Minister after 
consultation 
with the Central 
Bank 
10 Qualified in Shariah or 
experts in Shariah and 




Advise Central Bank on any Shariah issues relating to 
Islamic financial business, activities or transactions 
made by the Central Bank. 
 
Ascertain Islamic law on any financial matters. 
 
Advise any Islamic financial institutions about Shariah 
matters. 
 
Issue the Shariah legal opinions (fatwas) 
Indonesia Act of the Republic of 
Indonesia number 21 of 2008 










11 Comprising experts in 




Economic, financial and 
banking experts 
Assist the Bank of Indonesia in implementing fatwas 
issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council 
 
Develop Shariah banking 


















State Bank of 
Pakistan 
6 Three Shariah scholars, 
one lawyer, one 
accountant and one 
banker. 
Review and approve as Shariah compliant the 
products/instruments developed by the State Bank of 
Pakistan. 
 
Approve the fit and proper criteria for the appointment 
of institutions’ Shariah board members. 
 
Advise the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in case of any 
difference of opinion between an Islamic banking 
institution  and the SBP inspection. 
 
Perform such other functions as may be assigned from 
time to time, by the SBP. 
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 Table 2. 1: Shariah Committee regulation at national level (cont.) 
Country Banking regulation Name Attached 
to 









Negara Brunei Darussalam 
established, Supplement to 











The Sultan on 
the 
recommendation 
of the Religious 
Council.  
8 At least four Shariah 
scholars and experts 




finance, law or any 
other related 
discipline.  
Ascertain the Islamic law on any financial matter in any 
financial institutions 
Issue rulings on matters referred to it 
Advise on any Shariah issues relating to Islamic 
financial business, activities or transactions 
UAE Central Bank of the U.A.E, 
Federal Law No. 6 of 1985, 
Regarding Islamic Banks, 











cabinet decision  
Not 
specified 
Shariah scholars and 
experts on the banking 
system 
Oversee banks, financial institutions and Islamic 
investment companies to verify the legitimacy of their 
transactions in accordance with the provisions of Shariah 
law 
 
Express opinions on the issues presented from Islamic 
institutions during the exercise of their activities  
Sudan The Banking Business Act, 








The President of 
the country on 
the 
recommendation 
of the Bank of 
Sudan’s 





Shariah science, and 
experts in economics, 
exchange and law; 
provided that the 
majority of them are 
Shariah scientists. 
Issue the legal opinions about Shariah matters for the 
Central Bank any other Islamic institutions.  
 
Assist the technical control organs at the financial 
institutions, in performing the tasks in accordance with 
the ordinances of Islamic Shariah.  
 
Assist the research administrations and sections to 
promote scientific research and encourage publication.  
 
Consider and solve any Shariah disputes arising between 
the financial institutions about Shariah matters. 
 
Any other functions, as the Commission may deem 
necessary to meet the objectives. 
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From Table 2.1., we can see that the Shariah board is an independent body 
of the Central Bank whose members are either qualified Shariah scholars or 
experts in economics, finance, law or banking—or both. The main responsibilities 
of the Shariah Committee at the national level are the following: 
1. Advise the Central Bank on Shariah issues  
2. Issue legal religious opinions (fatwas) on financial matters 
3. Review and approve the Shariah compliant financial products 
4. Assist the Shariah Supervisory Boards in every Islamic bank  
5. In some cases (Malaysia, Pakistan and Indonesia), the Shariah 
Committee either approves or recommends appointments to Islamic 
financial institutions’ Shariah boards. 
2.5.2. Shariah board regulation at the Islamic financial institution level 
2.5.2.1. Countries with a centralized model 
As depicted in Table 2.1, under this approach, Shariah boards in Islamic 
financial institutions have an advisory function in their bank’s business operations. 
They also endorse Shariah compliance manuals for the institution and submit 
annual reports to the board of directors on its Shariah compliance. 
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Below, we specify the regulatory framework and the main functions of the 
Shariah board at the financial institution level for those countries with a centralized 
model. 
Malaysia 
Bank Negara Malaysia has published the Guidelines on the Governance of 
Shariah Committee for the Islamic Financial Institutions (2004). These guidelines 
require every Islamic financial institution to establish a Shariah Committee and 
define the relationship and working arrangements between a Shariah Committee 
and the Shariah Advisory Council of Bank Negara Malaysia. 
The board of directors, on the recommendation of a nomination committee, 
should appoint the members of the Shariah Committee. The board of directors 
should then submit their applications for appointments to the Shariah Advisory 
Council of Bank Negara Malaysia. This appointment is valid for a renewable term 
of two years. 
The Shariah Committee shall consist of a minimum of three members, one 
of whom is the Officer, a Shariah scholar, who will serve as the secretariat to the 
Shariah Committee. The main duties and responsibilities of the Shariah 
Committee according to the Guidelines on the Governance of Shariah Committee 
for the Islamic Financial Institutions of Bank Negara Malaysia (2004) are: 
• To advise the Board on Shariah matters in its business operations. 
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• To endorse Shariah compliance manuals (specifying the manner in which a 
submission or request for advice be made to the Shariah Committee). 
• To ensure that Islamic financial institutions’ products comply with Shariah 
principles. 
• To assist related parties with advice on Shariah matters on request. 
• To advise the Islamic financial institution to consult the Shariah Advisory 
Council on any Shariah matters. 
• To prepare written Shariah opinions in some circumstances (e.g., when the 
Islamic financial institution refers to the Shariah Advisory Council or when 
it submits an application for approval of a new product to Bank Negara 
Malaysia). 
Indonesia 
Although Indonesia does not yet have a Shariah Governance Framework, 
according to Art. 32 of Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21 of 2008, all Islamic 
banks and conventional commercial banks with Islamic windows must implement 
an SSB. The SSB is appointed at the General Meeting of the shareholders, on the 
recommendation of the national Shariah Committee called the Indonesian Ulema 
Council. 
The task of the SSB is to give advice and recommendations to the board of 
directors and supervise the bank activities to ensure that they are in accordance 
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with Shariah principles (Act of the Republic of Indonesia No. 21 of 2008 
concerning Shariah (Islamic) Banking). 
The Indonesian Ulema Council issues the fatwas relating to banking 
operations (Grass, 2015). They coordinate with the Bank of Indonesia, which is a 
member of the AAOIFI in Bahrain. The Bank of Indonesia, as a member of this 
organization, is encouraged to refer to AAOIFI pronouncements, but they are not 
compulsory. 
Pakistan 
Every Islamic bank is required to have a Shariah board comprising at least 
three Shariah scholars appointed by the board of directors. The appointment of the 
Shariah board members is subject to prior written clearance of the State Bank of 
Pakistan. The Shariah board is empowered to consider, decide and supervise all 
Islamic bank operations. Therefore, all decisions, rulings, and fatwas of the 
national Shariah Committee are compulsory, and the individual Shariah boards 
must implement them. Each individual Shariah board is responsible and 
accountable for all its Islamic bank’s Shariah-related decisions (State Bank of 
Pakistan, Instructions for Shariah Compliance in Islamic Banking Institutions, 
Annex 1 of IBD Circular No. 2 of 2008). 
Islamic banks may, in consultation with the Shariah board, also seek the 
services of or engage lawyers, accountants, economists and other professionals to 
assist and advise the Shariah board on banking, legal, financial, economic and 
other relevant matters. The engagement of such members is however of an 
advisory nature and they do not have any voting rights in the meetings of the 
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Shariah board (State Bank of Pakistan, Shariah Governance Framework for 
Islamic Banking Institutions, IBD Circular No. 3 of 2014). 
Brunei Darussalam 
An internal Shariah Advisory Body within each Islamic financial institution 
is comprised of at least three members, all of whom must be religious scholars. 
The role of this board is to ensure that all bank operations comply with Shariah 
law (Laws of Brunei, chapter 168, Islamic banking arrangement of sections, 1999). 
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
The SSB in every financial institution consists of at least three members, 
appointed by the board of directors. The role of this board is to review all bank 
activities and ensure their compliance with Shariah law (Central Bank of the 
U.A.E, Federal Law No. 6 of 1985, Regarding Islamic Banks, Financial 
Institutions and Investment companies). They follow the AAOIFI 
pronouncements, although it is not compulsory. 
Sudan 
 In Sudan, there is no specific regulation governing Shariah boards in 
Islamic financial institutions. 
2.5.2.2. Countries with a non-centralized model 
Under this structure, there is no effective national Shariah board at the level 
of the central bank.  Instead, there are only individual Shariah boards in each 
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Islamic Bank. Hence, the permissibility of contracts and the Shariah compliance 
of financial products is decided at the level of these institutions by their own 
Shariah Committees, because every Shariah board is independent of the central 
bank. This is the typical model implemented in some countries of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and certain other states. Such a model can be found in 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Bangladesh, Singapore, Thailand, 
Jordan and Indonesia. 
In some countries, the Shariah boards are influenced by the AAOIFI 
standards related to size, composition and meetings frequency (Song and 
Oosthuizen, 2014). 
Bahrain 
There is a Shariah board in the Central Bank of Bahrain but its supervisory 
role is limited to the products and transactions of the central bank and it does not 
cover individual Islamic institutions. The members of the National Shariah Board 
can also join the board of any other financial institution (Hamza, 2013; Grass, 
2015). 
The Central Bank of Bahrain requires all Islamic banks working in Bahrain 
to establish an independent Shariah Supervision Committee complying with the 
AAOIFI standards. Therefore, in every bank, the Shariah Supervisory Committee 
must comply with all AAOIFI accounting standards as well as Shariah 
pronouncements issued by the Shariah board of the AAOIFI (Khan, 2007). The 
SSB comprises at least three members appointed at the shareholders’ annual 
general meeting, on the recommendation of the board of directors (Central Bank 
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of Bahrain, Islamic Banks, Part A, High Level Standards of Shariah Governance, 
2017). 
The Shariah Supervisory Committee members are specialized in Islamic 
commercial jurisprudence (fiqh al-muamalat). The main role of this board is: 
• To monitor and review transactions to ensure full compliance with Shariah 
law. 
• To approve the internal Shariah audit annual plans. 
• To notify the Central Bank of Bahrain in case of any failure by the board of 
directors to effectively deal with any major Shariah non-compliance. 
• To review all relevant documentation for new products and services. 
• To review and approve Islamic bank annual charity (Zakat) calculations on 
behalf of the shareholders. 
• Submit annual reports on Shariah oversight to the board of directors 
Qatar 
In the Qatar model, there is no Shariah Advisory Board in the Qatar Central 
Bank. Nevertheless, in accordance with Art. 106 of Qatar Central Bank Law 
(2013), an independent consultation board referred to as the Shariah Supervisory 
Board must be formed in each Islamic financial institution in order to supervise 
the institution’s activities.  
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The SSB must have no fewer than three members and should be appointed 
by the institution’s general assembly on the recommendations of the board of 
directors. The appointment of the Shariah board members is restricted to a 
renewable term of three years. The bank’s board of directors must inform the 
Central Bank of Qatar of its decision to appoint or dismiss the Shariah board 
members. The board consists of scholars specialized in jurisprudence, Islamic 
Shariah and financial operations, activities and services. 
There are independence restrictions because, according to Art. 107 of Qatar 
Central Bank Law, “A member of the Shariah board shall have no employment 
function at the Islamic financial institution and shall not provide any operation to 
the institution. A member shall not be a shareholder of the institution, nor shall 
any of his relatives until the fourth degree have any related interests whatsoever 
in the Islamic financial institution.” 
The main function of the Shariah board in accordance with Circular No. 108 
of Qatar Central Bank, 2013 is: 
1- Review the bank's operations and activities and supervise it with regards to 
its compliance with Shariah. 
2- Review any matters assigned to it by the board of directors or pursuant to 
the Qatar Central Bank instructions, to ensure that the products of the 
Islamic financial institutions comply with Shariah principles. (The Central 
Bank of Qatar, Instructions of Supervision and Control, Financing Policies 
in Islamic Banks, 2013, Art.105 of QCB Law, page 217). 
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Kuwait 
Articles 93 and 97 of Law No. 32 of the Central Bank of Kuwait (1968) 
state that "The board of directors of each bank shall nominate the members of the 
Shariah Supervisory Board for the approval of their appointment by the bank 
shareholders general meeting. Those members should be Islamic Shariah scholars 
of recognized efficiency and experience, especially in the area of transactions 
jurisprudence" (Central Bank of Kuwait, Instructions for Islamic Banks, 
Instructions No. 2/IBS/100/2003). 
There should be no fewer than three SSB members, and they should not be 
members of the bank’s board of directors or executive management, nor any 
shareholder of effective influence who owns 5% or more. It is worth noting that 
for the meeting of the SSB to be duly held, all members must attend the meeting. 
The main functions of the SSB are: 
•  To review the bank's operations and provide opinions on the bank’s 
compliance with Shariah rules in all of its operations. The SSB has 
the right to inspect all contracts, agreements, policies and transactions 
of the bank with other parties to ascertain its compliance with Shariah. 
• To prepare and submit the annual report to the bank’s board of 
directors. This report includes: 
• The scope of the SSB, describing the nature of the work carried 
out and assuring that the appropriate examinations and 
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procedures have been performed and the work has been 
appropriately monitored. 
• The SSB opinion as to whether the contracts, documents and 
transactions executed by the bank are compliant with the rules 
and principles of Shariah. 
•  To publish the fatwa (legal opinion) and resolutions passed by the 
SSB by printing booklets or bulletins and making them available to 
different parties in the bank (Central Bank of Kuwait, Instructions for 
Islamic Banks, Instructions No. 2/IBS/100/2003). 
Saudi Arabia 
In Saudi Arabia, Shariah law is the main source of regulation of all aspects 
of life, including civil law. The Shariah court is the highest court in the jurisdiction 
system; however, there is a special commercial court for the commercial sector, 
which functions as the highest court related to all commercial matters, including 
Islamic finance. 
The Central Bank of Saudi Arabia, which is called the Saudi Arabia 
Monetary Agency, was founded in 1952. The role of the Saudi Arabia Monetary 
Agency includes issuance of national currency, bank governance, management of 
foreign exchange reserves, service provider for commercial banks, and handling 
monetary policy, among others (Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, 2012).  
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However, the country’s Islamic banks are not monitored by the Saudi 
Arabia Monetary Agency. Instead, all Islamic financial institutions are under the 
supervision of the Saudi Ministry of Commerce (Al-Azizah et al. 2017) because 
they are considered, by nature, commercial companies.  
In Saudi Arabia, there is no organization that acts a national Shariah board 
authority. The Banking Disputes Committee, launched in 1987 by the Saudi 
Arabia Monetary Agency, is the specialized institution for solving banking sector 
disputes, although the government issues no specific laws or guidelines about 
Islamic finance. 
Jordan 
In 2016, the Central Bank of Jordan issued Amended Instructions of 
Corporate Governance for Islamic Banks (64/ 2016) for Shariah compliant banks.  
Under Art. 58 of Banking Law 28 of 2000 and its amendments, banks must 
comply with the following rules: 
1. The members of the Shariah board must be appointed by the nomination 
and compensation committee based on the recommendations of the board 
of directors, for a renewable term of four years. 
2. The bank must appoint a local SSB of no fewer than three members for 
foreign Islamic bank branches operating in Jordan, to ensure the application 
of the conditions and duties stipulated in these instructions. 
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3. A commitment message must be signed between the SSB and the bank, 
specifying the scope of the Shariah board’s actions as well as its duties and 
fees. 
4. The Shariah board must prepare a guide to its procedures, covering the 
working system of the Shariah board and its specializations and 
responsibilities; the organization of its relationship with the board and the 
executive management; the mechanism for preparing its reports submitted 
to management, the board, and the shareholders; its approach to Shariah 
supervision; and procedural information on holding meetings. 
5. The Shariah board should comply with the bank’s Code of Conduct. 
The role of the Shariah board is:  
1. To supervise the bank’s work and activities in terms of being compliant with 
and not in breach of the provisions of Shariah law. 
2. To give an opinion of and approve all contracts, transactions, agreements, 
products, services, investment policies and the policy that governs the 
relationship between the shareholders and the investment account holders. 
3. To provide consultation to the parties that deal with the bank such as 
auditors, lawyers, counsellors and customers. 
4. To submit semi-annual reports to the board of directors and the annual 
report to the general assembly of shareholders, and a copy of each to the 
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Central Bank. (Amended Instructions of Corporate governance for Islamic 
(Shariah compliant) Banks No. (64/2016) Dated 25/9/2016). 
Oman 
The Sultanate of Oman has recently implemented a Shariah governance 
system in the banking industry. Each bank must establish its own Shariah board 
(Central Bank of Oman, Islamic banking regulatory framework, 2012) and they 
follow the AAOFI on a voluntary basis. This board is an independent body of 
shariah scholars specialized in Islamic commercial jurisprudence (fiqh al-
muamalat), however SSB members may include one or more members who are 
not specialized in Islamic commercial jurisprudence, but with experience in 
Islamic banking or related areas (economics, finance, accounting, etc). The SSB 
must comprise a minimum of three members. The general assembly of the bank is 
responsible for appointing the SSB members, who will serve a maximum initial 
term of three years, which can be renewed for another three-year term. Members 
can serve a maximum of two consecutive terms in an institution, but are not 
allowed to work in competing institutions in the country. The SSB is the ultimate 
responsible authority for all Shariah-related matters in the bank. The main role of 
the Shariah supervisory board is:  
• To advise the board of directors and management on shariah matters in the 
day-to-day business 
• To review and approve all the policies, procedures, products, systems, 
contracts and agreements for their Shariah compliance. 
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• To provide written Shariah opinion on Shariah matters to board of directors 
and the management of the bank. 
• To submit a report to the board of directors on Shariah compliance to be 
published as part of the annual report. 
• Document its Shariah rulings and guidelines, which are then kept centrally 
for ready reference, and are disseminated and implemented. 
• Explain any legitimacy issue about the bank's operations to the management 
or customers. 
Bangladesh 
In 2009, Bangladesh Bank issued guidelines to provide an operational 
framework for Islamic banking. The guidelines cover Shariah and CG 
mechanisms, product definition and operational framework, alternative 
investment modes, and procedures for converting a conventional bank to an 
Islamic bank. However, these guidelines have certain shortcomings. A major issue 
is that, under these guidelines, it is optional for an Islamic bank to have a Shariah 
board, which contradicts global practice (Global Islamic Finance Report, 2011). 
The board of directors of each bank is responsible for ensuring that its 
activities and products are Shariah compliant. The boards of Islamic banks, 
subsidiary companies or conventional commercial banks with Islamic branches 
should therefore comprise directors with the requisite knowledge and expertise in 
Islamic jurisprudence. The board may put together an independent Shariah 
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Supervisory Committee made up of people with experience and knowledge of 
Islamic jurisprudence. However, the board is responsible for any 
lapses/irregularities on the part of that committee (Bangladesh Bank, Guidelines 
for Islamic Banking, Appendix I, 2009). 
Bangladesh Bank guidelines establish stringent criteria for the qualities and 
competencies required of a member of a Shariah Supervisory Committee. Notably, 
candidates should have (Bangladesh Bank, 2009): 
• a postgraduate qualification in a relevant field—such as Islamic studies, 
Arabic studies, Islamic law, Islamic economics or Islamic banking—and a 
good knowledge of the Arabic language; 
• a minimum of three years’ experience in teaching or conducting research in 
the field of Islamic jurisprudence or Islamic finance; 
• three years’ experience as a member of any board issuing Shariah 
resolutions for Islamic financial matters; or published either three articles in 
recognized journals or three books in the field of Islamic jurisprudence or 
Islamic finance. 
Bangladesh Bank does not have a Shariah board to supervise Islamic banks 
in Bangladesh. However, there is a private non-corporate body called the Central 
Shariah Board for Islamic Banks of Bangladesh (CSBIB), which embraces almost 
all Islamic banks in Bangladesh. It consists of several prominent Bangladeshi 
scholars and arranges regular meetings to discuss Shariah issues related to the 
country’s Islamic banking industry. The mail role of this board is: 
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• To provide cooperation and necessary advice to member banks on following 
the same procedure and practice of Shariah policy, and to supervise the 
implementation of Shariah principles in member banks. 
• To conduct activities aimed at generating public awareness and interest in 
managing financial transactions according to Shariah. 
It also conducts research and publishes books and journals to serve its 
members (Global Islamic Finance Report, 2011; CSBIB, website). However, 
Shariah resolutions issued by the CSBIB are not mandatory for Islamic financial 
institutions; it only provides advisory services. Nevertheless, no Islamic bank in 
Bangladesh contravenes the resolutions of the CSBIB due to reputational risks 
(Abdullah and Rahman, 2017). 
Thailand 
There is one Islamic bank in Thailand, set up by the Islamic Bank of 
Thailand Act B.E. 2545 (2002), as a state enterprise under the Ministry of Finance, 
administered by a board of governors, with an advisory council on Islamic 
banking. The bank operates in accordance with the rules of Shariah (Grais and 
Pellegrini, 2006). 
This bank has a Shariah Advisory Council appointed by the board of 
directors, the main role of which is to provide advice and suggestions to the bank’s 
board, to help it fully comply with Shariah principles, and to approve the bank’s 
financial products and services (Islamic Bank of Thailand, Annual Report, 2008).  
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Singapore 
In the case of Singapore, the country adopted the decentralized Shariah 
governance structure, which means that the Shariah committees are nominated at 
the institutional level, and their decisions are only binding to their respective 
Islamic financial institutions. In addition, the country’s regulatory framework is 
also silent about the body that has the ultimate authority to decide on Islamic 
finance matters. Overall, a flexible Shariah governance structure is in place, with 
the country leaving Shariah governance matters to the industry players (Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, Guidelines on the Application of Banking Regulations to 
Islamic Banking, 2010). 
There are no specific provisions of law or guidelines on the Shariah 
governance process.  Instead, a mandate is given to the respective Islamic financial 
institutions to establish their own policies or best practices on this matter. Shariah 
governance is regulated in the form of specific guidelines and circulars issued by 
the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Each Islamic bank has to appoint its internal 
Shariah board and has to consider the best mix of Shariah scholars to maintain the 
confidence of its customers. 
2.5.2.3. Main functions of the Shariah board at the Islamic financial 
institution level 
One of the most relevant characteristics of CG is the board size. As depicted 
in Table 2.2., the minimum number of Shariah board members at the institutional 
level varies: 
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• The most common number is three (in Malaysia, Pakistan, Brunei 
Darussalam, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan) 
• In Indonesia, the minimum is two with a maximum of five 
• In the remaining countries, the size is either left open to choice (Bangladesh) 
or it is not specified. 
In relation to the Shariah board members’ education, they are often required 
to be a qualified Shariah scholar and /or expert on different subjects such as 
accounting, economics and financial matters. 
The Shariah board is tasked with a number of duties related with the 
following roles: 
• Informative. In general, the Shariah board is requested to submit an annual 
report about the Shariah compliance of the Islamic bank to the board of 
directors. In the case of Jordan, they also need to report to the general assembly 
of shareholders.  Indonesia, Pakistan and Jordan also require the Shariah board 
to report to the National Shariah Board or to the Central Bank. 
• Monitoring. They generally review and approve all the bank’s policies, 
procedures, products, systems, contracts and agreements for their Shariah 
compliance. 
• Advisory. They provide consultation about Shariah matters to all parties that 
deal with the bank such as auditors, lawyers, counsellors and customers. 
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• Jurisprudence. In some cases, for example in Indonesia, they give legal 
opinions about financial matters. 
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Table 2. 2. Shariah Committee regulation at the Islamic financial institution level 










Malaysia Guidelines on the 
Governance of 
Shariah Committee 







Board of directors on 
the recommendation 










al law (fiqh al-
Muamalat) 
No Advise the board on Shariah matters in business operations 
 
Endorse Shariah Compliance Manuals 
 
Assist related parties with advice on Shariah matters on 
request 
 
Advise the institution on matters to be referred to the 
National Shariah Committee 
 
Submit annual report to the board of directors on Shariah 
compliance 
Indonesia Investment Guide 
to Islamic Banking 












The General Meeting 
of shareholders on the 
recommendation of 












Monitor the compliance of bank operations with Shariah 
law 
 
Evaluate the Shariah legal aspects of the bank’s operational 
guidelines and products  
 
Issue Shariah legal opinion on the overall conduct of bank 
operations 
 
Submit semi-annual and annual reports on Shariah 
oversight to the board of directors, the National Shariah 
Board and the Bank of Indonesia 







1 of IBD Circular 
No. 2 of 2008. 
 











The board of 
directors /  renewable 




in Science of Shariah 
with a minimum GPA 
of 3.0 or equivalent 
 
 
No Supervise all Shariah related matters of the bank. 
 
Develop a comprehensive Shariah compliance framework 
for all operations of the bank 
 
Submit annual reports on Shariah oversight to the board of 
directors and the National Shariah Board in the SBP 
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Table 2.2. Shariah Committee regulation at the Islamic financial institution level (continued) 
Brunei 
Darussalam 













No Monitor the compliance of bank operations with Shariah 
law 
 
UAE Central Bank of the 
U.A.E, Federal 













Not specified Yes/Not 
Compulsory 
Ensure that bank's operations conform with Shariah law.  
Sudan There is no specific 




Not specified Not 
specified 
Not specified Not specified Not specified 
Bahrain Central Bank of 
Bahrain Volume 2, 
Islamic Banks, Part 
A, High Level 
Standards, SG 
Shariah 





general meeting on 
the recommendation 










Monitor and review transactions to ensure full compliance 
with Shariah law. 
Approve the internal Shariah audit annual plans. 
Notify the Central bank of Bahrain in case of any failure by 
the board of directors to effectively deal with any major 
Shariah non-compliance. 
Review all relevant documentation for new products and 
services. 
Review and approve Islamic bank annual charity (Zakat) 
calculations on behalf of the shareholders. 
Submit annual reports on Shariah oversight to the board of 
directors.   
Qatar The Central Bank of 
Qatar, Instructions 
of Supervision and 
Control, Financing 
Policies in Islamic 
Banks, 2013, Art. 





following a proposal 
by the board of 





in jurisprudence and 






Conduct Shariah supervision on the institution’s operations 
and activities with regards to their compliance with 
Shariah.  
Express binding opinions with regards to the extent of 
compliance of the Islamic financial institution’s operations.  
Review any matters assigned to it by the Islamic financial 
institution’s board of directors. 
Submit annual reports on Shariah oversight to the board of 
directors.   
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Table 2.2. Shariah Committee regulation at the Islamic financial institution level (continued) 









General Meeting of 
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recommendation of 













Responsible for providing opinion on the bank’s 
compliance with Shariah law in all of its operations. 
Inspect all contracts, agreements, policies and transactions 
of the bank with the other 
parties. 
Submit annual reports on Shariah oversight to the board of 
directors.  






Not specified Not 
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Advise the board of directors and management on Shariah 
matters.  
Review and approve all the bank's operations. 
Provide written Shariah opinion on Shariah matters. 
Submit annual report to the board of directors on Shariah 
compliance. 
Explain any legitimacy issue about the bank's operations to 





Islamic Banks (64/ 












Bachelor’s degree, as 
a minimum, in 
Shariah science in the 
fields of commercial 
jurisprudence (fiqh 
al-muamalat, Islamic 
economics, or Islamic 
finance.  
No Review and approve all the bank's operations. 
Provide consultation to parties related to the bank. 
Submit semi-annual report to the board of directors and the 
annual report to the general assembly of shareholders and a 
copy of each to the central bank.  
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Table 2.2. Shariah Committee regulation at the Islamic financial institution level (continued) 
Bangladesh Bangladesh Bank, 
Guidelines for 
Islamic Banking, 




Board of directors Voluntary 
size 
Postgraduate 
qualification in a 
relevant field of 
Islamic studies, 
Arabic studies, 
Islamic law, Islamic 
economics or Islamic 
banking and good 
knowledge of the 
Arabic language. 
 
A minimum of three  
years’ experience in 
teaching or 
conducting research 
in the field of Islamic 
jurisprudence or 
Islamic finance. 
No Not specified 







Not specified Not 
specified 
Not specified No Not specified 







Not specified Not 
specified 
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2.6. Shariah governance models 
As stated above, the existing framework for Islamic finance in various 
countries demonstrates diverse practices and models of Shariah governance 
systems. Following Al-Azizah (2017), we identify the following Shariah 
governance models: 
2.6.1. Minimalist approach 
This model is mainly used by the GCC countries except for Oman and Saudi 
Arabia. Unlike the reactive approach, the minimalist model allows minimal 
intervention from regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities expect Islamic 
financial institutions to have proper Shariah governance systems in place, without 
specifying the requirements in detail. There is no restriction on Shariah board 
members being appointed to seats in various institutions at the same time. Some 
jurisdictions in the GCC countries, such as Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar, favour the 
adoption of the AAOIFI Governance Standards. Under the minimalist approach, 
it is preferable for the market to develop its own Shariah governance system rather 
than greater intervention on the part of regulators (Al-Azizah, 2017). 
2.6.2. Proactive approach 
This model is the one adopted by the Malaysian regulatory authority. 
Proponents of this model have a strong faith in the use of a regulatory-based 
approach to strengthen the Shariah governance framework. Accordingly, the 
Malaysian regulator is responsible for implementing a comprehensive Shariah 
governance framework with respect to both regulatory and non-regulatory aspects. 
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Several laws have been passed and amended by the parliament, such as the Islamic 
Banking Act 1983, the Takaful Act 1984, the Banking and Financial Institutions 
Act 1984 and the Securities Commission Act 1993. The Central Bank of Malaysia 
Act 2009 confirms the status of the National Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) as 
the sole authoritative body in Islamic finance. Furthermore, the Bank Negara 
Malaysia has issued Guidelines on the Governance of the Shariah Committee for 
Islamic financial institutions known as the BNM/GPS1. To complement this, the 
Securities Commission of Malaysia issued the Registration of Shariah Advisers 
Guidelines 2009, which sets out the criteria for the registration of a Shariah adviser 
in the capital market sector (Hassan et al. 2016). 
2.6.3. Reactive approach 
This model is more prevalent in non-Islamic legal environment countries 
such as the United Kingdom and Turkey. Although several Islamic banking 
licences have been issued to Islamic financial institutions, the regulatory authority 
is silent on the Shariah governance framework. Like any other conventional banks, 
Islamic financial institutions are required to comply with existing legislation and 
regulations. On top of that, they have a duty to make sure that all their business 
operations and products are Shariah compliant. There is no specific legislation 
governing Islamic financial institutions, nor any directives specifying the Shariah 
governance framework. At this point, the regulators will only react and intervene 
in Shariah governance matters if they involve a significant issue which may affect 
the industry. For instance, the UK Financial Services Authority holds that the role 
played by the Shariah board of Islamic financial institutions should be advisory 
and supervisory rather than executive in nature. 
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2.6.4. Interventionist approach 
The interventionist model only applies to Pakistan. The interventionist 
model allows third-party institutions to make decisions on Shariah matters 
pertaining to Islamic finance. In the case of Pakistan, the Shariah Federal Court is 
the highest authority in matters involving Islamic finance, despite the 
establishment of the Shariah board at the level of the State Bank of Pakistan (Pita, 
2014). 
2.6.5. Passive approach 
This model is exclusive to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Authority Monetary 
Agency treats Islamic financial institutions as equal to their conventional 
counterparts and has yet to issue legislation pertaining to Islamic finance or 
guidelines on a Shariah governance system. There is no national Shariah advisory 
board or any institutions that act as the sole authoritative body in Islamic finance. 
The existing Shariah governance system implemented by the country’s Islamic 
financial institutions is a product of their own initiative rather than regulatory 
requirement or regulator instructions (Al-Azizah, 2017).  
Shariah supervision takes different forms at macro and micro levels. At the 
macro level, some countries have implemented Shariah Supreme Councils inside 
the central banks to monitor the Islamic financial institutions. At the micro level, 
the supervision is conducted by an SSB. In general, in Islamic financial 
institutions, the Shariah body is the common form of Shariah supervision and 
derives its importance from five sources: religious, social, economic, legal, and 
governance (Garas and Pierce, 2010; Grassa, 2015). 
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Table 2.3 below illustrates the main similarities and differences among the 
models described above: 
Table 2.3: Shariah governance models 
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH 
HYPOTHESES 
3.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this research is to identify the associations, if any, between 
CG mechanisms in Islamic banks and their performance. Board of director 
performance, accountability, and the effectiveness of governance mechanisms 
continue to attract the attention of researchers. 
This chapter presents an extensive evaluation of the literature on this 
subject, highlighting the main findings of all relevant experimental studies. The 
aim of the chapter is twofold: to introduce the main research terms, and to 
contextualize the present research topic within the wider field. A special focus is 
placed on CG in the Islamic banking system. 
This investigation is framed within agency theory, although we aware that 
its application to the banking industry raises serious concerns because several 
studies have failed to find evidence to support its postulates (Grove et al., 2011). 
Moreover, other theories might also suit our objectives, such as stewardship theory 
or stakeholder theory. 
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Within the framework of agency theory, we address three CG mechanisms 
designed to mitigate agency conflicts, which have been widely addressed in prior 
literature: 
• The Shariah board. 
• The ownership structure. 
3.2. Research paradigms and CG theories 
The accounting and finance literature offers a widespread, and sometimes 
inconsistent, use of the terms paradigms and theories. 
Kuhn (1962) described a research paradigm as a set of practices that define 
a scientific discipline during a particular period of time. It frames what is to be 
studied, what kind of research questions are supposed to be formulated in relation 
to these subjects, what methods should be used to conduct these studies and how 
their results should be interpreted. 
More recently, Jonker and Pennink (2010) state that a research paradigm is 
a set of fundamental assumptions and beliefs as to how the world is perceived, 
which then serves as a thinking framework that guides the behaviour of the 
researcher. 
Within the functionalist paradigm, there are several key theories that frame 
current research on CG, which we explore below. 
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3.2.1. Agency theory 
The mainstream research on CG in financial institutions is framed within 
the agency theory.  The agency theory is a theoretical model developed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and extended by Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983). 
It addresses the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, 
attempting to explain the incentives and relationships triggered by a principal-
agent contract. Under the agency contract, the principal delegates the management 
of an economic activity to the agent, and the management commits to act on behalf 
of the principal. However, this contract entails several problems, called agency 
problems or agency costs, which have been widely discussed by accounting, 
economics and finance scholars in different research areas: 
a) One problem arises due to the divergence of the principal’s and the agent’s 
interests. While the principal is mainly interested in maximizing the 
performance, profitability or utility of the economic unit (the company), the 
agent will try to maximize his/her individual benefit; that is, his/her own 
wealth (Fama, 1980; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). This suggests that there is 
always a conflict of interest between the principals and the agents (Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Obid and Naysary, 2014), which may arise in different 
contexts: 
• CG literature has predominantly tackled the manager-owner 
relationship. According to the agency approach, managers of the firm 
are the agents who make decisions on behalf of the shareholders 
(principals), who supply the capital. However, shareholder and 
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manager interests may not be aligned. It is assumed that shareholders 
maximize returns at a reasonable risk, focusing on high dividends and 
rising stock prices. Conversely, managers may prefer growth (as it 
can generate prestige or higher salaries), may be lazy or fraudulent, 
or may maintain costly labour or product standards above the 
competitive minimum (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). Prior empirical 
evidence (Almazan et al.2005; Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms, 2015; 
López Iturriaga et al., 2015) confirms that board members 
representing blockholders effectively control and monitor managers 
and, therefore, are effective in reducing agency costs. 
• More recently, CG research has also investigated the agency conflicts 
between the majority and the minority shareholders. The ownership 
structure is one focus of agency theory and influences CG practices, 
as costs can increase when firms have a complicated and highly 
concentrated ownership structure. Majority shareholders might 
expropriate minority wealth (tunnelling effect) through hostile 
takeovers, for instance. 
• The relationship between the shareholders and the remaining 
stakeholders is another agency problem. Shareholders are primarily 
interested in maximizing the company’s profitability, while the 
employees, suppliers, or debt holders are concerned with other 
financial and non-financial variables. 
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• Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) observe that when family 
members occupy positions in the top management levels, there is an 
additional layer of agency behaviour; moreover, the opportunity for 
free and objective consultation which can otherwise exist in a board 
of directors is lost. 
b) The second agency problem is information asymmetry. Commonly, 
information is unevenly distributed between the agent (better informed) and 
the principal (worse informed) and so there is uncertainty and risk associated 
with the decision-making based on that information. 
According to agency theory, there are three basic mechanisms to mitigate the 
agency problems:  
a) Incentivising the agent, through a reward scheme to align the agent’s 
preferences with the principal’s preferences and to mitigate potential 
conflicts of interest. 
b) Supervising the agent, through direct control over his/her behaviour, 
implementation of codes of conduct and ethical codes, monitoring his/her 
compliance and sanctioning any misconduct. 
c) Improving the information systems to diminish the information asymmetry 
problems. This is one of the biggest problems in the agency contract because 
the higher the quality of the information, the easier it is to monitor the agent. 
In particular, within the financial markets, these information asymmetry 
problems trigger the so-called “adverse selection” risk and the “moral 
hazard problem. The adverse selection risk refers to the probability of 
financing less profitable projects because they are less risky. The moral 
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hazard problem concerns the probability that the agent will act in his/her 
own interests by investing funds in projects other than those they were 
permitted to invest in by the principal. 
The agency theory approach has not been free of criticism. In the first place, 
it assumes that managing firms in shareholders’ best interests requires maximizing 
their wealth. This view is often called “shareholder primacy”, in order to contrast 
it more directly with its main rival, “stakeholder theory”. Aguilera and Jackson 
(2003) also state that agency theory fails to account for key differences across 
countries. Donaldson and Davis (1991) criticize agency theory on the grounds of 
its methodology, individualism, narrow definition, disregard for other research, 
organizational economics, CG defensiveness and ideological framework, such that 
it focuses only on individual rather than organizational behaviour. 
3.2.2. Stakeholder theory 
This theory was first put forward by Freeman in the 1980s (Freeman, 1984; 
Freeman and Reed 1983), and then refined by Freeman and various collaborators 
over the next 30 years (see, e.g., Freeman et al., 2010). Freeman (1984) suggested 
that the firm is accountable for creating wealth for owners. He developed the 
theory to address the interests of a wider range of stakeholders and to protect the 
interests of other non-financial stakeholders. According to stakeholder theory, 
managers should seek to balance the interests of all stakeholders, where a 
stakeholder is anyone who has a “stake”, or interest (including a financial interest) 
in the firm that affects the decision-making process and the outcomes of the firm. 
Based on those definitions, stakeholders may be either external or internal. Internal 
stakeholders are employees, managers and owners, while external stakeholders are 
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customers, shareholders, suppliers, creditors, government and society (de 
Chernatony and Harris, 2000). Moreover, Greenwood (2007) defined stakeholders 
as those who are located in the community and have the power to affect corporate 
activities or can be affected by corporate operations. 
The rationale for managing firms in the interests of all stakeholders is that 
balancing stakeholders’ interests is better for the firm strategically than 
maximizing shareholder wealth (Freeman, 1984). All stakeholders form part of a 
network within the organization to serve the business goals (Freeman, 1999). 
Freeman pointed out that the company has a binding fiduciary duty to put 
stakeholders’ needs first and increase value for them, rather than just concentrating 
on increasing value for shareholders. The company’s owners and managers must 
therefore consider the legitimate interests of those groups and individuals who can 
affect their activities. Post et al. (2002) asserts that the traditional role of 
organizations is to create wealth for all stakeholders. 
Stakeholder theorists reject the three main propositions of the shareholder 
system and argue for the following: (1) all stakeholders have a right to participate 
in corporate decisions that affect them, (2) managers have a fiduciary duty to serve 
the interests of all stakeholder groups, and (3) the firm’s objective should be to 
promote the interests of all stakeholders and not only those of shareholders 
(Freeman and Reed, 1983; Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Maak (2007) and Du et 
al. (2010) agree on the idea of a broader set of stakeholders, all of which are 
important, with no interest groups being dominated by others. 
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Stakeholder analysts argue that all people and groups with legitimate 
interests in participating in an enterprise must get the same benefits. Managers 
should develop relationships, inspire their stakeholders, and create communities 
where everyone strives to give their best to deliver the value the firm promises. 
Good relationship between stakeholders is the main reason for the success the firm 
(Friedman and Miels, 2002; Freeman et al., 2004). 
Scholars such as Burchell and Cook (2006) and Cooper and Owen (2007) 
have extensively reviewed and supported this theory in order to explain the 
behaviour of an organization towards its stakeholders. However, other scholars 
such as Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) argue that stakeholders require 
management’s attention. Conversely, Donaldson and Preston (1995) assume that 
all groups of stakeholders are involved in the business activities to obtain benefits. 
To its critics, stakeholder theory seems to be both insufficiently articulated 
and weakly defended. With respect to the former, Orts and Strudler (2009) claim 
that there is no clear identification of the groups of stakeholders that should be 
considered. The groups most commonly identified are shareholders, employees, 
the community, suppliers, and customers. But other groups have stakes in the firm, 
including creditors, the government and competitors, and it makes a great 
difference where the line is drawn. 
Regarding the latter, the concepts of stakeholder, stakeholder model, 
stakeholder theory, stakeholder management and stakeholder society are 
explained and used by various authors in very different ways, and supported with 
diverse and often contradictory evidence and arguments (Donaldson and Preston, 
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1995). Wheeler et al. (2002) argued that stakeholder theory incorporates 
sociological and organizational disciplines. Viewed thus, it is a broad theory 
derived from a combination of many subjects such as philosophy, ethics, politics, 
economics and law (Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). 
Freeman and collaborators state that stakeholder theory is simply “the body 
of research … in which the idea of ‘stakeholders’ plays a crucial role” (Jones et 
al., 2002). According to Norman (2013), stakeholder theory is best regarded as 
“mindset”, i.e., a way of looking at the firm that emphasizes its embeddedness in 
a network of relationships. 
Stieb (2009) criticizes this theory, arguing that Freeman’s (1984) 
proposition focuses on the protection of the interests of all stakeholders and is 
aimed an unmerited transfer of decision-making power and wealth. The 
propositions of stakeholder theory can be divided into three main approaches, 
which are descriptive, normative and instrumental (Freeman, 1999; Jawahar and 
McLaughlin, 2001; Hendry, 2001). The descriptive approach plays a more 
informative role as it is concerned with real corporate actions with respect to a 
firm’s stakeholders and reports what is actually happening in the organization. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argue that the descriptive aspect can be used 
as a guide by managers in order to ensure that corporations operate in such a way 
that all stakeholders benefit. The normative approach, which is supported by 
Freeman (1994), is central to stakeholder theory; this approach considers the 
ethical issues that an entity should take into account, regarding what is morally 
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right or wrong. The other two approaches rely on the decisions involved in the 
normative stage (Introna and Pouloudi, 1999). 
Neville and Menguc (2006) argue that stakeholders’ reactions are affected 
by management decisions on specific organizational behaviour, which can be 
viewed as either instrumentally or normatively motivated. Wood and Jones (1995) 
note that stakeholder theory is helpful for predicting stakeholders’ actions as well 
as reactions. In addition, Mitchell et al. (1997) suggest that this theory is concerned 
with which groups of stakeholders deserve or require managerial attention. 
3.2.3. Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory posits that managers are essentially trustworthy 
individuals and so are good stewards of the resources entrusted to them 
(Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Davis et al. (1997) provide an 
interesting explanation on the basis of stewardship theory: “a steward protects and 
maximizes shareholders’ wealth through firm performance, because by so doing, 
the steward’s utility functions are maximized”. The theory assumes that managers 
can be good stewards of corporations by acting in the best interests of their 
principals (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010). Therefore, the theory holds that 
there is no conflict of interest between managers and owners, and the goal of 
governance is to find the mechanisms and structure that facilitate the most 
effective coordination between the two parties (Donaldson, 1990). Under this 
theory, company executives are not motivated by individual goals, but rather are 
stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of their principals. Hence, 
managers are motivated to act in the best interests of their principals, to protect the 
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interests of the shareholders and to make decisions on their behalf, because their 
only objective is to create and maintain a successful organization that allows the 
shareholders to prosper.  
Stewardship theorists argue that the performance of a steward depends on 
whether the structural situation facilitates effective action (Davis et al., 1997). The 
steward differs from the agent in that the steward is trustworthy and will make 
decisions in the best interests of the organization, whereas an agent needs to be 
incentivized or controlled to do this. This theory assumes that the behaviour of 
stewards is collective because they seek to attain the objectives of the organization 
and govern it through purely trust-based governance mechanisms (Joslin and 
Müller, 2016; Müller et al., 2016).  
Stewardship theory is related to psychology and sociology. There are 
psychological factors that predispose the executive to becoming a steward. Some 
of these factors include having higher-order motivations, better disposition to 
identify with the objectives of the firm, valuing commitment and greater use of 
personal power as a basis to influence others (Davis et al.,1997). The 
psychological and situational characteristics of the principal and the manager are 
antecedents for their rational choice between agency or stewardship relationships 
(Davis et al., 1997). 
According to this theory, the primary role of the board is to serve and advise, 
rather than to discipline and monitor, as agency theory prescribes (Arosa et al., 
2010). The CEO chair is responsible for the fate of the corporation and has the 
power to determine strategy (Davis et al., 1997) without fear of countermand by 
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an outside chair of the board. CEOs can improve firm value when they 
simultaneously hold the position of chair of the board; contrary to agency theory, 
the stewardship theory suggests a positive association between CEO duality and 
firm performance (Ramdani and Witteloostuijn, 2010).  
Proponents of stewardship theory focus on structures that facilitate and 
empower rather than those that monitor and control (Albrecht et al., 2004) and 
emphasize that corporate performance is more strongly linked to inside directors 
than to outside directors, as they work to maximize profit for shareholders. This is 
because inside directors understand the business; they have more knowledge of 
the firm’s operating policies and day-to-day activities than outsiders (Booth and 
Deli, 1996; Hossain et al., 2000). They also govern better than outside directors 
and so can make superior decisions (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Nicholson and Kiel, 2007).  
In sum, proponents of this theory contend that superior corporate 
performance will be linked to having a majority of inside directors (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2004; Arosa et al., 2010; Segaro, 2012; Rashid, 2015) to ensure more 
effective and efficient decision-making (Aduda et al., 2013). 
3.2.4. Institutional theory 
This theory is concerned primarily with an organization’s interaction with 
the political and economic institutional environment, the effects of institutional 
pressures on the organization, and the incorporation of these expectations into 
organizational practices and characteristics (Dillard et al., 2004). It describes how 
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an organization adopts practices that are considered acceptable and legitimate 
within its organizational field (Scott, 1995; Hessels and Terjesen, 2010). 
According to Scott (2008), institutional theorists consider the processes by 
which regulatory, normative and cultural cognitive structures are established as 
“authoritative guidelines” for social behaviour and address the formal and 
informal rules embedded in corporations. 
Scott (1995) further elaborates the three institutional mechanisms 
mentioned above (developed in DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) as three distinct 
pillars of the institutional context: regulatory (corresponding to coercive 
pressures), normative (related to normative pressures), and cognitive (referring to 
the concept of mimetic pressures). Through their response to coercion, compliance 
with norms and imitation, organizations demonstrate structural and procedural 
isomorphism, which is defined as “a constraining process that forces one unit in 
a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.149). 
The organizations embedded in the same environment are believed to 
become similar as they respond to similar institutional conditions. The 
constraining process reflects the adaptation of an institutional practice by the 
organization (Dillard et al., 2004). Institutional isomorphism leads to the 
acquisition of legitimacy, and thus promotes the survival and success of 
organizations (Michailova and Ang, 2008). Institutional theory does not consider 
legitimacy as a commodity to be possessed or exchanged, as it is interpreted in the 
bourgeois perspective of political economy theory. Instead, legitimacy is regarded 
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as a condition reflecting compliance with regulations or market competition, 
normative support, and cultural alignment (Scott, 1995, p.45). Organizations 
compete not just for resources and customers, but also for political power and 
institutional legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Institutional researchers have criticized agency theorists by showing how 
politics shape CG (Roy, 1999) and that national diversity reflects various 
institutional constraints stemming from coercive political regulation (Roe, 1997). 
Where institutional environments are nationally distinct, similar processes drive 
CG practices to become more similar within countries and to differ across 
countries. 
Nevertheless, some scholars criticize institutional theory for the lack of 
explicit attention to the strategic behaviour that organizations employ in direct 
response to the institutional processes that affect them (Hung, 1998). Institutional 
theory leans toward an oversocialized perspective of organizational behaviour that 
is abstracted from the conflicts and coalitions between stakeholders at the firm 
level (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). 
3.2.5. Resource dependence theory 
This theory is one of the most influential theories in organizational theory 
and strategic management (Hillman et al., 2009). It states that the ways in which 
organizations act are associated with their level of dependence on various 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p.1) posit that 
“to understand the behavior of an organization you must understand the context 
of that behavior—that is, the ecology of the organization”. 
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According to this theory, organizations interact with their environments and 
attempt to reduce dependency on certain resources. Organizational power, from 
this perspective, arises from the ability to cope with and minimize uncertainty, the 
control over scarce resources, and the substitutability of the controlled resources 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). 
Under resource dependence theory, a board of directors with high levels of 
links to the external environment would be expected to improve a company’s 
access to various resources, thus improving CG and firm performance (Jackling 
and Johl, 2009). 
The management literature views the board of directors as a potentially 
important resource for companies, and thus supports a resource dependence theory 
of CG (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Jackling and Johl, 2009). The board of directors 
can collectively bring to the executive management team environmental linking 
relationships, knowledge, financial resources or information that reduces 
uncertainty and adds power to the organization (Bryant and Davis, 2012). In this 
vein, Hillman et al. (2000) and Palmer and Barber (2001) conclude that the board 
of directors’ main role is to be resource-providers, especially in terms of the 
association with the external environment.  
Previous studies framed in this theory have focused on board size and 
composition as indicators of the board’s ability to provide critical resources to the 
firm. Organizations need diverse boards in order to get the four types of resources: 
(1) advice and counsel, (2) legitimacy, (3) channels for communicating 
information between the firm and external organizations, and (4) assistance in 
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obtaining resources from important elements outside the firm (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Lynall et al., 2003). This ability flows from larger rather than 
smaller sized boards (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
The positive relationship between board size and firm performance is 
confirmed by, among others, Hillman et al. (2009), Elsayed (2011), Tanna and 
Nnadi (2011), Adams and Mehran (2012), Aebi et al. (2012), and in the meta-
analysis performed by Dalton et al. (1998). Table 3.1 illustrates the comparisons 
between CG theories. 
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Table 3. 1: Comparison between CG theories and implications for boards 







Independent boards are a mechanism for 
shareholders to retain ownership control 
rights and monitor performance. 
 
Stewardship Managerial empowerment The board controlled by management is 
authorized and manages corporate assets 
responsibly. 
 
Stakeholder Serve and maintain interests of 
all stakeholders 
Achieving benefits for all stakeholders is the 
board’s main objective. 
 
Resource 
dependence   
Search for external resource  Board with high levels of links to the external 
environment would improve a company’s 
access to various resources.  
 
Institutional  Formulate and disseminate 
corporate goals and policies. 
The board of directors is a technical 
instrument, designed as means to definite 
goals and partly adaptive vehicles shaped in 
reaction to the influences and constraints 
from the external environment. 
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3.3. Corporate Governance mechanisms 
CG mechanisms are designed to: 
• Monitor management, so as to align managers’, shareholders’ and other 
stakeholders’ interests 
• Mitigate information asymmetry problems 
• Advise on certain issues 
• Secure resources 
There are several criteria used to classify CG mechanisms. Jensen (1993) 
identifies control markets, political and regulatory systems, the industry and the 
internal control systems. Gillan (2006) and Brown et al. (2011) distinguish 
between internal and external mechanisms. According to Denis (2001) and Allen 
and Gale (2001), examples of internal mechanisms are: 
• The board of directors 
• Other committees that support the board of directors (such as the Audit, 
Risk or Remuneration Committees) 
• The ownership structure 
• The remuneration scheme 
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Examples of external mechanisms, as stated by Brown et al. (2011) are: 
• Regulatory and prudential framework 
• Industrial regulation 
• Blockholders  
• Stock markets 
However, there is no clear distinction between those mechanisms since the 
same issue (e.g. ownership structure) can be considered as an internal or an 
external factor (Brown et al., 2011). 
In addition, there have been lively debates over the transferability of best 
practices (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003) and academics have not yet fully identified 
the main national differences in CG and how they should best be conceptualized 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000). Moreover, Claessens 
and Yurtoglu (2013) posit that there is a narrow definition of CG focused on the 
rules in capital markets governing equity investments in publicly listed firms, 
including listing requirements, insider dealing arrangements, disclosure and 
accounting rules and protections of minority shareholder rights. In the arena of 
finance, this CG definition covers the protection of minority rights, the strength of 
creditor rights and their enforcement, and the composition and rights of the 
executive directors, among others. 
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When considering CG from a cross-country perspective, the questions arises 
of whether the CG framework extends to rules or institutions. From one point of 
view, prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the framework is determined by 
rules and, thus, by markets and outsiders. In much of the rest of the world, banks 
and insiders are thought to determine the actual CG framework. In fact, both 
institutions and rules evolve over time and are endogenous to other factors and 
conditions in the country (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). 
Our research project is focused on two CG mechanisms, namely, the 
Shariah board and the ownership structure. 
3.4. Literature on bank governance and performance 
CG in the banking industry is a research issue that deserves further attention 
(Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Banks are different from other companies in that 
they have special features that intensify governance problems and might reduce 
the effectiveness of standard governance mechanisms. Moreover, some authors 
(Grove et al., 2011) posit that CG practices may not be particularly effective at 
mitigating agency conflicts. 
The first characteristic that sets the governance of banks apart from that of 
other non-financial firms is that banks have higher leverage than non-financial 
firms, because the bank’s capital resources come from the depositors and 
debtholders. Gornall and Strebulaev (2018) show that the average leverage of US 
banks over eight years, measured as the ratio of debt to assets, is between 87%–
95%, whereas the average leverage of US non-financial companies is in the range 
of 20%-30%.  
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The conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders in the 
presence of high leverage interact with the equity governance (John et al., 2016). 
The that top management is very closely aligned with equity interests in banks and 
they will have strong incentives to undertake high-risk investments, even those 
investments that lack positive net present value (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011).  
The second attribute that makes bank governance different from that of 
other non-financial companies is the unique nature of banking operations and 
assets. They perform complex financial operations where the underlying assets are 
difficult to identify and the risk and profitability associated with the investment 
difficult to estimate. Moreover, some academics claim that banks’ operations are 
opaque and complex (Mehran et al., 2011). As such, the asymmetry of information 
in the context of banking makes it more difficult for equity holders to control 
managers and for debtholders to control banks from shifting risk from 
shareholders to debtholders. This difficulty of monitoring exacerbates agency 
costs. Complexity makes it harder to design effective incentive contracts (John et 
al., 2016; Levine, 2004). 
In addition, banks have a wider variety and a greater number of stakeholders 
than in the non-banking industry, since not only investors, but also depositors, 
standard setters, policy makers, regulatory and prudential bodies have a direct 
interest in bank performance. Hence, in the European Union, banks are considered 
as Public Interest Entities because of their economic impact. Their systemic 
characteristics entail an elaborate array of accounting, taxing, financing and 
prudential regulations that, in some cases, overlap. Moreover, in some countries, 
governments own banks.  The diversity and strong degree of enforcement of these 
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regulations makes it more difficult for stakeholders to have control over the bank’s 
management. 
The role of regulators might not be neutral; indeed, they might act in their 
own interests and intervene in the bank’s operations, which could create more 
governance problems. Besides this, regulatory oversight is itself an active 
monitoring force and limits the incentives for boards from blockholders to monitor 
(Grove et al., 2011). 
Within the range of regulatory changes, CG practices in the banking 
industry have received heightened attention in recent years (Liang et al., 2013). 
The OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance argues that board failures in 
financial firms are a major cause of the financial crisis (Adams and Mehran, 2012). 
Indeed, banking regulators and central banks have stressed the need for effective 
CG practices in the banking system because failures and weaknesses in bank 
governance contribute to the development of financial crises (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2010). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX hereafter) 
and the financial market crisis have influenced the board structure-bank 
performance linkage (Pathan and Faff, 2013). 
Prior studies on CG in the financial industry show that weak governance 
has a detrimental impact on financial companies’ performance and valuation, and 
also influences their opportunistic manipulation of earnings (Caprio et al., 2007; 
De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Cornett et al., 2009; Grove et al., 2011; Erkens et 
al., 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). However, Diamond and Rajan (2009) find 
that firms with weaker CG quality may not implement adequate incentives and 
Chapter 3.- Literature review and Research Hypotheses 
103 
controls that can increase shareholder value. As a result, financial firms will not 
find it advantageous to improve the quality of their governance if it does not help 
them to better identify project risk and potential return. 
Conversely, there is also a large number of studies reporting that firms with 
strong  CG mechanisms are generally associated with better financial 
performance, higher firm valuation and higher stock returns; for example, a more 
independent board, a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity and an increase in 
insider ownership is positively related to banks’ crisis performance (see e.g., 
Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Core et al., 2006; Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008;  Bebchuk et al., 2008;  Brown and Caylor,  2009; Chhaochharia and 
Laeven, 2009; Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012; Ammann et al., 2011). Peni and 
Vähämaa (2012) analyse 62 individual publicly traded US commercial banks 
included in the S&P 1500 index for the fiscal years 2005–2008, finding that banks 
with stronger CG mechanisms were associated with higher profitability in 2008. 
Akhigbe and Martin (2006) report that improvements in certain governance 
characteristics as a result of SOX in 2002 are associated with higher valuation of 
financial companies and reduced risk measures. Erkens et al. (2012), focusing on 
the 2007–2008 period, document that greater board independence and larger 
institutional ownership of financial firms is related to lower stock returns. 
The role of CG in the banking industry has also been examined (e.g. Mishra 
and Nielsen, 2000; Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 2003; Pacini et al., 2005; Sierra et al., 
2006; Caprio et al., 2007; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Cornett et al., 2009; 
Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; and Cooper, 2009). 
Consistent with the literature on non-financial firms, these studies demonstrate 
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that strong CG has positive effects on the financial performance and stock market 
valuation of banks. More generally, the prior studies indicate that the same CG 
attributes that affect non-financial firms are also relevant in bank governance. 
Furthermore, the relationship between CG and bank risk-taking has been 
examined, revealing that risk measures of financial firms vary inversely with the 
strength of CG; studies suggest that banks with strong governance attributes may 
take more risk (Pathan, 2009; Fortin et al., 2010; Akhigbe and Martin, 2008). 
Nevertheless, it is also conceivable that better CG practices may fail to improve 
the performance of financial firms because either the projects are riskier or the 
costs of implementing good governance exceed the market value benefits 
(Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Fortin et al., 2010; Pathan, 2009). 
3.5. Prior studies on CG in Islamic banks 
The Shariah board is a central component of the governance system in 
Islamic banks. It is an independent board that monitors and audits all financial 
transactions to ensure that are in conformity with Shariah law (Quttainah, 2013). 
The integration of the Shariah Supervisory Board within the governance structure 
of Islamic banks is aimed at improving the reliability, legitimacy and financial 
performance of the banks that comply with Shariah principles (Saida, 2015; 
Alnasser and Muhammed, 2012; Quttainah, 2013). Thus, Shariah-compliance in 
Islamic institutions triggers a new principal-agent relationship between managers 
and stakeholders other than shareholders. Accordingly, several main agency costs 
can be identified: 
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a) Divergence of principal-agent interests: Muslim customers and other 
stakeholders make investment and financing transactions with the Islamic 
bank on the basis that the bank is a Shariah compliant institution. Managers 
(agent) might pursue their own interests and settle transactions that are more 
profitable but do not comply with Shariah principles, while stakeholders are 
acting under the understanding that they are interacting with an Islamic 
institution. As Hasan (2009) states, the success of the Islamic financial 
industry relies on all stakeholders’ belief that all components of the financial 
system comply with Shariah principles and rules. 
b) b. Information asymmetry: Managers have access to all internal information 
related to the financial services delivered by the bank, while the 
stakeholders lack the information concerning the Shariah-compliance of 
those financial products. Since managers are the only ones who are entitled 
to access the financial information, if the agent’s incentives are not aligned 
with those of the principals, the managers who control the assets of the firms 
may choose to satisfy their personal ambitions rather than those of 
shareholders and other stakeholders (moral-hazard problem).  
To mitigate these agency costs, the Shariah Governance System might adopt 
different structures. At the macro level, a Shariah Committee is set up to rule, 
monitor and oversee the Shariah-compliance of all Islamic institutions; an 
example is the model established in Malaysia. At the micro level, every Islamic 
bank has to implement a Shariah Board that commonly fulfils the following duties: 
• Endorsing Shariah-compliant proceedings 
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• Monitoring to ensure that all financial services and products delivered by 
the bank comply with Shariah principles 
• Advising the bank on Shariah issues 
• Advising the customers about the Shariah-compliance concerns 
However, there is lack of homogeneity in the Shariah Governance Systems 
across countries and several approaches, such as interventionist or minimalist, 
have been identified (Al-Azizah, 2017). Hasan (2011) reveals that there are 
differences in Shariah governance among Malaysia, GCC countries and the UK. 
He identifies shortcomings and weaknesses based on commitment to Shariah 
governance, regulatory framework, independence, competence and disclosure. 
Grassa (2013) has identified some differences between the Shariah Supervisory 
System in SA and GCC countries. She recommends in her study that Islamic 
institutions need to be more effective in establishing a good Shariah governance 
system. Abu-Tapanjeh (2009) provides a comparative analysis of the OECD and 
the Islamic principles of CG. He concludes that the OECD principles have been 
successfully implemented and are a more effective tool than the Islamic rules, 
which present wide diversity and are not well enforced. 
The Islamic finance literature lacks empirical studies that specifically 
address the impact of the Shariah board characteristics on bank’s performance. 
Table 3.1 summarizes prior empirical studies about CG in Islamic banks. Two 
studies have mainly focused on the comparison between Islamic vs Conventional 
banks: Grassa and Matoussi (2012) have compared governance structures between 
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Islamic banks (62 Islamic banks in GCC countries and 28 Islamic banks in 
Southeast Asian countries) and conventional banks (85 banks located in the same 
countries) over the period 2000-2009. The study reveals that Islamic banks are 
more profitable than conventional banks. However, they did not find clear 
evidence to confirm or reject the efficiency of the Shariah board structure in 
improving the Islamic bank’s performance. The comparative study by Quttainah 
et al. (2013) concludes that Islamic banks are less likely to conduct earnings 
management compared with conventional banks. In addition, they find that several 
Shariah board characteristics (size and independence) are associated with earnings 
management. 
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Table 3. 2: Prior studies of Corporate Governance in Islamic banks 
Study Firms Period of study Methodology  Dependent variables Conclusion  
 




90 large Islamic banks and 















Islamic banks are more profitable than 
conventional banks  
The Shariah Supervisory Board characteristics 
do not affect the financial performance of 
Islamic banks 
Quttainah et al.   
(2013) 
82 Islamic banks and 82 
conventional banks from 
15 countries 
1993-2008 Regression analysis 
 
Abnormal loan loss 
provision 
Islamic banks are less likely to conduct 
earnings management compared with 
conventional banks 
Several Shariah board characteristics (size and 
expertise) are associated with earnings 
management.  
Daly and Frikha 
(2015) 
42 Islamic banks in  
Gulf countries and 25 
Islamic banks in Southeast 
Asian countries 
2004-2014 Regression analysis ROA 
ROE 
Board’s fee, CEO duality and the bank’s age are 
positively related to performance 




Mollah and Zaman 
(2015) 
147 Islamic banks in 25 
countries  
2005-2011 Regression analysis ROA 
ROE 
Tobin’s Q 
Shariah boards positively influence banks’ 
performance 
Board structure (size, independence, and CEO 
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Other studies have been performed over a whole sample of Islamic banks. 
Daly and Frikha (2015) analyse 42 Islamic banks in GCC Countries and 25 Islamic 
banks in South Asian countries to investigate the effect of CG variables on banks’ 
performance by means of regression analysis. They conclude that the board’s fees, 
CEO duality, and the bank’s age have a positive relationship with the bank’s 
performance. On the other hand, they find that Shariah board characteristics do 
not have any impact on the variable of interest. Mollah and Zaman (2015) find that 
Shariah boards significantly influence the firm’s performance and they also 
conclude that board structure (size and independence) and CEO power in Islamic 
banks negatively affect bank performance.  
As can be concluded from Table 3.3., empirical evidence on CG in Islamic 
banks is scarce and inconclusive. Therefore, we rely on the previous CG research 
on conventional banks to develop our research questions. Following, we present 
the literature covering the characteristics of the board of directors and firm 
performance in the conventional banking industry to support our research 
questions. 
3.6. Literature review and research hypotheses related to Shariah 
board characteristics 
As stated above, several theories have addressed the complex relationships 
among managers, owners and other stakeholders, such as the agency, stewardship, 
stakeholder, institutional or resource dependence theory, among others.  
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Although none of the abovementioned theories has received definitive 
empirical support (Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007), we frame our investigation 
within agency theory, the main stream of CG research. Nevertheless, we believe 
that several approaches can explain the observed empirical behaviour reported in 
this investigation. 
The Shariah board is a unique governance body that is implemented solely 
in Islamic financial institutions. In addition, the implementation of CG codes is 
recent and uneven across countries embracing Islamic financial institutions. 
Therefore, although there is a novel stream of research addressing Islamic 
banking, empirical evidence on Islamic CG and, more specifically, on the impact 
of Shariah boards on banks’ performance is scarce (Mollah and Zaman, 2015) and 
contradictory. Therefore, the impact of the Shariah governance system on banks’ 
performance deserves further attention. To that end, we rely on CG literature on 
conventional banks.  
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983), the primary role of the board is to reduce agency costs resulting 
from the separation of ownership from control by overseeing managerial decisions 
and activities, and to align their interests with those of shareholders. Hence, the 
board of directors is the core CG body of any organization.  It constitutes the 
competent corporate body for adopting, implementing and monitoring strategic 
objectives and policies (Staikouras et al., 2007). The structure of the board differs 
from country to country (Mülbert, 2009). The two most important roles of a board 
of directors are the monitoring and advisory functions. Under the former, the board 
supervises the managers to ensure that their behaviour is in line with the interests 
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of the shareholders (De Haan and Vlahu, 2015). Under the latter, the board helps 
to design the strategy of the company but also helps secure resources through its 
social networks. In this vein, Mishra and Nielsen (2000) demonstrates that foreign 
CEOs are more efficient, while other studies show that they have a positive impact 
on the firm’s strategy (Ramaswamy and Li, 2001). 
Board size and composition constitute two of the most prevalent CG factors, 
attracting extensive theoretical and empirical attention. Researchers have 
emphasized the influence of the size and the composition of the board of directors 
on bank performance (Staikouras et al., 2007). Following, we present a review of 
the most relevant contributions addressing board characteristics in the banking 
industry to provide support to our research questions. 
3.6.1. Board size and bank performance 
The optimal size of the board of directors and its influence over the firm’s 
performance has been widely addressed in the CG literature but it still remains a 
controversial issue.  
According to Jensen (1993), a small board is more effective than a large 
board   since it can play a better monitoring role, as well as exercising an effective 
control over agency costs (Peiró and Gracia, 2017). Additionally, Pathan et al.  
(2007) suggest that larger boards are liable to increase agency as well as ”free-
rider” problems..  
In addition, smaller boards are said to be more effective because decision-
making costs are lower in smaller groups. However, the empirical studies that 
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address the relationship between board size and firm performance reveal both 
negative (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Staikouras et al., 2007; Pathan et al., 2007; 
Huang, 2010; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Mollah and Zaman, 2015) and positive 
associations (Malik et al., 2014; Tanna and Nnadi, 2011; Adams and Mehran, 
2012; Aebi et al., 2012).  
Dalton et al. (1998) summarize prior literature by applying a meta-analysis 
to 27 published studies, concluding that larger boards are associated with better 
financial performance in firms. 
In the banking industry, boards tend to be bigger and more independent than 
those in the non-financial sector (Booth et al., 2002; Hayes et al., 2004;  De Andrés 
et al., 2012). The main argument for the bigger size is that CEOs of complex and 
opaque operations may need more advice on their many segments and benefit from 
the experience of larger boards.   
Table 3.4 summarizes prior studies on board size and bank performance. 
There is extensive evidence from common-law countries, such as the US, the UK 
and Australia. Some research papers demonstrate that bigger boards positively 
impact banks’ performance (Adams and Mehran, 2012) and efficiency (Salim et 
al., 2016). However, other studies conclude that the association between the two 
variables of interest is concave (Grove et al; 2011), positive (Aebi et al., 2012) and 
negative (Wang. et al., 2012; Pathan and Faff, 2013). 
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Table 3. 3: Empirical studies that address the relationship between board size and firm performance in the banking industry  
 
Author Firms Period of study Methodology Dependent variables  Conclusion  
 

















Pathan et al. (2007) Local Thai commercial 
banks 
1999–2003 Regression analysis ROA 
ROE 
Negative relationship  
De Andres and Vallelado 
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1995-2005 Regression analysis Tobin’s Q 
Shareholders’  
Market Return 
Inverted U- shaped relationship  







Grove et al. (2011) 
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North America database  











41 commercial banks in 

















Companies listed on the 
stock exchanges in four 
East Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, 
South Korea and 
Thailand) 
2001-2002 Quantile regression  ROA Negative relationship  
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 Table 3. 4: Empirical studies that address the relationship between board size and firm performance in the banking industry (Cont.) 
Author Firms Period of study Methodology Dependent variables  Conclusion  
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In Europe (Table 3.4), mixed results are also reported for the impact of the 
board’s size on the bank’s performance. Staikouras et al. (2007), using a sample 
of 58 large European banks over the 2002-2004 period, finds that bank 
profitability is negatively related to the size of the board of directors, but De 
Andres and Vallelado (2008) report a concave relationship. Tanna and Nnadi 
(2011) report a positive association between board size and performance in 17 UK 
banks.  
In Asia, Pathan et al. (2007) reveal a negative association between board 
size and performance in local Thai commercial banks over the period 1999-2003. 
Similar conclusions are offered by Wang et al. (2012), Pathan and Faff (2013), 
Liang et al. (2013), Pathan and Faff (2013) and Mamatzakis and Bermpli (2015). 
Conversely, Adams and Mehran (2012), Aebi et al. (2012), Mangena et al. 2012 
and Salim et al. (2016) report a positive sign.  
Finally, some authors report an inverted U-shaped relationship (De Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008; Grove et al., 2012), while others find a non-significant 
relationship (Gust, 2009).  
Salim et al. (2016) find a positive relationship between board size and bank 
performance. They suggest that larger boards bring more knowledge into the 
decision-making and supervisory process. This result is in line with agency theory 
and stewardship theory. 
Regarding Shariah board size, as discussed in the preceding chapter, the 
minimum recommended by the standard-setter associations (AAOIFI and IFRS) 
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and regulatory bodies (such as the Bank Negara Malaysia) is three members, but 
the size may differ across countries and financial institutions. 
Prior empirical research on Shariah board size and Islamic banks reveals a 
positive relationship between SSB size and bank performance (Alman, 2012; Li 
et al., 2014; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Farag et al., 2018 and Nomran et al., 2018). 
Other researchers do not find any relationship between SSB size and bank 
performance (Matoussi and Grassa, 2012; Daly and Frikha, 2015).  
In all, prior literature reports both linear and non-linear relationships (De 
Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Grove et al., 2011) and heterogeneous conclusions; 
a plausible explanation for this is the use of different measures of firm 
performance. Therefore, we posit the following null hypothesis: 
H1= Shariah board size does not impact Islamic banks’ performance 
3.6.2. Board activity and bank performance 
One of the most common board characteristics linked with performance is 
the intensity of the board activity, as measured by the frequency of board meetings  
(Jackling and Johl, 2009). One of the important duties of the board of directors is 
to arrange and attend periodic meetings during the year. This is considered the 
basic method for the directors to collect information, make decisions and monitor 
the management (Principle 3, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
Guidelines: Corporate governance principles for Banks, 2014). 
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These meetings are also considered as an opportunity for board members to 
get to know each other and discuss matters relating to the organization, any 
problems they may face and how to solve them and prepare plans and strategies 
for the future development of the organization, all of which will be reflected in the 
performance. The active boards have good opportunities to transfer information to 
society (Rodrigues et al. 2017).  
Hence, some researchers consider that the complexity of banking operations 
requires a more active board, with the number of board meetings thus being a good 
indicator of the quality of the board’s work, which in turn will mean increased 
supervision of the top management (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; García-Meca 
et al., 2015; Liang et al., 2013). However, the evidence reported is sometimes 
weak (Grove et al., 2011). Conversely, in some cases, frequent board meetings are 
associated with poor performance (Vafeas, 1999; Jackling and Johl, 2009). 
Vafeas, (1999), using financial data from a sample of 307 firms between 1990 and 
1994, establishes that the annual number of board meetings is inversely related to 
firm value. It is worth noting that this result is driven by increases in board activity 
following a drop in the share price. 
Agency and stewardship theories suggest that board meeting frequency is 
correlated with challenges, firm earnings and market performance (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2001). Frequent board meetings may be a signal of a proactive board. 
The more frequent the meetings, the greater the supervision of the top management 
and the more relevant the advisory role, which might improve firm performance 
(Liang et al., 2013). 
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In Islamic banks, the Shariah board meets regularly to carry out periodic 
reviews to monitor Shariah compliance of general bank operations. However, as 
and when necessary, the Shariah board can hold a meeting if the bank urgently 
requires its advice and opinion on Shariah-related matters (IFSB-10, December 
2009. Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions offering 
Islamic Financial Services). 
As far as we are aware, only one study (Shittu et al., 2016) has addressed 
the relationship between Shariah board meetings and bank performance, finding a 
positive effect. Accordingly, the following null hypotheses is formulated: 
H2: Shariah board meetings do not affect Islamic bank’s performance 
3.6.3. Shariah board education and bank performance 
According to the human capital theory (Becker, 1964), the organization can 
benefit from a person’s stock of education, experience, and skills. In this vein, the 
OECD Corporate Governance Principles (Principle VI.E.3) states that “board 
members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities”. 
This principle suggests that board members must have a high level of education 
and experience in their area of specialization to be able to manage the business 
properly. In consequence, the firm should recruit board members with a high level 
of education. 
The existing literature on the association between the educational 
backgrounds of those in the upper echelons of the firm and the firm’s financial 
performance is largely dominated by US studies (Darmadi, 2013). Cheng et al. 
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(2010) show that university degrees held by the board chairman are positively 
associated with firm performance. 
King et al. (2016) find that CEO educational attainment, level and quality 
positively affect bank performance. They argue that a board member with higher 
education has the ability to appropriately deal with any action.  Berger et al. (2014) 
suggest that the age, gender, and education of the executive team on the board 
jointly affect the variability of bank performance. Directors’ qualifications may 
influence bank performance, as a higher educational level leads to better 
judgments on an investment strategy and thus, to better corporate decisions 
(Fernandes et al., 2017). This is particularly important in the case of banks because 
the complexity of their activity often requires a great deal of specific knowledge. 
In the case of Islamic banks, although regulation and enforcement might be 
different across countries, the Shariah board is commonly composed of qualified 
Shariah scholars and experts in business, finance and accounting. Anyone who 
wants to work as a member of a Shariah board should have strong skills and 
extensive experience in the field of accounting and finance (IFSB-10, Guiding 
Principles on Shariah Governance). However, the minimum academic level 
required is not specified.   
Nomran et al. (2018) and Farook et at. (2011) argue that Shariah board 
members with a doctorate degree in finance and a religious degree have a positive 
effect on the performance of the organization. The main reason for this is that the 
Shariah board member will analyse the operations of the bank from a religious and 
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accounting point of view and, accordingly, he will write the annual report and 
submit it to the board in an appropriate way. 
Hence, in accordance with the human capital theory and prior results, we 
expect a positive association between the average educational level of Shariah 
board members and the Islamic bank’s performance. Therefore, we explore the 
following hypothesis in its null form: 
H3: Shariah board members’ education does not impact Islamic banks’ 
performance 
3.7. Literature review and research hypotheses related to Islamic 
banks’ ownership structure 
Within the good governance literature, one of the main streams of research 
focuses on the ownership structure. According to Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013), 
the nature of the CG challenges strongly depends on the countries’ overall 
development and institutional environment, and specifically on prevailing 
ownership structures. Thus, the nature of a firm’s agency problems is influenced 
by the ownership structure (John and Senbet, 1998; De Haan et al., 2016).  
In the Anglo-Saxon countries, under the common-law legal system, 
investors are strongly protected (Porta, 1998). In those countries, such as the US, 
the UK, Canada or Australia, the stock markets are well developed and big 
companies are traditionally public companies, with their equity funds spread 
across a large number of shareholders.  In this case, when a company is owned by 
numerous small shareholders, the traditional principal-agent conflicts of interest 
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arise, and monitoring managers can be difficult and costly for the firm. In this 
scenario, the board of directors’ main role is to safeguard shareholders’ interests 
and reduce agency problems by monitoring managers. 
The main characteristics of the European continental model are that 
investors have lower institutional protection (Leuz et al., 2003), stock markets are 
less developed than those of the Anglo-Saxon countries (Millar et al., 2005) and 
firm ownership is highly concentrated (Cuervo, 2002).  
Those shareholders with a high proportion of shares (at least 5% of a firm’s 
outstanding shares), known as blockholders, often have a strong presence in the 
board of directors and can play an active monitoring role (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Under the agency framework, higher block ownership facilitates active 
participation in the decision-making process because such shareholders can use 
their influence to elect the board of directors and mitigate agency costs for several 
reasons: First, they have more incentives to do so because they are risking big 
investments (Cernat, 2004). Second, they can be more effective at overcoming the 
free-rider problem caused by ownership dispersion. Third, by internalizing the 
benefits from monitoring in proportion to their own shares, their monitoring costs 
become lower (Grove et al., 2011).  
Under the agency framework, the most relevant agency problems are those 
between the majority shareholders and the minority ones, also referred to as 
principal-principal agency conflicts. The main risk is faced by the minority 
shareholders, whose wealth can be expropriated by the majority owners 
(tunnelling effect) through dividend policies or aggressive public offerings. 
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Porta et al. (1998) document that except for US and UK companies, where 
the ownership is widely dispersed and the shareholder protection is high, firms 
exhibit a high degree of ownership concentration.  
In some countries, such as Spain, the main blockholders are institutional 
investors. Small shareholders enjoy less legal protection (Porta et al., 1998) and, 
therefore, their participation in the firm’s ownership is through institutional 
investors (Faccio and Lang, 2002). Institutional investors have acquired an 
important role in the governance of companies (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ruiz-
Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2009, 2011). The reason is that when such 
shareholders disagree with the board of directors’ policies or strategies, they may 
sell off large amounts of shares, meaning that the company is faced with great 
losses.  
Institutional investors participate in the governance of the company through 
two main mechanisms:  They have the right to appoint the proprietary members 
of the board of directors (Boyd, 1994) and are one of the main mechanisms for 
controlling the executive team (Gillan, 2006). In addition, they actively participate 
in the governance of the companies, becoming one of the most active stakeholders 
influencing firm performance (Jiao and Ye, 2013), leverage (García-Meca et al., 
2013) or strategic decisions (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006), among others.  
When the firm’s ownership is concentrated in the hands of a few owners, 
the most relevant agency conflicts are those generated by the relationship between 
majority-minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
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Ownership concentration is also common in SA companies, such as those 
located in Hong Kong, Indonesia or Malaysia, where the biggest shareholder 
owns, on average, 50% of the share capital. In India and Singapore this percentage 
is above 50%, while in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, those percentages are 
around 20%, 30% and 40%, respectively (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013; Bae et 
al., 2008; Khanna and Yafech, 2007; Bertrand et al., 2002). 
Ownership concentration can generate two opposite effects: On the one 
hand, through the entrenchment effect, majority shareholders may expropriate 
minority shareholders. On the other hand, majority shareholders usually mitigate 
the information asymmetry problems because they either participate in the 
company’s management or they invest time and resources in supervising the 
managers, since they are facing high investment risks (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 
2013). 
There are few studies that address the relationship between ownership and 
performance in the conventional banking industry. Iannotta et al. (2007) analyse a 
sample of 181 large banks from 15 European countries for the period 1999–2004, 
concluding that ownership concentration does not significantly affect banks’ 
profitability. However, a higher ownership concentration is associated with better 
loan quality, lower asset risk, and lower insolvency risk. Busta et al. (2014) use 
GMM dynamic estimator on a sample of European banks over a 13-year period 
(1993–2005). They argue that this relationship is influenced by different 
institutional settings and report a negative effect of ownership concentration on 
bank value.  Haw et al. (2010) analyse a sample of East Asian and Western 
European banks for the years 1990–1996. They conclude that banks with 
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concentrated control exhibit poorer performance, lower cost efficiency, greater 
return volatility, and higher insolvency risk relative to those with more dispersed 
control. 
In sum, highly concentrated ownership seems to mitigate information 
asymmetry problems and ease the monitoring role of shareholders over the CEO 
or executive team. In particular, within the banking industry, disciplinary 
takeovers are rare, bank directors hold small equity stakes and bank directors are 
less aggressive than other directors in removing poorly performing managers 
Therefore, the presence of majority shareholders might impact positively on the 
firm’s performance. However, empirical evidence on the banking industry reports 
either negative (Haw et al., 2010) or non-significant results (Busta et al., 2014).  
Following Grove et al. (2011), we consider block ownership as a 
mechanism to align the interests of managers and shareholders due to increased 
oversight. Thus, based on the majority shareholders’ incentives to avoid risk and 
increase their investment profitability, we posit the following null hypothesis: 
H4: The level of ownership concentration is not associated with Islamic banks’ 
performance. 
Some researchers have found that banking outcomes also worsen with state 
ownership. Mian (2003), using data for a large set of emerging economies, finds 
that state-owned banks report higher loan loss provisioning and achieve lower 
profitability than private banks. Micco et al. (2007) report that state-owned banks 
located in developing countries tend to have lower profitability and higher costs 
than their private counterparts. Cornett et al. (2010) show that state owned-banks 
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in 16 Asian countries operated less profitably and had greater credit risk than 
privately-owned banks prior to 2001, although this performance gap was largely 
closed after the Asian financial crisis.  
In the same vein, Berger et al. (2005) find that the performance of state-
owned banks in Argentina, measured by cost efficiency, was low in the 1990s, and 
improved considerably after privatization. Lin and Zhang (2009) report that, the 
‘‘Big Four’’ state-owned commercial banks in China are less profitable, are less 
efficient, and have worse asset quality than other types of banks that involve some 
domestic or foreign private ownership. Erkens et al. (2012) analyse 296 bank 
holding companies in 30 countries during the crisis period (2008-2009), 
concluding that banks with high institutional ownership registered worse 
performance, measured through stock returns, during the crisis.  
Therefore, based on consistent prior evidence, we test the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: State ownership is not associated with Islamic banks’ performance. 
Some studies indicate that banks with institutional ownership (banks, 
companies) and foreign shareholders do not perform better (Zouari and Taktak, 
2014). However other studies (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Barry, et al. 2011) 
found that institutional ownership don not effect on the performance. 
Barry, et al. (2011) used 249 banks in 16 Western European countries in the 
period 1999-2005 to analyse the link between ownership structure and risk in both 
privately owned and publicly held banks. They found that, when a bank owns 
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another bank, the risk–return relationship and strategies are expected to be handled 
by the parent company and not by its subsidiary. They also conclude that, when 
bank owns another bank, it doesn’t seem to impact on bank's performance.  
Therefore, based on consistent prior evidence, we test the following 
hypothesis: 
H6: Bank ownership is not associated with Islamic banks’ performance. 
In the following chapter, we perform the statistical analysis to confirm or 
reject our research questions. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN, SAMPLE SELECTION 
AND DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we present the research design used to test the research 
questions and the study sample.  
We have developed a performance model that comprises the exploratory 
variables, that is, those variables related to the Shariah board and the ownership 
structure, and a set of control variables typically considered in the empirical 
literature. 
Below, we describe the sample selection process and analyse the sample 
composition. Also, we review the main descriptive statistics for both the 
dependent and the explanatory variables. We also provide a test of means to 
identify statistically significant differences between those banks based in countries 
with a national Shariah board and those where there is no such body. Finally, a 
correlation analysis is carried out in order to assess possible problems that could 
appear in the estimation of the models. 
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4.2. Research design 
Following prior studies, and in order to test our research hypotheses, the 
model that we use to test the influence of our variables of interest on bank 
performance is built as follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘′𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
= 𝛼𝛼 + �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶 𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where i goes from bank 1 to bank 93; t refers to years from 2011 to 2016; α 
parameter is the estimated coefficient for the constant; the β parameters are the 
estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables (variables of interest and 
control variables); Year is the time effect; and ɛ is the stochastic error term. 
4.2.1. Specification of the dependent variable 
The dependent variable in our model is Bank performance. Archival 
research provides a wide variety of measures with which to assess performance. 
As depicted in Table 4.1, we have first employed the most common one, i.e. the 
market-based measure Tobin's Q ratio (Q). Q is the ratio of the firm market value 
to the replacement cost of its assets (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). In an 
equilibrium situation, the Tobin's Q ratio has a value of one. If the ratio is above 
one, it stimulates investment and if the value is below one, the company offers less 
investment opportunities (Kim et al. 1993). Following prior research (Yermack 
Chapter 4.- Research Design, Sample Selection and Description of the Data 
129 
1996; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Coles et al. 2008; De Andres and Vallelado, 
2008; Belkhir, 2009; Adams and Mehran 2012; Erkens, et al.2012; Peni and 
Vähämaa 2012), we measure it as the book value of total assets minus the book 
value of common equity plus the market value of common equity divided by the 
book value of total assets. 
Tobin’s Q ratio 
Q = 
(Book Value Total Assets – Book Value Equity + Market Value Equity) 
Book Value of total Assets 
Martin (1993) states that profitability measures complement rather than 
substitute the Q ratio. Thus, to better illustrate the impact of Shariah board 
characteristics and ownership structure on bank performance, we have also used 
accounting-based approaches, such as Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on 
Equity (ROE). Financial accounting literature offers a wide range of measures of 
profitability where both the numerator and denominator are computed in several 
ways. We measure ROA as the net income divided by the total assets and, 
similarly, we estimate ROE as the net income divided by total equity (such as in 
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4.2.2. Specification of the Shariah Board characteristics  
Shariah board size 
Our exploratory variables related to the Shariah Board (Table 4.1.) are 
Shariah Board size (SBS) which consists of the total number of Shariah Board 
members (Grassa and Matoussi, 2014; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Matoussi and 
Nomran et al. 2018). In addition, in order to test the presence of an inverted U-
shaped (concave) relationship between board size and performance (De Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008; Grove et al. 2011), the model also comprises the squared 
variable SBS2.  
Shariah board members= Number of members of the Shariah board.  
Shariah board members2 = Squared number of members of the Shariah board. 
Shariah board activity 
Shariah boards are regularly convened to carry out monitoring and advisory 
functions. Shittu et al. (2016) report a positive relationship between Shariah board 
meetings and bank performance but Matoussi and Grassa (2012) failed to find any 
significant association between those two variables. We measured Shariah board 
activity (SBM) through the number of Shariah board meetings in a year. 
Shariah board activity = Number of Shariah board meetings in a year. 
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Shariah board expertise 
Shariah boards with more educated scholars might lead to a better 
interpretation of the operations in Islamic bank, and consequently better 
performance (Shittu et al. 2016; Hamza, 2016; Nomran et al. 2018). Following 
prior research, Shariah board expertise (SBEDU) is operationalized through the 
average education of its members, that is, the number of members who hold degree 
in the accounting and finance field divided by the total number of Shariah board 
members: 
Shariah board average education = Proportion of members holding a degree in 
accounting and/or finance field. 
4.2.3. Specification of the ownership structure 
The second set of exploratory variables is related to ownership structure. 
First, we measure the ownership concentration, labelled Control rate, as the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder.  
Control rate = Percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder. 
In order further explore the impact of the type of blockholder on the bank´s 
performance, we employ the dummy variable State that equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder is a governmental entity and 0 otherwise (Mian, 2003; Berger et 
al.2005; Micco et al.2007).  
State = Dummy that equals 1 if the largest shareholder is a governmental entity 
and 0 otherwise. 
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In addition, we use a dummy variable Bank, which equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder is a bank and 0 otherwise (Shleifer, 1998; Cornett et al. 2009). 
Bank = Dummy that equals 1 if the largest shareholder is a bank and 0 otherwise. 
4.2.4. Control variables 
In analysing bank performance, we control for other potential determinants 
of the dependent variable, which we group in CG and macroeconomic variables. 
4.2.4.1. Corporate Governance variables 
According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) the main role of 
the board of directors are to monitor managers and align their interests with those 
of the shareholders. In this model, we control for board characteristics that impact 
firm performance in line with prior published results. In particular, as depicted in 
Table 4.1, we include the variable board size, labelled BoDS, and calculated as the 
number of board members; board activity measured through the number of annual 
board meetings (BoDM) and board independence, which is the proportion of non-
executive members of the board (BoDIND).  
Board size  
Similar to Jensen’s (1993) conclusions, some studies on the banking 
industry found that there is a negative relationship between board size and bank 
performance, suggesting that larger boards are liable to increase agency as well as 
‘free-riding’ problems (Staikouras et al., 2007; Pathan et al., 2007; Pathan and 
Faff, 2013; Liang et al., 2013; Ramadani and Witteloostuijn, 2010; Mollah and 
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Zaman, 2015). However, prior studies found that there is a positive relationship 
between bank size and bank performance (Malik et al., 2014; Tanna and Nnadi, 
2011; Adams and Mehran, 2012; Esayed, 2011; Aebi et al., 2012).  In sum, 
although it seems clear that board size significantly influences firm performance 
(Nor and Zawawi; 2016) the sign and the optimal size remains elusive. Following 
prior researches, we control for the number of members of the board of directors. 
Board members = Number of members of the board of directors 
Board activity  
One of the important duties of the board of directors is to arrange and attend 
periodic meetings during the year. This is considered their basic means of 
collecting information, making decisions and monitoring management. It also 
represents an opportunity for board members to get to know each other; to discuss 
organizational matters, the problems they may face and how to solve them; and to 
prepare plans and strategies to develop the organization in the future; all of which 
will be reflected in the performance. In this regard, some researchers consider that 
the number of meetings of the board is a good indicator of an effective board, 
which will improve the monitoring of the top management (De Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008; García-Meca et al., 2015; Liang et al., 2013). Nevertheless, 
Vafeas, (1999) demonstrates that frequent board meetings may lead to poor 
performance. Thus, we control for the impact of board activity on bank 
performance through the following variable: 
Board activity = Total number of meetings per year  
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Board independence  
Board independence is a central subject in governance research. Agency 
theory argues that independent, non-executive directors can monitor managers 
more efficiently and they have more incentives to protect shareholders’ interests 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1983; and Fama, 1980). Moreover, the 
literature on non-financial firms argues that outsiders, i.e. directors who have no 
direct financial, family or interlock ties with management, are considered to be 
more effective monitors of management because they are in theory less beholden 
to management (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 2001). They also provide expertise 
and experience on different backgrounds that may be valuable for advisory roles. 
A potential disadvantage of outside directors is that they may lack relevant firm-
specific information (Adams and Ferreira, 2007).  
According to Adams and Mehran (2012), it is not clear what relationship 
we should expect between board independence and firm performance. On the one 
hand, firm performance should improve with independence as a measure of the 
monitoring intensity of the board. On the other hand, there may be costs associated 
with independence due to outside directors’ lack of firm-specific knowledge. 
Hence, the relationship between performance and independence must ultimately 
be determined empirically.  In European banks, this ratio is lower and differs from 
country to country, with a very low ratio of outside directors in German banks and 
a very high proportion in other countries such as the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands (De Haan and Vlahu, 2015).  
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Conversely, stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 
1991) indicates that companies with boards dominated by insiders perform better 
than those dominated by outsiders. The reason behind is that inside directors are 
better informed and have more financial knowledge about their firms than outside 
directors, which will boost the performance of their firms (Ramdani and 
Witteloostuijn, 2010). 
Despite the growing number of studies pointing out the significant 
association between independent directors and bank performance, the sign of the 
relationship remains unclear. Some studies report a positive effect, e.g. Pathan and 
Skully and and Wickramanayake (2007) show that an increased proportion of 
independent directors positively affect local Thai banks’ performance. Liang et al. 
(2013) used 50 large Chinese banks over the period 2003-2010 to prove that the 
board's independence has a positive effect on banks’ performance and asset 
quality. Liu et al. (2015) found that independent directors have an overall positive 
effect on firm operating performance in China. On the contrary, some evidence 
indicates that there is a negative relationship between independence of the board 
of directors and bank performance (Aebi et al.; De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; 
Wang et al., 2012; Erkens et al., 2012). Finally, Chio and Hasan (2005) and Adams 
and Mehran (2012) do not find any significant effect on bank performance. 
In addition, banking regulations and the legal system have a significant 
impact on the internal governance arrangements of banks, particularly on board 
independence. 
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We identify outsiders as those members of the boards that do not hold an 
executive position within the bank. In particular, we measure board independence 
as the proportion of non-executive members over the total number of members: 
Board independence = 
Number of non-executive members 
Total number of board members 
4.2.4.2. Non-corporate governance variables of control 
In addition to CG variables, we have also considered other factors that have 
been shown to be significantly associated with bank profitability. However, the 
literature about Islamic banks’ performance is still in its relatively infancy 
compared to studies on conventional banks, and is not conclusive yet.  
Bank variables 
Based on data availability constraints and prior corroborated results, we 
employ the following set of bank control variables:  Bank_ size, calculated as the 
natural logarithm of total assets; Bank_age; the number of the years from 
establishment date to the current date; year and country.   
Agency theory of the firm suggests that the actions and decisions of 
managers are skewed towards personal gain. This implies that the managers might 
seek to increase the size of the bank to gain more power and earn higher salaries 
without considering the impact of the company’s growth on its profitability. 
According to this theory, bank size may have a negative influence on bank 
profitability. However, stewardship theory suggests that managers are good 
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stewards of the corporate assets because they are naturally trustworthy and not 
liable to misuse the firm’s resources (Davis et al., 1997). De Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) and Adams and Mehran (2012) report a negative relationship between bank 
size and bank performance, thus corroborating the premises of agency theory. 
Conversely, Faff and Pathan (2013) found a positive relationship between the two 
variables, as stewardship theory predicts.  
To reduce variability, we have measured total bank assets in its logarithmic 
form: 
Bank size = Natural log of total bank assets in US$ millions 
As in prior literature (Dick, 2006; Matoussi and Grassa, 2012; Hamza, 
2016) we also control for bank age: 
Bank age = Number of years from the establishment date 
In order to control for the bank’s leverage (Bonin et al.2005; Iannotta et 
al.2007; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Aebi et al.2012; Berger et al.2016) the model also 
comprises: 
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Macroeconomic variables 
Prior literature contemplates a wide range of macro-economic but without 
conclusive results. Due to data availability restrictions, we control for the 
following macroeconomic determinants of bank performance: 
Bank’s performance can be associated to the country level of income, 
measured as the growth rate of GDP (Bashir, 2003; Grassan and Gazdar, 2014). 
Inflation has also proved to influence banks’ profitability, although both a 
negative (Zeitun, 2012) and positive (Bashir, 2003) relationship has been reported. 
Our model also controls for the influence of the inflation rate on the bank’s 
performance.  
Following, table 4.1. provides the variables, labels and measurements used 
in our empirical analysis. 
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Table 4. 1: Variables of the model 




Panel A Dependent variables and control variables 
 Dependent variables (bank’s performance)   




Book value of total assets minus the 
book value of common equity plus the 
market value of common equity divided 
by the book value of total assets. 
  
ROA Return on assets Net income divided by total assets   
ROE Return on equity Net income divided by total equity   
 Experimental variables related to Shariah Board 
characteristics 
  
SBS Shariah Board Size Number of Shariah board members H1 + 
SBS2 Shariaz Board Size2 Squared number of Shariah board 
members 
H1 - 
SBM Shariah Board 
Meetings 
Number of Shariah board meetings per 
year 
H2 + 
SBEdu Shariah Board 
Education 
Average number of Shariah board 
members which are holding a degree in 
finance science 
H3 + 
     
 Experimental variables related to ownership structure   
Control rate Main shareholder Largest percentage of shares H4 + 
State Government is the  
main shareholder 
Dummy that equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder is a governmental entity and 
0 otherwise  
H5 - 
Bank Bank is the main 
shareholder 
Dummy that equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder is a bank and 0 otherwise 
H6 + 
     
 Control variables    
BoDS Board Size Number of Board of Directors members   
BoDM Board Meetings Number of Board of Directors meetings 
per year 
  
BoDIND Board Independence Fraction of Non-executive board 
members 
  
Bank_size Bank Size Natural logarithm of total assets   
Bank_age Bank Age Number of years from the establishment 
dated until current date. 
  
Loansta             Loans-to-Assets The ratio loans to total assets   
GDP_growth  Growth rate in the income of an 
economy  
  
Inflation  Growth rate in price level of goods and 
services in an economy 
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4.3. Statistical methods 
Performance models usually suffer from problems of endogeneity 
(companies that perform better also implement better CG mechanisms) and the 
existence of unobservable fixed effects associated with explanatory variables.  
In order to address the endogeneity concerns, also called reverse causality, 
we need an instrumental variable that is correlated with board size but uncorrelated 
with performance. In the context of governance regressions, it is difficult to come 
up with valid instruments that exhibit sufficient variation over time. The factors 
that are arguably most closely correlated with the endogenous variable are other 
governance or firm characteristics that are already (or should be) included in 
performance regressions. For example, Eisenberg et al. (1998) use firm age and 
group membership as instruments for board size in performance regressions; Coles 
et al. (2008) use three-stage least squares but do not explain the validity of their 
instruments for board size, which are firm age and CEO tenure. Lehn et al. (2009) 
use 5-year lagged performance as an instrument for board size, but lagged 
performance is potentially correlated with performance. 
Following Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998) and De 
Andres and Vallelado (2008), we apply the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) from Arellano and Bond (1991) to control for unobservable panel-level 
effects derived from the linear models and to ensure correlation with the lagged 
dependent variables does not produce inconsistent estimators. Therefore, to 
control for the endogeneity of some variables, we use 2 to 4 lags of board of 
director variables (Board Size and Board Meetings) as instrumental variables, as 
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well as controlling for dynamic adjustment by considering the lagged dependent 
variables during 2 periods. Furthermore, by using the dynamic dimension of panel 
data, we can check response processes across time and identify how the 
characteristics of the board of directors affect bank performance. 
Finally, the model also incorporates the correction proposed by Windmeijer 
(2000) for small samples, due to the relatively few observations related to South 
Asian Islamic banks. To test the validity of the model we calculate AR1 and AR2 
tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation. 
4.4. Sample selection  
The sample and the main financial information were sourced from 
Bankscope database. The data related to the Shariah board were mostly hand-
collected from individual banks’ annual reports and, additionally, from other 
sources such as stock markets websites. Other sources of financial and non-
financial information used in this study are: 
 ORBIS. This database provided financial information such as return on 
assets and return on equity.  
 Annual Accounts and Corporate Governance Annual Reports of the banks, 
released on their official websites, which provided additional information 
about the Shariah board and board of directors.  
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 Official websites of the Stock Exchanges database of Gulf countries and 
Southeastern Asian countries and World bank, which have been used to 
supplement the data. 
Initially, the period of study was from 2008 to 2016 but, as depicted in Table 
4.2, we lacked relevant financial data from 2008 until 2010. The missing data 
during this period is likely associated with the financial crisis in the Islamic 
banking industry (Grassa and Matoussi, 2014). Thus, we dropped 279 bank-year 
observations and investigated bank performance from 2011 to 2016. The final 
sample consists of 93 banks and 558 bank-year observations. The sample includes 
unlisted banks, so we could only calculate Tobin’s Q ratio for 50 banks, yielding 
300 observations. 
Table 4. 2: Sample of the study 
Variables Banks Observations 
Initial samples 93 837 
Lack of Information (2008-2010)  279 
Final sample for 2011-2016 93 558 
Lack of information related to Q ratio (non-listed banks) 43 258 
Final sample for listed banks for 2011-2016 50 300 
 
Our sample comprises banks based in 15 countries. We test our hypotheses 
on the full sample, but also on two groups of countries: those whose system can 
be classified as Centralized (central Shariah board plus Shariah board in financial 
institutions); and Non-Centralized (Shariah board only in financial institutions). 
Hence, we present in Table 4.3 the distribution of the banks and observations for 
each region and country. 
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Table 4. 3: Distribution of the sample by geographical region and country  
Country Number of banks Number of observations 
Non-Central Shariah Board Countries 46 276 
Bangladesh 7 42 
Bahrain 14 84 
Jordan 3 18 
Kuwait 6 36 
Oman 2 12 
Qatar 4 24 
Saudi Arabia 8 48 
Singapore 1 6 
Thailand 1 6 
Central Shariah Board Countries 47 282 
Brunei Darussalam 3 18 
Indonesia 8 48 
Malaysia 12 72 
Pakistan 11 66 
Sudan 5 30 
UAE 8 48 
Total 93 558 
 
As depicted in Table 4.3, within the countries without a national Shariah 
board, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have the largest number of Islamic banks: 14 and 
8 respectively. Within the group of countries with a national Shariah board, 
Malaysia and Pakistan have the largest number of Islamic banks (12 and 11, 
respectively).   
Notably, the sample in both groups is evenly distributed: out of 93 banks 
(558 observations), 46 banks (276 observations) are based in the non-centralized 
Shariah board countries and 47 banks (282 observations) are located in the 
centralized Shariah board countries. 
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4.5. Descriptive analysis 
Table 4.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables. Regarding the 
dependent variables, performance measured through the Q ratio reaches, on 
average, the value 1, while the mean of ROE (7.2%) remains higher than the mean 
of ROA (0.6%). The Shariah board, on average, consists of 4.4 members and 
ranges from 2 to 12 members. They meet more than 5 times per year, although the 
range is very wide: some banks’ Shariah board only met once in a year (e.g. 
Tamweel PJSC; Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC, First Security Islami Bank Limited; 
PT Bank BNI Syariah or Hong Leong Islamic Bank Berhad) whereas the Alrajhi 
Bank in Saudi Arabia met 45 times in one year. The reason for this unusually high 
activity is that in 2016 the Shariah board had to deal with 450 phone and 83 mail 
inquiries from the customers and issued 15 decisions and 240 guidelines. In 
addition, the Shariah board prepared a number of educational manuals and also 
organized 13 Shariah courses for new employees, and held 19 workshops for 
branch managers, both in collaboration with the Training Centre.6 
 
  
                                                 
6 As reported in the Alrajhi Bank Annual Report, 2016.  
Chapter 4.- Research Design, Sample Selection and Description of the Data 
145 
Table 4. 4: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Median SD Min Max 
Q 275 1.000 0.996 0.185 0.397 3.150 
ROA 458 0.006 0.010 0.031 -0.357 0.217 
ROE 458 0.072 0.086 0.157 -1.160 1.980 
SBS 516 4.410 4.000 1.730 2.000 12.000 
SBM 514 5.120 4.000 4.860 1.000 45.000 
SBEDU 502 0.286 0.330 0.224 0.000 0.870 
BoDS 520 9.223 9.000 3.038 3.000 24.000 
BoDM 487 10.400 7.000 9.200 3.000 74.000 
BoDIND 487 0.717 0.750 0.231 0.182 1.000 
Control_rate 534 52.700 49.100 34.000 0.001 100.000 
State 527 0.245 0 0.430 0 1 
Bank 527 0.326 0 0.469 0 1 
Bank_size 458 21.900 22.000 1.580 16.400 25.500 
Bank_age 521 24.700 21.000 15.100 1.000 75.000 
Loansta 451 0.579 0.619 0.170 0.016 0.974 
GDP_growth 558 0.044 0.044 0.100 -0.313 0.357 
Inflation 558 4.860 3.170 6.150 -0.900 37.400 
The table shows the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of the following variables: Tobin’s Q 
proxy (Q), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah 
board average education (SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), Non-executive members (BoDIDN), Bank 
size (Bank_size) and Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the percentatge held by the major 
shareholder (Control_rate), the major shareholder is the government (State), the major shareholder is a financial institution 
(Bank). 
Regarding the average education variable, there are some Shariah boards 
that do not have any members educated in accounting and/or finance, while in 
other Shariah boards 87% of their members hold a degree in those disciplines. On 
average, 28.6% of the Shariah board members hold a degree in accounting and/or 
finance. 
Board of director characteristics show higher average values in terms of size 
(9.223) and meetings (10.400) than the corresponding Shariah board values. The 
most active board is the one pertaining to the BNI Shariah Bank in Indonesia, who 
met 74 times in 2013. According to the BNI Shariah Bank Annual Report (2013), 
this frequency is the consequence of the BNI Shariah Bank policy and the strategic 
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decision to increase the number of board meetings in order to improve the 
performance of the board. Additionally, the average ratio of non-executive 
members on Shariah boards is 0.717. 
The Islamic banks in the sample show a mean bank size of 21.900 
(logarithm of total assets), with a minimum value of 16.400 and a maximum of 
25.500. The banks’ experience represented by the bank age displays a mean of 
24.7 years. The oldest bank (75 years) is the Habib Bank Limited established in 
Pakistan in 1941.  
Finally, regarding the ownership structure, the smallest main shareholder 
owns 0.001% of the total shares (Tadamon Islamic Bank, Al Hilal Bank, Ajman 
Bank, Emirates Islamic Bank, Mashreq Bank, Dubai Bank, Sharjah Islamic Bank, 
ABC Islamic Bank, Kuwait Finance House and Bahrain Islamic Bank), but, on 
average, the main shareholder owns 52.7% of the shares. Furthermore, we can see 
that the major shareholder is the government in 24.5% of the cases, whereas 32.6% 
of Islamic banks have other financial institutions as their major shareholder. So, 
for the remainder (42.9%), the major shareholder of the Islamic bank is either a 
private firm or a family. 
Table 4.5 reports the descriptive statistics by country and regions. Results 
show that banks based in countries without a centralized Shariah board show, on 
average, higher performance values from a market perspective than those with a 
centralized Shariah board, i.e. a Q ratio of 1.021 for the former and 0.977 for the 
latter. However, the results for accounting-based performance measures 
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demonstrate that ROA and ROE are higher for countries with a centralized Shariah 
board, i.e. an ROA of 0.3% (0.9%) and an ROE of 6.3% (8.0%). 
The Islamic banks with the highest Q ratio are based in Jordan, Oman, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia (within the countries without a centralized Shariah board); and 
Pakistan in the group of countries with a centralized Shariah board. For the former 
group of countries, banks based in Qatar and Saudi Arabia show the highest ROA 
(1.80%) and ROE (11.5% and 12.8% respectively). Whereas for the second group 
of countries, banks located in Sudan are the most profitable in terms of ROA 
(2.7%) and ROE (19.3%) followed by those located in Brunei Darussalam with 
ROA of 1.5% and an ROE of 9.0%. 
Descriptive statistics show that those countries without a central Shariah 
board have, on average, bigger Shariah boards (4.601 members) and boards of 
directors (10.187 members) and a higher proportion of Shariah board members 
with a degree in accounting and/or finance (31.3%) than countries with a 
centralized Shariah board. Conversely, in countries with a central Shariah board, 
both governance bodies exhibit higher activity levels (on average, the Shariah 
board and the board of directors holds 5.291 and 11.245 annual meetings, 
respectively) than those that only have a bank-level Shariah board. 
Moreover, Islamic banks based in countries without a central Shariah board 
are, on average, larger and more experienced financial entities than those in the 
other group of countries. Conversely, in those countries with a central Shariah 
board, the mean control rate for the major shareholder is higher (63.6%), with the 
main shareholder being a governmental body or another financial institution in 
Chapter 4.- Research Design, Sample Selection and Description of the Data 
148 
25.8% or 42.4% of the observations, respectively. Therefore, in the remaining 
31.8% of the observations, the highest proportion of shares is in the hands of a 
family or a private company. 
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Table 4. 5: Descriptive statistics per country 
Country Q ROA ROE SBS SBM SBEDU BoDS BoDM BoDIND Bank_Size Bank_age Loansta GDP_growth Inflation Control_rate State Bank 
Non-Central SB 
countries 1.021 0.003 0.063 4.601 4.957 0.313 10.187 9.673 0.697 21.938 26.420 0.596 0.046 3.319 41.516 0.232 0.228 
Bangladesh 0.950 0.000 0.095 7.760 3.740 0.476 14.738 19.400 0.690 21.200 27.600 0.703 0.108 7.190 44.500 0.000 0.286 
Bahrain 0.948 -0.005 -0.011 3.670 3.740 0.322 8.974 5.440 0.693 20.700 19.900 0.458 0.037 2.160 46.300 0.039 0.234 
Jordan 1.010 0.009 0.100 3.390 3.670 0.216 8.833 6.440 0.816 21.500 39.200 0.717 0.070 2.460 72.700 0.000 0.667 
Kuwait 0.984 0.006 0.061 4.430 8.370 0.079 9.033 8.800 0.758 22.800 28.500 0.640 0.002 3.360 31.600 0.533 0.200 
Oman 1.010 -0.028 -0.054 4.000 4.900 0.452 8.200 7.400 0.811 20.000 18.600 0.559 0.024 1.730 22.000 0.500 0.000 
Qatar 1.120 0.018 0.115 3.000 4.420 0.413 9.625 10.300 0.773 23.200 24.300 0.564 0.038 2.460 14.400 0.500 0.000 
Saudi Arabia 1.150 0.018 0.128 4.210 7.430 0.289 9.667 6.670 0.467 24.000 40.300 0.608 0.042 3.430 42.200 0.375 0.125 
Singapore . -0.034 -0.044 9.000 3.000 0.330 14.667 26.300 0.922 19.300 6.500 0.357 0.040 2.030 50.000 0.000 1.000 
Thailand . -0.040 0.061 5.000 3.000 0.020 8.667 20.000 1.000 21.800 11.500 0.764 0.033 1.700 48.500 1.000 0.000 
Central SB 
countries 0.977 0.009 0.080 4.221 5.291 0.259 8.288 11.245 0.739 21.880 23.061 0.564 0.043 6.370 63.559 0.258 0.424 
Brunei Darussalam . 0.015 0.090 5.670 2.000 0.047 7.000 5.000 0.563 22.400 10.500 0.391 -0.023 0.252 42.000 1.000 0.000 
Indonesia 0.963 0.003 0.061 2.880 4.600 0.492 6.290 26.100 0.826 21.200 20.500 0.660 0.037 5.390 79.200 0.042 0.708 
Malaysia . 0.005 0.076 5.140 7.890 0.124 8.640 9.770 0.815 22.100 20.200 0.612 0.027 2.390 87.200 0.167 0.667 
Pakistan 1.020 0.007 0.053 4.020 3.360 0.333 9.303 6.360 0.608 21.800 27.500 0.388 0.078 7.130 50.200 0.100 0.300 
Sudan 0.852 0.027 0.193 4.460 9.380 0.190 9.967 17.100 0.914 20.200 30.100 0.421 0.067 26.800 8.870 0.000 0.250 
United Arab Emirates 0.985 0.012 0.077 4.000 3.020 0.235 7.230 6.000 0.733 23.000 23.800 0.660 0.036 1.780 64.400 0.714 0.143 
Total Sample 1.000 0.006 0.072 4.410 5.120 0.286 9.210 10.400 0.717 21.900 24.700 0.579 0.044 4.860 52.700 0.245 0.326 
The table shows the average values per country of Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), 
Shariah board average education (SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), Non-executive members (BoDIDN), Bank size (Bank_size) and Bank age (Bank_age), 
the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the percentatge held by the major shareholder (Control_rate), the major shareholder is the government (State), the major shareholder is a 
financial institution (Bank). 
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4.6. Correlation analysis 
Table 4.6 presents Pearson pairwise sample correlations between variables. 
Regarding our key test variables, the correlations between Shariah board 
characteristics and all bank performance measures are not statistically significant. 
The correlations between Shariah board meetings and all bank performance 
measures are not statistically significant. The correlations between Shariah board 
average education and bank performance measures are not statistically significant. 
The size of the board of directors is positively and statistically significantly 
correlated with ROA and ROE, though the correlation with Q is not statistically 
significant. The board of directors’ meetings is positively and statistically 
significantly correlated with ROE, though the correlation with Q and ROA is not 
statistically significant. The number of non-executive members is positively and 
statistically significantly correlated with ROE, though the correlation is not 
statistically significant with Q and ROA. Bank Size shows a significant positive 
correlation with all bank performance measures. Bank age is positively and 
statistically significantly correlated with ROA and ROE, though the correlation 
with Q is not statistically significant. 
Although the correlation coefficients between some variables are 
statistically significant, they do not show multicollinearity. However, we detect a 
significant and positive correlation between the size of Islamic financial 
institutions and their performance and SBM, but a negative correlation between 
size and the education of Shariah board members.   
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Table 4. 6: Pearson pairwise sample correlations 
  Q  ROA  ROE  SBS  SBM  SBEDU  BoDS  BoDM  
Q 1.000                
                 
ROA 0.293 *** 1.000              
 (0.000)                
ROE 0.224 *** 0.551 *** 1.000            
 (0.000)  (0.000)              
SBS -0.051  0.014  0.077 * 1.000          
 (0.393)  (0.764)  (0.097)            
SBM 0.078  0.048  0.065  0.069 * 1.000        
 (0.194)  (0.303)  (0.165)  (0.058)          
SBEDU 0.076  0.021  0.026  -0.003  -0.115 *** 1.000      
 (0.219)  (0.659)  (0.587)  (0.932)  (0.002)        
BoDS 0.067  0.107 ** 0.135 *** 0.526 *** -0.054  0.115 *** 1.000    
 (0.255)  (0.021)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.136)  (0.002)      
BoDM -0.058  0.022  0.093 * 0.271 *** 0.111 *** 0.223 *** 0.211 *** 1.000  
 (0.343)  (0.647)  (0.050)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)    
BoDIND -0.051  -0.004  0.0572  0.104 *** 0.158 *** -0.153 *** -0.083 ** 0.161 *** 
 (0.404)  (0.928)  (0.231)  (0.005)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.025)  (0.000)  
Bank_Size 0.287 *** 0.210 *** 0.251 *** -0.008  0.095 ** -0.106 ** 0.070  -0.042  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.864)  (0.041)  (0.025)  (0.131)  (0.378)  
Bank_Age 0.007  0.162 *** 0.150 *** -0.028  0.110 *** -0.064 * 0.062 * 0.007  
 (0.912)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.453)  (0.003)  (0.087)  (0.091)  (0.854)  
Loansta 0.003  0.119 ** 0.078 * 0.133 *** -0.042  0.067  0.020  0.163 *** 
 (0.960)  (0.010)  (0.093)  (0.004)  (0.368)  (0.161)  (0.675)  (0.001)  
GDP_Growth -0.207 *** 0.045  0.064  0.063 * -0.056  0.113 *** 0.103 *** 0.102 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.326)  (0.169)  (0.098)  (0.142)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.009)  
Inflation -0.147 ** 0.145 *** 0.179 *** 0.046  0.089 ** 0.048  0.115 *** 0.105 *** 
 (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.203)  (0.014)  (0.187)  (0.001)  (0.005)  
Control_Rate -0.075  -0.008  -0.033  -0.033  -0.027  0.025  -0.217 *** 0.119 *** 
 (0.214)  (0.871)  (0.484)  (0.459)  (0.546)  (0.585)  (0.000)  (0.009)  
State 0.215 *** 0.062  0.047  -0.048  0.095 ** -0.074  -0.160 *** -0.080 * 
 (0.000)  (0.187)  (0.317)  (0.284)  (0.035)  (0.104)  (0.000)  (0.082)  
Bank -0.008  -0.026  0.002  0.042  0.036  -0.095 ** -0.075 * 0.166 *** 
  (0.896)   (0.579)   (0.959)   (0.356)   (0.419)   (0.038)   (0.096)   (0.000)   
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Table 4.6: Pearson pairwise sample correlations (continued) 
  BoDIND  Bank_Size  Bank_Age  Loansta  GDP_Growth Inflation  Control_Rate  State  
BoDIND 1.000                
                 
Bank_Size -0.024  1.000              
 (0.6176)                
Bank_Age -0.141 *** 0.465 *** 1.000            
 (0.000)  (0.000)              
Loansta 0.033  0.074  -0.038  1.000          
 (0.495)  (0.113)  (0.431)            
GDP_Growth -0.072  -0.081 * -0.014  -0.104 ** 1.000        
 (0.855)  (0.081)  (0.709)  (0.026)          
Inflation -0.083  -0.268 *** 0.121 *** -0.200 *** 0.117 *** 1.000      
 (0.822)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)        
Control_Rate 0.056  -0.087 * -0.183 *** 0.263 *** -0.023  -0.239 *** 1.000    
 (0.218)  (0.064)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.590)  (0.000)      
State -0.021  0.378 *** 0.093 ** 0.050  -0.083 * -0.226 *** -0.236 *** 1.000  
 (0.655)  (0.000)  (0.039)  (0.298)  (0.058)  (0.000)  (0.000)    
Bank 0.196 *** -0.223 *** -0.291 *** 0.172 *** -0.004  0.015  0.547 *** -0.396 *** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.933)   (0.740)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
The table shows Pearson pairs-wise sample correlations. Bold text indicates statistically significant at 1% level. See table 4 for variables definitions 
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4.7. Univariate analysis 
In chapter 2, we identified two different Shariah governance systems, that 
is, with a national-level central Shariah committee and without such a committee. 
We have tested whether there are statistical differences between the two groups of 
countries. To that end, we performed a test of means. Results are reported in Table 
4.7. 
Table 4. 7: Test of Means according to Central Shariah Board and Non-Central Shariah Board 
countries 
Variables Central SB countries Non-central SB countries Mean Diff Sig 
Q 0.977 1.021 -0.044 ** 
ROA 0.009 0.003 0.006 * 
ROE 0.080 0.063 0.017  
SBS 4.221 4.601 -0.380 *** 
SBM 5.291 4.957 0.334  
SBEDU 0.259 0.313 -0.054 *** 
BoDS 8.343 10.261 -1.918 *** 
BoDM 11.245 9.673 1.571 * 
BoDIND 0.754 0.693 0.061 *** 
Bank_Size 21.880 21.938 -0.058  
Bank_Age 23.061 26.420 -3.360 *** 
Loansta 0.564 0.596 -0.032 ** 
GDP_growth 0.043 0.046 -0.003  
Inflation 6.370 3.319 3.050 *** 
Control_rate 63.559 41.516 22.043 *** 
State 0.258 0.232 0.026  
Bank 0.424 0.228 0.196 *** 
The table shows the T-test of mean for South Asian countries and Gulf countries. of Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education 
(SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), Non-executive members (BoDIND), Bank size logarithm of total assets 
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Regarding performance, the group of countries with a non-central Shariah 
board exhibits a significantly higher Q ratio (1.021) than the other group (0.977) 
with a 5% level of statistical significance. Profitability measured through ROA is 
statistically higher (at 10%) in central-Shariah board countries, but when it is 
measured through ROE there are no significant differences between the two 
groups. 
The results demonstrate that, on average, Islamic banks based in countries 
that follow a centralized model have a Shariah board that is smaller but more 
educated in finance and accounting than the other group. Boards of directors in 
Islamic banks from countries with a centralized model are, on average, 
significantly smaller but more independent and also more active (although the 
level of significance of this last characteristic is only 10%). Additionally, Islamic 
banks are older and have a higher debt ratio in the non-centralized model than in 
the centralized model. Finally, regarding ownership structure variables, those 
banks based in countries with a centralized Shariah board show a significantly 
higher percentage held by the major shareholder, as well as a higher proportion of 
financial institutions being the major shareholder. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we present the outcome of the statistical analyses performed 
to test the hypotheses related in chapter 3. 
In first place, we have explored the influence of Shariah Supervisory Board 
and ownership characteristics. Following, we present the additional analyses and 
the robustness tests. 
5.2. Hypotheses testing and discussion of the results 
Table 5.1 displays the coefficients and standard errors from the robust one-
step estimators of the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic model. This model deals 
with unobserved heterogeneity, a common problem in CG research. The model 
displays the coefficient of two period lagged dependent variables, the coefficients 
of explanatory variables, as well as the year dummies. The model also includes 
the first- and second-order correlation tests (AR1 and AR2). The AR1 and AR2 
show that serial correlation does not invalidate our results, as well as confirming 
the absence of second-order serial correlation, which implies that the instruments, 
employed to correct the possible endogeneity problem, are valid. The results also 
show that the Wald Chi2 tests are highly significant for all models. 
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The results related to the whole sample suggest that Shariah board 
characteristics affect significantly (at 1% level) the performance of financial 
institution according to the Q ratio but they do not influence the accounting 
measures (ROA and ROE), consistently with De Andres and Vallelado (2008).  
Therefore, those results reject the first hypothesis (H1), in other words, the Shariah 
Board Size significantly impact Islamic bank’s market performance. Moreover, 
the Shariah Board size presents a concave or U-inverted relationship with bank’s 
performance. Thus, the higher number of members of Shariah board, the higher of 
the Q ratio. This result corroborates that big boards benefits from higher diversity 
of skills and competences provided by a higher number of board members. 
Nevertheless, the negative coefficient displayed by the shariah board size squared 
(SBS2) suggests that excessive large boards difficult the coordination and the 
communication among members, triggering at the same time the aggravation of 
free-riding problems (Adams and Mehran, 2012; De Andrés and Vallelado, 2008). 
We have estimated the optimal number of Shariah Board members through 
the following equation 5.1: 
𝑃𝑃′(𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆) = 𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 2 · (𝛽𝛽𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2)𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆 = 0 (5.1) 
 
The optimal size of Shariah Board is around 12 members, in the case of Q 
ratio, because it did not show statistical significance for the accounting measures. 
Regarding the market-based model (Q), we also find a positive relation 
between Shariah board meetings and the banks’ performance. These results 
highlight the relevance of banks having a proactive board (De Andrés and 
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Vallelado, 2008; Liang et al., 2013; García-Meca et al., 2015). For Islamic banks, 
the number of meetings of the Shariah board seems to reflect a more proactive 
than reactive behaviour, which improves significantly the performance of the 
Islamic bank (therefore, we can reject the second null hypothesis, H2).  
In this sense, both a larger size and a regular activity of Shariah board seems 
to stimulate the advantages (advising and monitoring Islamic bank operations), 
increasing the pool of expertise (Dalton, 1998), to the detriment of disadvantages 
(lack of coordination and decision-making deficiencies).  
Additionally, the average education shown by members of Shariah Board 
impacts significantly and positively bank’s performance. That is consistent with 
the human capital theory and prior studies (Nomran et al. 2018 and Farook et 
at.2011) proving that educational issues turn usually into a higher quality of 
performance. According to those results we can reject the null H3, that is, the 
Shariah Board members’ education impact Islamic bank’s performance.  
On the other hand, Shariah Board characteristics are not relevant in terms 
of accounting-based performance measures. A plausible explanation might be 
rooted in the main role of the Shariah board: Since all Islamic banks’ governance 
systems include a Shariah Board that oversight bank’s operations, the range of 
allowed bank transactions do not differ significantly in terms of profitability. 
However, a better Shariah Board in terms of size, activity and education is 
perceived by the investors in a positive way and, therefore, positively impacts the 
Islamic bank’s market value. 
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Regarding Board of Directors, the higher number of independent members 
triggers lower levels of performance in terms of Q ratio, ROA and ROE. Bank age 
is negatively associated to both performance and return on assets, but with a low 
level of significance (10%). Conversely, the level of debt, measured through 
Loansta, is positively associated with both accounting measures of profitability, 
ROA and ROE suggesting positive financial leverage. 
Once we have tested the bank’s performance models for Shariah Board 
characteristics, we employ the same model in order to analyse the possible 
influence of ownership structure on Islamic Bank’s performance. Table 5.2 reports 
the multivariate analysis using one-step system estimator of the Arellano-Bond 
model (1991) for the bank’s performance regarding the ownership characteristics. 
Neither the measure related to ownership concentration (the percentage of 
shares hold by the major shareholder) nor the interaction with the identity of 
largest owners (either the state or bank) has significant implications for 
profitability (similar conclusions are reached by Thomsen and Pederson, 2000; 
Zouari and Taktak, 2014). Therefore, we cannot reject H4 and we cannot assert 
that the level of ownership is positively associated with Islamic bank’s 
performance. 
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Table 5. 1: Shariah Board characteristics. One-step model for all observations 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
VARIABLES Q  ROA  ROE  
Q t-1 0.252 ***      (2.892)      
Q t-2 -0.27 ***      (-3.122)      
ROA t-1   -0.38 **      (-2.194)    
ROA t-2   0.194       (1.241)    
ROE t-1     0.156       (0.644)  
ROE t-2     -0.049       (-0.986)  
SBS t 0.284 *** 0.009  0.047   (3.602)  (0.498)  (1.085)  
SBSt2 -0.012 ** -0.001  -0.004  
 (-2.357)  (-0.531)  (-1.186)  
SBM t 0.006 *** -0.000  -0.001   (4.117)  (-0.340)  (-0.552)  
SBEDU t 0.593 *** -0.020  0.008   (3.628)  (-0.537)  (0.058)  
BoDS t 0.003  0.002  0.007   (0.517)  (0.898)  (1.211)  
BoDM t -0.001  0.000  0.001   (-0.784)  (0.757)  (1.257)  
BoDIND t -0.083 *** -0.025 ** -0.067 *  (-2.799)  (-2.225)  (-1.956)  
Bank_size t -0.052  0.036  0.095 *  (-0.768)  (1.339)  (1.840)  
Bank_age t -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.001   (-1.799)  (-1.669)  (-0.273)  
Loanstat -0.175  0.136 ** 0.264 ** 
 (-1.343)  (2.257)  (2.094)  
GDP_growtht -0.155  -0.008  -0.017  
 (-1.589)  (-0.323)  (-0.260)  
Inflationt 0.001  0.001 ** 0.002  
 (0.575)  (2.325)  (0.822)  
Constantt 1.194  -0.823  -2.219 **  (0.750)  (-1.326)  (-1.975)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  
Observations 105  176  176  
AR1 -2.065 ** -0.093  -1.436  
AR2 0.547  -0.330  -0.944  
Wald Chi2 718.550   28.230   154.29  
The table shows the One-step GMM system estimator in all observations (Central and Non Shariah Board countries). The variables are Tobin’s 
Q proxy (Q), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average 
education (SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members (BoDIND), logarithm of total assets at 
book value in US $ millions (Bank_size), Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the growth rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP_growth), the inflation index (Inflation). ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. 2: Ownership structure and bank performance. One-step model for all observations 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
VARIABLES Q  ROA  ROE  
Q t-1 0.169 *      (1.887)      
Q t-2 -0.263 ***      (-2.696)      
ROA t-1   -0.425 ***   
   (-2.857)    
ROA t-2   0.182    
   (1.065)    
ROE t-1     0.135  
     (0.526)  
ROE t-2     -0.053  
     (-0.992)  
Control_Rate t 0.529  0.192  0.234  
 (1.158)  (1.332)  (0.651)  
State t -0.551 ** -0.041  0.067  
 (-2.421)  (-0.697)  (0.187)  
Bank t 0.006  -0.032  0.050  
 (0.102)  (-0.960)  (0.558)  
Control_Rate*State 1.467  0.142  -0.281  
 (1.348)  (0.509)  (-0.151)  
Control_Rate*Bank -0.073  0.117  -0.076  
 (-0.277)  (1.085)  (-0.308)  
SBS t 0.308 *** 0.008  0.041   (4.446)  (0.393)  (0.924)  
SBSt2 -0.012 *** -0.001  -0.003  
 (-2.976)  (-0.425)  (-0.980)  
SBM t 0.006 *** -0.000  -0.001   (4.938)  (-0.215)  (-0.612)  
SBEdu t 0.584 *** -0.023  0.050   (4.020)  (-0.651)  (0.349)  
BoDS t 0.004  0.001  0.007   (0.873)  (0.411)  (1.208)  
BoDM t -0.000  0.000  0.001   (-0.121)  (0.318)  (1.077)  
BoDIND t -0.048  -0.029 ** -0.074 *  (-1.221)  (-2.245)  (-1.824)  
Bank_size t -0.016  0.039  0.1 *  (-0.254)  (1.431)  (1.949)  
Bank_age t -0.001 * -0.001  -0.001   (-1.956)  (-1.558)  (-0.276)  
Loanstat -0.069  0.147 ** 0.277 ** 
 (-0.395)  (2.232)  (2.087)  
GDP_growtht -0.122  -0.023  -0.018  
 (-1.295)  (-0.707)  (-0.239)  
Inflationt 0.000  0.001 * 0.002  
 (0.123)  (1.695)  (0.865)  
Constantt 0.246  -0.958  -2.445 **  (0.159)  (-1.414)  (-2.062)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  
Observations 100  171  171  
AR1 -1.805 * 0.198  -1.438  
AR2 -0.091  -0.446  -0.853  
Wald Chi2 4,997.830   45.810   178.480  
The table shows the One-step GMM system estimator in Gulf countries. The variables are Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), return on assets 
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education 
(SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members (BoDIND), logarithm of total assets 
at book value in US $ millions (Bank_size), Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the growth rate of 
gross domestic product (GDP_growth), the inflation index (Inflation), the percentage held by the major shareholder 
(Control_rate), the major shareholder is the government (State), the major shareholder is a financial institution (Bank).  
***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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In order to test H5 and H6, we categorize the identity of the major 
shareholder by using two dummy variables. State is the first dummy that identifies 
whether the major shareholder is the government, and Bank is the second dummy 
that identifies whether the major shareholder is another financial institution. Only 
the fact that the main shareholder is a governmental institution has a negative 
impact on the Islamic bank’s performance. Therefore, it seems that the remaining 
investors do not perceive the high governmental participation in the Islamic Bank 
in a positive way. A plausible explanation could be related to the fact that the 
monitoring activity of government is less intensive than private firms, as 
concluded by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Beck et al. (2013); Micco et al. 
(2007); Iannotta et al. (2007) and Cornett et al. (2010). However, the accounting 
measures do not support this idea because ownership structure characteristics have 
no significant effect on profitability. According to those results we can reject the 
fifth hypothesis (H5) but not the sixth one (H6). Therefore, we can assert that the 
state-owned banks (ceteris paribus) perform worse than non-state-owned banks 
but the main shareholder being another bank does not seem to influence market 
performance. 
Table 5.3. summarizes the main results regarding the hypotheses developed 
in Chapter 3. It presents the tested dependent variables, the exploratory variables 
related with the hypotheses of the present investigation and the final results. 
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Table 5. 3: Main results 
Label Variables Definition Hypothesis tested Final result 
 Dependent variables and control variables 
 Dependent variables (bank’s performance)   
Q Tobin's Q (Q) ratio  
Book value of total assets minus 
the book value of common 
equity plus the market value of 
common equity divided by the 
book value of total assets. 
  
ROA Return on assets Net income divided by total assets   
ROE Return on equity Net income divided by total equity   
 Experimental variables related to Shariah Board characteristics   
SBS Shariah Board Size Number of Shariah board members H1 
Inverted U 
relationship with 
Q and not 
significant with 
ROA and ROE  
     
SBM Shariah Board Meetings 
Number of Shariah board 
meetings per year H2 
+ with Q ratio. 
Not significant 
with ROA and 
ROE 
Q Shariah Board Education 
Average number of Shariah 
board members which are 
holding a degree in finance 
science 
H3 
+ with Q ratio. 
Not significant 
with ROA and 
ROE 
 Experimental variables related to ownership structure   
Control 
rate Main shareholder Largest percentage of shares H4 Not significant 
State Government is the main shareholder 
Dummy that equals 1 if the 
largest shareholder is a 
governmental entity and 0 
otherwise  
H5 
- with Q ratio. 
Not significant 
with ROA and 
ROE 
Bank Bank is the main shareholder 
Dummy that equals 1 if the 
largest shareholder is a bank and 
0 otherwise 
H6 Not significant  
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5.3. Additional analysis 
5.3.1. Central vs Non-Central Shariah Board 
To further explore the impact of the Shariah Board models described in 
Chapter 2, we split the sample into two groups, those IBs settled on countries 
following a centralized model (results displayed in Table 5.4.) and those that do 
not have a national Shariah Board (Table 5.5.).  
For the subsample of countries with a Shariah Board at national level (Table 
5.4), the Q ratio is positively affected by the Shariah Board size and the 
relationship is concave or u-inverted. However, Shariah Board education drops its 
significance and the number of meetings is significant, but with a weak 10% level 
of significance.  
Regarding to the set of control variables, Board of Directors size and 
meetings affect significantly the Islamic bank’s ROE in a negative and positive 
way, respectively. The number of outsider is negatively related to the bank’s 
performance. Bank_size, bank_age and the level of debt (Loansta) negatively 
impact Islamic bank’s Q ratio. 
  
Chapter 5.- Analysis and Discussion of the Results 
164 
Table 5. 4: One-step model for Central Shariah Board countries 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
VARIABLES Q  ROA  ROE  
Q t-1 0.281 ***      (4.264)      
Q t-2 -0.234 ***      (-5.039)      
ROA t-1   0.008       (0.053)    
ROA t-2   -0.287       (-1.403)    
ROE t-1     0.112       (0.795)  
ROE t-2     -0.48 ***      (-4.385)  
SBS t 2.514 *** -0.005  -0.346   (3.656)  (-0.191)  (-1.420)  
SBSt2 -0.324 *** 0.000  0.035  
 (-3.552)  (0.182)  (1.448)  
SBM t -0.067 * 0.001  0.001   (-1.864)  (0.895)  (0.286)  
SBEdu t 0.000  -0.027  -0.431   (0.990)  (-0.741)  (-1.446)  
BoDS t -0.009  -0.002  -0.01 *  (-1.250)  (-1.205)  (-1.832)  
BoDM t -0.005  0.001  0.003 **  (-0.958)  (1.520)  (2.560)  
BoDIND t -0.087 ** -0.011  -0.039   (-2.430)  (-1.085)  (-0.709)  
Bank_size t -0.125 *** 0.027  0.091 *  (-2.582)  (1.095)  (1.708)  
Bank_age t -0.002 *** -0.000  -0.006 **  (-3.879)  (-1.341)  (-2.449)  
Loanstat -0.143 ** 0.088  0.202 ** 
 (-2.312)  (1.563)  (2.261)  
GDP_growtht -0.115 ** -0.055  -0.355 * 
 (-2.078)  (-1.200)  (-1.919)  
Inflationt -0.002  -0.000  -0.002  
 (-1.615)  (-0.579)  (-0.807)  
Constantt 0.000  -0.550  -0.798   (0.990)  (-0.976)  (-0.647)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  
Observations 35  92  92  
AR1 .  -1.090  -2.116 ** 
AR2 .  0.538  1.513  
Wald Chi2 33,718.640   567.930   18,968.640  
The table shows the One-step GMM system estimator in Central Shariah Board countries. The variables are Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education (SBEDU), 
Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members (BoDIND), logarithm of total assets at book value in US $ 
millions (Bank_size), Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP_growth), 
the inflation index (Inflation). ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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When there is no Shariah board at national level (results reported in Table 
5.5), the Shariah Board characteristics do not affect either the market or the 
accounting performance measures, suggesting that the market does not value a 
good Shariah Board. 
Board of Directors size positively affect IBs profitability (either ROA or 
ROE), but regarding its independence it seems that the Stewardship theory 
prevails, since it impacts significantly but negatively bank’s profitability, so inside 
background of the Board of Director’s members contribute to better managerial 
decisions.  
Finally, it is worth noting that regardless the model used (full sample and 
the Central/Non-central Shariah Board subsamples), AR1 and AR2 tests confirm 
the validity of instrumental variables and the lack of second-order serial 
correlation. 
  
Chapter 5.- Analysis and Discussion of the Results 
166 
Table 5. 5: One-step model for Non-Central Shariah Board Countries 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
VARIABLES Q  ROA  ROE  
Q t-1 0.416 ***      (4.520)      
Q t-2 -0.394 ***      (-3.172)      
ROA t-1   -0.553 ***      (-5.888)    
ROA t-2   0.296 *      (1.742)    
ROE t-1     -0.163 *      (-1.712)  
ROE t-2     -0.086 ***      (-4.057)  
SBS t 0.200  -0.001  0.035   (0.787)  (-0.069)  (0.842)  
SBSt2 -0.008  0.001  0.001  
 (-0.530)  (1.292)  (0.165)  
SBM t 0.003  -0.000  -0.000   (1.280)  (-0.386)  (-0.220)  
SBEdu t 0.385  0.032  0.163   (1.494)  (0.856)  (1.387)  
BoDS t 0.006  0.004 *** 0.015 ***  (0.716)  (2.690)  (3.162)  
BoDM t -0.001  -0.000  0.000   (-0.549)  (-0.394)  (0.285)  
BoDIND t -0.074  -0.054 *** -0.123 ***  (-1.245)  (-4.417)  (-3.114)  
Bank_Size t 0.005  -0.008  0.021   (0.047)  (-0.527)  (0.383)  
Bank_age t 0.071 * 0.023 *** -0.024   (1.699)  (2.892)  (-1.119)  
Loanstat -0.425  0.09 ** 0.289 ** 
 (-1.386)  (2.571)  (2.259)  
GDP_growtht -0.196 * -0.006  -0.094 ** 
 (-1.682)  (-0.458)  (-2.076)  
Inflationt 0.031 ** -0.001  -0.000  
 (2.095)  (-0.448)  (-0.041)  
Constantt -1.751  -0.553 ** -0.071   (-0.871)  (-2.022)  (-0.078)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  
Observations 70  84  84  
AR1 -2.469 ** -1.382  -0.964  
AR2 -0.502  -0.748  -2.592 *** 
Wald Chi2 38,984.020   217.430   924.500  
The table shows the One-step GMM system estimator in Non-Central Shariah Board Countries. The variables are Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), return 
on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education (SBEDU), 
Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members (BoDIND), logarithm of total assets at book value in US 
millions (Bank_size), Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP_growth), 
the inflation index (Inflation). ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
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5.3.2. GCC vs South Asian countries 
Prior literature has extensively used (Hamza, 2013; Grassa and Gazdar, 
2014; Abdullah et al., 2015; Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Al-Azizah, 2017), the 
classification of Islamic banks according to the geographic and economic criteria 
of being based in one of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries or in the SA 
region. We have analysed whether this grouping criteria could shed some light 
over the investigation. To provide additional findings we have run again the model 
reported above over the new subsamples, GCC countries and SA countries. 
Table 5.6 reports the multivariate analysis using one-step system estimator 
of the Arellano-Bond model (1991). The results related to the banks that belong to 
GCC countries suggest that, Shariah board size presents the opposite, that is, 
convex or U-shaped relationship to both Islamic banks measures of profitability, 
that is, ROA and ROE because the lineal variable (SBS) is negative meanwhile its 
quadratic form (SBS2) presents a positive coefficient. This is not an isolated 
finding because it is consistent with previous studies (see e.g., Yermack, 1996; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998). The reported data also suggest that the remaining SB 
characteristics, education and activity, do not significantly affect neither the 
performance nor the profitability of the Islamic banks (according to Grassa and 
Matoussi, 2014). Therefore, we could reject the first hypothesis (H1) but not H2 
and H3 for the GCC countries.  
In addition, none of the ownership characteristics but the major shareholder 
being a bank impact Islamic banks’ performance. For the Islamic banks located in 
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GCC countries, when the main shareholder is a bank presents a positive impact on 
the Islamic bank’s ROA. 
Regarding to the control variables, it is worth mention that there is no 
relationship between board size and bank’s performance (Beiner et al.2004; Guest, 
2009) but there is a positive relationship between board of directors meetings and 
market-based measure (Q), which is consistent with previous studies (De Andres 
and Vallelado, 2008; García-Meca et al., 2015; Liang et al., 2013). However there 
is no relationship between baord meetings and accounting-based measures of 
performance (ROA and ROE).  
We can also assert that there is a negative relationship between the number 
of non-executive members and bank´s performance. This result is consistent with 
previous studies (Yermack, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2001; Aebi et al.2012; 
Mollah and Zaman, 2015) and supports the Stewardship theory. 
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Table 5. 6: One-step model for GCC countries 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
VARIABLES Q  ROA  ROE  
Q t-1 0.170       (1.518)      
Q t-2 -0.831 ***      (-2.964)      
ROA t-1   -0.636 ***   
   (-14.658)    
ROA t-2   0.497 ***   
   (11.611)    
ROE t-1     -0.145  
     (-0.994)  
ROE t-2     -0.052  
     (-0.303)  
SBS t 0.069  -0.097 ** -0.444 ***  (0.135)  (-2.237)  (-3.323)  
SBSt2 0.070  0.011 ** 0.051 *** 
 (1.122)  (2.503)  (3.710)  
SBM t 0.003  -0.000  -0.000   (1.379)  (-0.221)  (-0.066)  
SBEdu t -1.340  -0.056  -0.195   (-0.743)  (-1.058)  (-0.931)  
Control_Rate t -0.490  0.074  0.246  
 (-0.495)  (0.428)  (0.298)  
State t 0.051  0.013  -0.354  
 (0.124)  (0.208)  (-1.170)  
Bank t 0.225  0.088 ** -0.003  
 (1.376)  (1.998)  (-0.006)  
Control_Rate*State -0.847  -0.035  2.102  
 (-0.385)  (-0.094)  (1.130)  
Control_Rate*Bank -1.144  -0.630 ** -0.039  
 (-0.970)  (-2.000)  (-0.011)  
BoDS t 0.005  -0.001  -0.000   (0.765)  (-0.676)  (-0.043)  
BoDM t 0.013 ** -0.000  -0.001   (2.071)  (-0.480)  (-0.377)  
BoDIND t -0.095 ** -0.04 *** -0.126 *** 
 (-2.225)  (-2.846)  (-2.992)  
Bank_size t -0.010  -0.008  0.022   (-0.128)  (-0.976)  (0.480)  
Bank_age t 0.031  0.029 *** -0.025   (0.804)  (8.310)  (-1.373)  
Loanstat -0.318  0.044  0.206  
 (-1.200)  (1.288)  (1.377)  
GDP_growtht -0.150  -0.003  -0.052  
 (-1.312)  (-0.122)  (-0.468)  
Inflationt 0.005  0.001 ** 0.003 * 
 (1.449)  (2.446)  (1.916)  
Constantt 0.000  -0.270  1.379   (0.990)  (-0.956)  (1.384)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  
Observations 63  84  84  
AR1 -1.777 * -1.941 * -1.613  
AR2 -0.578  -1.429  -1.946 * 
Wald Chi2 1.380·109   4.740·109   8.200·107  
The table shows the One-step GMM system estimator in Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC). The variables are Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education 
(SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members (BoDIND), logarithm of total assets at book value 
in US $ millions (Bank_size), Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the growth rate of gross domestic product 
(GDP_growth), the inflation index (Inflation), the percentage held by the major shareholder (Control_rate), the major shareholder is the 
government (State), the major shareholder is a financial institution (Bank). ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 5.7 shows the results related to the banks settled in SA countries. The 
Shariah board characteristics don not affect significantly the performance of 
banks, except for Shariah board size that presents a convex relationship with 
bank’s ROE (model 3). Shariah board meetings (SBM) present a weak association 
with Q ratio. Regarding ownership characteristics, the results depicted in Table 
5.7 suggest a weak association with Q ratio (10% significance) and, similar to the 
subsample of GCC banks, only when the major shareholder is another financial 
institution it seems to impact positively on the Islamic bank’s ROE (model 3). 
None of the interactions between control rate and major shareholder 
(Control_Rate*State and Control_Rate*Bank) exhibits significant association 
with the three performance measures (Models 1, 2 and 3). 
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Table 5. 7: One-step model for South Asian Countries 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
VARIABLES Q  ROA  ROE  
Q t-1 0.137       (1.167)      
Q t-2 0.226 *      (1.857)      
ROA t-1   -0.075    
   (-0.295)    
ROA t-2   -0.033    
   (-0.218)    
ROE t-1     -0.019  
     (-0.083)  
ROE t-2     -0.106 * 
     (-1.771)  
SBS t 0.010  0.008  0.112 **  (0.117)  (0.640)  (2.198)  
SBSt2 -0.003  -0.001  -0.010 ** 
 (-0.796)  (-1.333)  (-2.543)  
SBM t 0.003 * 0.001  -0.000   (1.765)  (0.858)  (-0.136)  
SBEdu t -0.170  -0.030  0.107   (-0.855)  (-0.985)  (0.698)  
Control_Rate t 0.185 * 0.146  0.536 * 
 (1.787)  (1.248)  (1.715)  
State t 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.990)  (0.990)  (0.990)  
Bank t -0.023  0.016  0.271 ** 
 (-0.535)  (0.720)  (2.472)  
Control_Rate*State 0.000  -21.837  -92.097  
 (0.990)  (-0.880)  (-1.194)  
Control_Rate*Bank 0.053  0.023  -0.441  
 (0.327)  (0.296)  (-1.632)  
BoDS t 0.005 ** 0.000  0.004   (2.157)  (0.312)  (0.937)  
BoDM t 0.000  0.000  0.001   (0.338)  (0.763)  (0.844)  
BoDIND t -0.021  -0.004  0.015   (-1.454)  (-0.246)  (0.325)  
Bank_size t -0.060  0.037  0.161 *  (-1.380)  (1.073)  (1.665)  
Bank_age t -0.001 *** -0.000  -0.004   (-5.434)  (-0.824)  (-0.948)  
Loanstat 0.404 *** 0.158  0.387 ** 
 (2.746)  (1.316)  (2.163)  
GDP_growtht -0.239 ** -0.041  -0.174 * 
 (-2.001)  (-0.937)  (-1.772)  
Inflationt 0.001  -0.004  -0.020  
 (0.360)  (-1.326)  (-1.503)  
Constantt 1.693  0.000  0.000   (1.379)  (0.990)  (0.990)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  
Observations 63  84  84  
AR1 -2.260 ** -1.267 * -1.777 * 
AR2 0.995  -1.355  -0.913  
Wald Chi2 429.100   359.98   56,147.080  
The table shows the One-step GMM system estimator in SA Countries. The variables are Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education (SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), 
Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members (BoDIND), logarithm of total assets at book value in US $ millions (Bank_size), 
Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP_growth), the inflation index 
(Inflation), the percentage held by the major shareholder (Control_rate), the major shareholder is the government (State), the major shareholder 
is a financial institution (Bank). ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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5.3.3. Alternative measures of bank’s performance 
Prior investigations have used different measures of firm’s performance. As 
a robustness check, we have rerun the model with different dependent approaches 
to firm’s performance.  
Table 5.8 exhibits the results when the dependent variable is ROA and ROE, 
but the numerator is the Ebitda (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and 
Amortization) instead of net income. We have also considered Loans quality, Net 
interest margin and Sales growth (Beck et al., 2013; Zouari and Taktak, 2014) as 
dependent variables. 
Regarding Shariah board characteristics, only its size (SBS) displays a 
concave or u-inverted relationship with Sales growth. Therefore, it seems that the 
increase in the number of members positively affect bank’s growth but there is 
point when the bigger size impacts negatively on the bank’s sales growth. This 
confirms our previous findings reported in the table 5.1.  
The ownership characteristics become more relevant when addressing 
alternate measures of performance than in prior analysis. When the main 
shareholder is a governmental entity (State) negatively impact bank’s ROE-Ebitda 
(1% of significance). Conversely, the main shareholder being a bank positively 
impacts bank’ performance when it is measured through ROE-Ebitda. Despite 
this, the interaction between those two variables with the Control rate 
(Control_rate*State and Control_rate*Bank) presents the opposite sign. 
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 The control variables do not present consistent results. Only Board of 
Directors meetings offer weak-significant negative relationship with ROE-Ebitda 
and Net interest margin, which is consistent with previous studies (Vafeas, 1999; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009).  
5.3.4. Alternative statistical methodologies 
In addition to the GMM dynamic model, we have also used two different 
static models, i.e. a random effects and Taylor model, in order to test the 
robustness of our results.  
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Table 5. 8: Alternative performance measures 
 Alternative performance measures 









 Sales Growth  
Dep. Var. t-1 0.101  0.150  -0.120  -0.227  -0.959 ***  (0.413)  (0.862)  (-0.329)  (-1.623)  (-21.317)  
Dep. Var. t-2 0.387 ** 0.019  -0.006  -0.019  -0.625 ***  (1.988)  (0.372)  (-0.252)  (-0.229)  (-17.127)  
SBS t 0.006  -0.018  -0.033  0.009  0.915 ***  (0.715)  (-0.244)  (-0.420)  (0.752)  (3.150)  
SBSt2 -0.001  0.001  0.008  -0.001  -0.088 *** 
 (-0.890)  (0.142)  (1.149)  (-1.333)  (-3.258)  
SBM t -0.000  0.000  0.001  -0.000  -0.001   (-0.210)  (0.294)  (0.765)  (-0.199)  (-0.240)  
SBEdu t -0.010  -0.169  -0.192  0.024  -0.641   (-0.323)  (-0.785)  (-0.631)  (0.581)  (-1.066)  
Control_Rate t 0.0429  -1.252  0.545  -0.278 ** 2.032  
 (0.274)  (-0.855)  (1.398)  (-1.964)  (0.504)  
State t -0.048  -1.799 *** -0.280  0.075  0.000  
 (-1.311)  (-4.586)  (-1.414)  (1.378)  (0.990)  
Bank t 0.048 ** 0.797 ** 0.043  0.072 ** 0.076  
 (2.053)  (2.319)  (0.348)  (2.393)  (0.074)  
Control_Rate*State 0.280  10.526 *** 1.277  -0.250  -0.238  
 (1.395)  (4.787)  (1.340)  (-0.890)  (-0.123)  
Control_Rate*Bank -0.174 ** -2.664 ** -0.013  -0.284 ** -1.033  
 (-2.282)  (-2.443)  (-0.039)  (-2.451)  (-0.229)  
BoDS t 0.000  0.005  0.004  -0.001  -0.008   (0.078)  (0.725)  (0.655)  (-0.895)  (-0.362)  
BoDM t -0.000  -0.008 * -0.002  -0.001 ** -0.001   (-0.570)  (-1.751)  (-0.988)  (-2.182)  (-0.419)  
BoDIND t -0.002  -0.081 * 0.043  -0.009  0.136   (-0.319)  (-1.920)  (1.005)  (-1.066)  (0.534)  
Bank_size t -0.007  0.053  0.061  0.004  0.509 **  (-1.313)  (0.899)  (1.047)  (0.479)  (2.020)  
Bank_age t 0.000  -0.002  -0.004  -0.000  0.006 *  (0.797)  (-1.451)  (-1.043)  (-0.944)  (1.836)  
Loanstat -0.001  0.188  0.578  -0.061 ** -0.561  
 (-0.043)  (1.348)  (1.546)  (-2.014)  (-0.759)  
GDP_growtht 0.005  0.167  0.044  0.013  -0.169  
 (0.415)  (1.025)  (0.396)  (0.960)  (-0.460)  
Inflationt 0.000  0.006 * 0.001  0.001  -0.021 *** 
 (0.685)  (1.675)  (0.262)  (1.042)  (-3.241)  
Constantt 0.154  -0.053  -1.983  0.250  -11.883 *  (1.105)  (-0.035)  (-1.328)  (1.063)  (-1.949)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Observations 165  165  169  163  106  
AR1 -1.680 * -2.875 *** 0.479  0.223  -2.280 ** 
AR2 -1.586  -0.338  -0.147  -1.585  -1.742 * 
Wald Chi2 5,955.470   16,467.350   134.000  646.980   44,468.660  
The variables are: ROA (EBITDA) is the Return On Assets as EBITDA divided by total assets, ROE (EBITDA) is the Return On Equity as 
EBITDA divided by total Equity, Loans Quality is the non-performing loans divided by loans, Net Interest Margin is the Net Interest Revenues 
divided by loans , Sales Growth is the change in turnover between fiscal year t-1 and fiscal year t, Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board 
meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education (SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members 
(BoDIND), logarithm of total assets at book value in US $ millions (Bank_size), Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), 
the growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP_growth), the inflation index (Inflation), the percentage held by the major shareholder 
(Control_rate), the major shareholder is the government (State), the major shareholder is a financial institution (Bank). ***, ** and * denotes 
statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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5.3.4.1. Random effects model 
The Hausman hypothesis was not rejected and, therefore, we could get 
better estimations using random effects. Thus, we assume in this model that the 
individual-specific effect is a random variable that is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables of all past, current and future time periods of the same 
individual. 
Table 5.9 presents the results of using random effects model for all 
observations. From the data displayed in the table 5.9 we can conclude that Shariah 
Board characteristics only exhibit a statistically significant relationship with ROE 
profitability (Model 3). Shariah board size has a concave relationship with ROE, 
but with weak statistical significance (10%), and Shariah Board education presents 
a positive association with ROE.  
In addition, Islamic banks owned by the government impact in a negative 
way the market-based measure of profitability, Q ratio, and also the interaction 
Control_Rate*Bank exhibit a significant influence on the Q ratio (the coefficient, 
1.582, is positive because it is the outcome of two negative coefficients -0.105 and 
-0.322). 
In general terms, we can conclude that the board of director’ characteristics 
do not impact Islamic bank’s performance.  
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Table 5. 9: Random Effects for the whole sample 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
VARIABLES Q  ROA  ROE  
SBS t 0.011  0.004  0.029 *  (0.175)  (0.953)  (1.691)  
SBSt2 -0.001  -0.000  -0.002 * 
 (-0.223)  (-1.259)  (-1.929)  
SBM t 0.003  0.000  -0.000   (1.218)  (1.193)  (-0.039)  
SBEdu t 0.110  0.016  0.072 **  (1.467)  (1.468)  (2.189)  
Control_Rate t -0.105  0.014  0.008  
 (-1.177)  (0.948)  (0.251)  
State t -0.322 * 0.007  0.024  
 (-1.683)  (0.880)  (0.921)  
Bank t 0.028  0.010  0.033  
 (0.694)  (1.257)  (0.955)  
Control_Rate*State 1.582 ** -0.023  -0.040  
 (1.978)  (-1.418)  (-0.846)  
Control_Rate*Bank 0.031  -0.016  -0.013  
 (0.286)  (-0.957)  (-0.256)  
BoDS t 0.008 * 0.001  0.003   (1.825)  (0.988)  (1.184)  
BoDM t -0.003  -0.000  -0.000   (-1.550)  (-0.616)  (-0.365)  
BoDIND t -0.067  0.005  0.019   (-1.353)  (0.371)  (0.578)  
Bank_size t 0.046 ** 0.006 * 0.039 *** 
 (2.124)  (1.894)  (4.757)  
Bank_age t -0.001  0.000  -0.001   (-1.044)  (0.271)  (-0.673)  
Loanstat -0.063  0.035 ** 0.140 ** 
 (-0.697)  (2.013)  (2.477)  
GDP_growtht -0.314 *** 0.015  0.134 * 
 (-2.738)  (0.880)  (1.914)  
Inflationt 0.001  0.001 * 0.008 *** 
 (0.341)  (1.851)  (3.739)  
Constantt -0.034  -0.192 ** -1.060 ***  (-0.066)  (-2.574)  (-5.631)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  
Observations 215  377  377  
Wald Chi2 235.430   71.640   275.320  
The table shows the Random Effects model for all observations. The variables are Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education (SBEDU), Board 
size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members (BoDIND), logarithm of total assets at book value in 
US $ millions (Bank_size), Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the growth rate of gross domestic 
product (GDP_growth), the inflation index (Inflation), the percentage held by the major shareholder (Control_rate), the major 
shareholder is the government (State), the major shareholder is a financial institution (Bank). ***, ** and * denotes statistical 
significance at 1% , 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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5.3.4.2. Taylor model 
Finally, we applied the Taylor model. This model is based on the estimators 
originally proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981). However, it incorporates 
instrumental variables, proposed by Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986), and the 
model is useful to control a specific problem of correlated variables. Specifically, 
this model assumes that some of the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
individual-level random effects, but that none of these variables are correlated 
with the idiosyncratic error. We complement our robustness tests with this method 
in order to provide further analysis. Data displayed in Table 5.10 indicates that 
none of the Shariah board characteristics impact significatively on Islamic bank’s 
performance. 
Consistently with the prior reported results of this investigation, when the 
major shareholder is a governmental body it negatively impacts the market-based 
measure (Q ratio).  
None of the board of directors characteristics have significant effect on the 
performance, except board size that has a positive effect on the performance in 
model 2 (ROA).  
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Table 5. 10: Taylor model for the whole sample 
  Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3)  
VARIABLES Q  ROA  ROE  
SBS t 0.070  -0.001  0.014   (0.916)  (-0.063)  (0.228)  
SBSt2 -0.004  0.000  -0.001  
 (-0.754)  (0.175)  (-0.248)  
SBM t 0.003  0.000  -0.001   (0.962)  (0.335)  (-0.271)  
SBEdu t 0.070  0.008  0.032   (0.437)  (0.391)  (0.296)  
Control_Rate t -0.149  0.015  0.019  
 (-0.776)  (0.663)  (0.172)  
State t -0.466 ** 0.001  0.038  
 (-2.477)  (0.070)  (0.406)  
Bank t 0.007  0.014  0.136  
 (0.064)  (0.902)  (1.629)  
Control_Rate*State 2.218 *** -0.008  -0.027  
 (2.828)  (-0.195)  (-0.126)  
Control_Rate*Bank 0.071  -0.023  -0.161  
 (0.255)  (-0.819)  (-1.159)  
BoDS t 0.004  0.003 ** 0.002   (0.430)  (2.000)  (0.247)  
BoDM t -0.001  0.000  0.001   (-0.366)  (0.977)  (0.404)  
BoDIND t -0.057  0.017  -0.018   (-0.679)  (1.525)  (-0.285)  
Bank_size t 0.036  0.006  0.054 ***  (1.020)  (1.536)  (2.713)  
Bank_age t -0.001  -0.000  -0.003 **  (-0.645)  (-0.443)  (-2.084)  
Loanstat -0.063  0.039 ** 0.151 * 
 (-0.411)  (2.378)  (1.646)  
GDP_growtht -0.336 *** 0.008  0.048  
 (-2.576)  (0.422)  (0.415)  
Inflationt 0.001  -0.000  -0.001  
 (0.223)  (-0.564)  (-0.246)  
Constantt 0.033  -0.152 * -0.834 *  (0.045)  (-1.647)  (-1.787)  
Year dummy YES  YES  YES  
Country dummy YES  YES  YES  
Observations 215  377  377  
Wald Chi2 36.280   42.890   29.370  
The table shows the Taylor model in all observations (Central and Non Shariah Board countries). The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q proxy 
(Q), return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), Shariah board size (SBS), Shariah board meeting (SBM), Shariah board average education 
(SBEDU), Board size (BoDS), Board meeting (BoDM), fraction of non-executive members (BoDIND), logarithm of total assets at book value 
in US $ millions (Bank_size), Bank age (Bank_age), the ratio loans to total assets (Loansta), the growth rate of gross domestic product 
(GDP_growth), the inflation index (Inflation), the percentage held by the major shareholder (Control_rate), the major shareholder is the 
government (State), the major shareholder is a financial institution (Bank). ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at 1% , 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.
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 CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
6.1. Conclusions 
The purpose of this research is to identify the associations, if any, between 
CG mechanisms in Islamic banks and their performance.  
Islamic banks are required to meet not only the same goals as their 
conventional counterparts, in terms of profitability targets, dividend policies, 
accounting regulation or implementation of prudential measures required by 
international institutions such as the Basel Committee, but they must also comply 
with Shariah principles. In this regard, the Shariah board plays a key role in the 
CG structure of Islamic banks, seeking to ensure fairness to all stakeholders 
through greater transparency and accountability regarding Islamic principles.  
There is scarce research addressing the impact of two governance issues in 
the Islamic banking industry; namely, the Shariah board characteristics and the 
ownership structure. This research aims to shed light on both topics through in-
depth review of prior literature and an empirical analysis of a sample of Islamic 
banks based in different countries. 
Below, we outline the highlights of this research project. 
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In chapter 1, we explained the concept of Islamic finance and the main 
similarities with and differences from conventional finance. Some of those 
differences emerge from the need to comply with the following five Shariah 
principles: 
a) The prohibition of interest (usury) in all transactions.  
b) The prohibition of excessive uncertainty (ghara), according to which the 
details of the sale contract cannot be unknown or uncertain.  
c) The prohibition on financing illicit industries.  
d) The principle of profit-and-loss sharing.  
e) All transactions have to be backed by a real economic transaction that 
involves a tangible asset. 
We then presented a brief history of the emergence of Islamic banks around 
the world, followed by an overview of the activities of Islamic banks. In this 
chapter we illustrated how the Islamic economy has emerged in response to the 
social commitments and ethical norms established under Shariah law, which 
originates from the Muslim holy book (Quran) and the actions of the prophet 
Mohammed (Sunnah). The main aim of Islamic banks is not only to seek profits 
for shareholders, but also to perform a wealth redistribution role and adhere to the 
principle of social justice that contributes to the improvement and well-being of 
society.  
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We ended this chapter by describing the current state of Islamic finance and 
showing how the growth rate of Islamic banks differs not only in Islamic countries 
but also around the world.  
In chapter 2, we discussed the concept of CG and reviewed the main 
characteristics of CG in conventional banking. Then, we explained the specific 
features of CG in Islamic financial institutions to provide a better understanding 
of the role of the Shariah supervisory board as an essential body for ensuring good 
governance in these institutions.  
Islamic banks are subject to a multi-level governance system, with religious 
elements playing a notable role in the governance structure. All Islamic financial 
institutions must implement a Shariah governance system, and the particular 
structure of this system is a distinguishing feature of Islamic business 
organizations (Quttainah, 2013). 
In this chapter, we concluded that there is wide variety of Shariah 
governance models across countries. After a thorough review of the CG regulation 
in each country analysed in this research, we concluded that the Shariah board can 
be categorized according to whether or not they have a central Shariah board 
attached to the national Central Bank (or another regulatory authority). In some 
countries, i.e. Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Brunei Darussalam, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) and Sudan, each Islamic Bank has its own Shariah board, but it 
must comply with the rules set by the Shariah board of the Central Bank.  
Additionally, we identify another set of countries that lacks this Central 
Shariah body at a macro level. Instead, each Islamic bank has its own, individual 
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Shariah board, since it is compulsory for every Islamic financial institution to 
establish a Shariah board. The micro-level Shariah board has responsibilities such 
as participating in product development and structuring activities, reviewing and 
approving matters related with Shariah, issuing fatwa and Shariah auditing 
pronouncements. Hence, the permissibility of contracts and the Shariah 
compliance of financial products are decided at the level of these institutions by 
their own Shariah committees, because every Shariah board is independent of the 
central bank. This is the typical model implemented in a number of countries of 
the Gulf Cooperation Council and certain other states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Bangladesh, Singapore, Thailand, Jordan and Indonesia).   
In chapter 3, we presented an extensive review of the relevant literature 
related to the subject of study, highlighting the main theories and findings about 
the composition of the boards of directors, the ownership structure and their 
impact on the performance of Islamic and conventional banks. We also developed 
the hypotheses of this research project. Additionally, we showed that most 
previous empirical studies deal with CG mechanisms in conventional banks and 
only a few studies are focused on Islamic banks. Therefore, additional empirical 
investigation seems to be necessary in this field. 
In chapter 4, we develop the methodology in order to test the research 
questions. We describe the sample selection process and analyse its composition. 
Our final sample consists of 50 banks based in 15 countries, providing 300 bank-
year observations for the period 2011-16. We review the main descriptive statistics 
and perform a correlation analysis in order to assess possible problems that may 
arise in the estimation of the models.  
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The t-test of means showed that the group of countries with a non-central 
Shariah board exhibits a significantly higher Q ratio, while the countries with a 
central Shariah board achieve higher profitability, in terms of ROA. On average, 
Islamic banks located in countries that follow a centralized model have a bigger 
and more educated (in the field of accounting and finance) Shariah board than the 
other group. The former group also display higher ownership concentration with 
a financial institution as a major shareholder.  
Chapter 5 is devoted to displaying the results of the empirical analysis. 
From this chapter, we draw the following conclusions:  
The Shariah board characteristics significantly affect (at the 1 % level) the 
performance of financial institutions in terms of the Q ratio: 
There is a significant association between Shariah board size and bank 
performance, showing a concave relationship. These results corroborate prior 
findings about boards of directors (De Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Crove et al., 
2011). We estimate that 12 members is the optimal (maximum) size.  
There is a positive association between members’ average education in 
accounting and finance, and market performance. That is consistent with the 
human capital theory and prior studies (Nomran et al., 2018; Farook et at., 2011), 
which show that aspects relating to educational issues usually translate into better 
performance. 
The data also reveal that the number of meetings positively impacts the Q 
ratio. These results highlight the relevance of banks having a proactive board (De 
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Andrés and Vallelado, 2008; Liang et al., 2013; García-Meca et al., 2015). In 
Islamic banks, the number of meetings of the Shariah board seems to reflect 
behaviour that is more proactive than reactive, which significantly improves their 
performance.  
Both a larger size and regular activity of the Shariah board seem to generate 
advantages in Islamic banks (monitoring and advising), increasing the pool of 
expertise, while mitigating disadvantages (lack of coordination and decision-
making deficiencies). This is because the Shariah board must control and review 
all bank operations.  
In sum, our results suggest that a good Shariah board is positively perceived 
by the investors because they rely on this body to ensure compliance with Islamic 
principles and because, eventually, it impacts the banks’ market capitalization. 
Conversely, we failed to find any significant relationship between the 
Shariah board characteristics and the accounting measures (ROA and ROE); a 
plausible explanation for this finding is that the range of transactions and 
operations are limited by the Shariah board (e.g. high volatility investments or 
high levels of debt that are related to high interest rates). Consequently, the 
profitability derived from the banking operations performed by the board of 
directors is not a consequence of the direct intervention of the Shariah board.   
Regarding ownership structure, we explored the influence of ownership 
concentration, which is the percentage of shares held by major shareholders and 
the identity of the largest owners. None of the variables seem to influence our 
performance or profitability measures (Thomsen and Pederson, 2000; Zouari and 
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Taktak, 2014) but investors do not have a positive perception of the State being 
the majority shareholder. When the majority shareholder in Islamic banks is the 
government, the bank’s performance is negatively influenced. The reason for this 
might be that the government monitors less intensively than private firms do, 
which is consistent with the efficient monitoring hypothesis of Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001), Iannotta et al. (2007).  
Finally, we performed some additional analyses to explore the influence of 
the geographical region and the Shariah model but we could not provide new 
insights. We also reckon that the robustness tests offer weak evidence about the 
relationship between our variable of interests and the Islamic bank’s performance. 
6.2. Implications of the study 
The research findings identify different Shariah board oversight structures 
among Islamic banks. These differences are not only of a formal nature but also 
relate to content, since the Shariah board plays different roles according to the 
governance structure at national and organizational level. In those countries where 
there is no central Shariah board, the Shariah board at the bank level is a standard-
setter or regulatory body because they are entitled to issue fatwas that the banks 
must follow. The harmonization of current divergent governance structures might 
help in the standardization of banks’ practices in adherence with the Islamic 
religion. 
Therefore, the outcome of this research could be useful for:  
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a) Regulatory bodies, who could take into account the empirical evidence 
when developing CG regulation in the future.  
b) Islamic financial institutions, so that they can design a better structure for 
Islamic banks.  
c) Managers/boards of directors, because they are a crucial part of bank 
management and seek to improve bank performance. 
d) Other stakeholders, for instance customers or investors, who may be 
especially interested in the composition of the Shariah board and its 
reputation.   
e) Future researchers focusing on CG in Islamic banks. 
6.3. Limitation of the research  
The lack of empirical of studies in the field of CG in Islamic banks made it 
difficult to find good sources on which to ground the hypothesis. 
Lack of data also limits the investigation of additional, interesting CG 
variables (among others, Shariah board members interlock or Shariah board age) 
that might influence Islamic banks’ performance. Furthermore, we were unable to 
extend our research period because we lacked relevant financial data from 2008 
until 2010. This lack of information is likely associated with the financial crisis, 
which in the case of the Islamic bank industry lasted until 2011. In addition, some 
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Islamic banks are unlisted due to the national stock market limitations and we 
could not run the models due to lack of Q ratio values. 
Islamic CG is still in a developmental stage and is mainly focused on Islamic 
financial instruments. Thus, the absence of a single institution that issues 
governance standards for Islamic institutions has made it difficult to explain and 
interpret the governance standards of Islamic banks and compare Islamic banks 
with each other and with their conventional counterparts. 
Islamic banks are currently mainly distributed among Gulf and SA 
countries. Therefore, we could not compare them with Islamic banks based in 
other parts of the world to examine the influence of environmental and contextual 
issues. 
6.4. Future Research 
In our view, future research should address the motivational factors behind 
CG in Islamic banks that enhance bank performance in terms of efficiency.  
In this research, we focused on the Shariah supervisory board in Islamic 
banks but a comparison of other CG mechanisms in Islamic and conventional 
banks could help to provide a better understanding of the diversity in the banking 
industry.  
Finally, further insights into the specific country singularities and how they 
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El objetivo de este proyecto de investigación es arrojar luz sobre las 
relaciones entre algunas características del Gobierno Corporativo (GC) en la banca 
Islámica y su desempeño.  
Diversas razones motivan este estudio: 
En primer lugar, las instituciones financieras Islámicas han experimentado 
una alta tasa de crecimiento durante las últimas décadas. En particular, los bancos 
Islámicos se han expandido en varios países europeos, tales como el Reino Unido 
y Luxemburgo, pero, sobre todo, han experimentado un crecimiento destacable en 
dos áreas concretas, el Sur de Asia y el Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo (CCG), 
de acuerdo a la información ofrecida por la International Organization for 
Securities Commissions (2004) y el Islamic Financial Services Industry (2014). 
Esta diseminación de la banca Islámica ha generado numerosas cuestiones que 
deberían ser investigadas, tales como los factores desencadenantes de esa 
expansión.  
En segundo lugar, en las últimas décadas se ha producido un giro de 
intereses puramente financieros hacia intereses más inclusivos que comprendan 
valores relativos a la diversidad, a la sostenibilidad y a la responsabilidad social. 
En esta línea, la banca Islámica representa un área interesante de investigación por 
sus conexiones sociales y religiosas. El objetivo principal de los bancos Islámicos 
no es solo buscar beneficios para los accionistas, sino también realizar una función 
de redistribución de la riqueza y adherirse al principio de justicia social que 
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contribuya a la mejora y el bienestar de la sociedad. Por lo tanto, se esfuerzan por 
lograr un equilibrio entre proporcionar suficientes rendimientos a sus accionistas 
y depositantes, por un lado, y sus compromisos con sus responsabilidades sociales 
y diversos grupos de interés, por el otro (Haniffa y Hudaib, 2007; Khan, 2010). 
En tercer lugar, hay necesidad de explorar las causas de la reciente crisis 
financiera global, que en muchos países alcanzó proporciones sistémicas. El sector 
financiero Islámico, aunque experimentó una fuerte caída en su rentabilidad 
durante los años de la crisis global, no sufrió el mismo impacto grave que la banca 
convencional, que provocó el colapso de los bancos de inversión y condujo a la 
pérdida de confianza en el mercado de créditos hipotecarios en los Estados Unidos 
(Rosman et al.2014). Se han argumentado diversas razones para ello: 
• El abanico de servicios y productos financieros que ofrece está limitado 
por la aplicación de la Ley Shariah 
• La autosuficiencia de los bancos Islámicos reduce la diseminación de los 
problemas entre los agentes del sector financiero 
En cuarto lugar, el buen gobierno de las empresas se ha convertido en objeto 
de atención para académicos, emisores de estándares, legisladores y usuarios 
financieros. La reciente crisis financiera mundial ha puesto de manifiesto que el 
gobierno corporativo en instituciones financieras y corporaciones presenta 
debilidades (Claessens y Yurtoglu, 2013). Por ello, a pesar de que existe un 




Finalmente, la banca Islámica presenta la singularidad de tener un sistema 
de gobierno con múltiples niveles, donde la religión juega un papel importante. Es 
interesante analizar sus peculiaridades y cómo influyen los elementos 
institucionales, religiosos y culturales en el diseño de los mecanismos de buen 
gobierno.  
Este proyecto de investigación pretende contribuir al acervo científico sobre 
la banca Islámica mediante el estudio del impacto de diversos mecanismos de GC 
en el desempeño bancario. En concreto, los objetivos de la tesis son analizar el 
impacto de: 
• Las características del consejo Shariah.  
• Las características de concentración de propiedad 
en ambos casos sobre el desempeño del banco Islámico. 
Para alcanzar dichos objetivos, la presente tesis se estructura en seis partes 
diferenciadas: 
En el capítulo 1, se explica el concento de finanzas Islámicas y las 
principales similitudes y diferencias con la banca convencional.  
Las principales diferencias entre los bancos Islámicos y convencionales 
están arraigadas en los cinco principios y prohibiciones del Corán, aunque algunos 
académicos argumentan que los bancos Islámicos y convencionales son similares 
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en la sustancia y diferentes en el formato (Beck et al., 2013). Dichos principios 
son los siguientes:  
• El principio de reparto de ganancias y pérdidas, por el cual los contratos 
típicos de banca Islámica son préstamos de sociedad entre bancos y 
prestatarios, es decir, contratos de Mudarabah (participación en los 
beneficios) y contratos de Musharakah (empresa conjunta). La característica 
común de estos contratos es que el banco comparte el riesgo con el 
depositante. 
• La prohibición de usura, por la cual el banco no puede cargar intereses 
explícitos en las operaciones financieras. 
• La prohibición de incertidumbre se traduce en que los bancos Islámicos no 
pueden invertir en activos de gran riesgo ni a muy largo plazo. 
• La prohibición de financiar actividades ilícitas, como el juego o el consumo 
de alcohol. 
• Las transacciones deben estar respaldadas por activos tangibles. 
 Así, identificamos los contratos utilizados con mayor frecuencia en la 
banca Islámica, como son:  
• Mudarabah, según el cual el banco proporciona el capital completo 
necesario para financiar un proyecto, mientras que el cliente ofrece su 
trabajo y experiencia. Los beneficios del proyecto se comparten entre los 
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dos (banco y cliente), en una proporción predeterminada; sin embargo, en 
el caso de pérdida, es exclusiva del banco. 
• Bajo los contratos de Musharakah (similar a una joint venture), el banco no 
es el único proveedor de fondos, sino que más socios contribuirán a 
financiar el proyecto. Los beneficios y las pérdidas se comparten entre 
ambas partes (banco y socios) en proporción al capital aportado. Este 
contrato suele ser el instrumento utilizado para financiar proyectos de 
inversión a largo plazo (Hasan y Dridi, 2011).  
• Mediante el contrato Murabahah, el banco compra un bien único, o un 
conjunto de productos, en nombre de un cliente, que paga el costo más un 
recargo. Los reembolsos, incluido el recargo, generalmente se realizan de 
acuerdo con un calendario preestablecido del banco (Vinnicombe, 2010). 
Las principales características de este contrato son: (a) tanto el costo como 
el margen de ganancia deben ser conocidos por el banco y el cliente; (b) el 
banco debe asumir la propiedad de los bienes antes de revenderlos al cliente 
(con todos los riesgos de propiedad en el ínterin); (c) la promesa del cliente 
de comprar los bienes comprados en su pedido por el banco puede o no ser 
vinculante (en la mayoría de las jurisdicciones es vinculante); (d) no se 
aplican intereses por pagos atrasados, pero el banco podría requerir una 
garantía (International Monetary Fund, 2017, p.36). 
• Istisna consiste en un contrato que permite a una parte obtener productos 
industriales con un pago en efectivo inicial y entrega diferida o pago y 
entrega diferidos. El banco actúa como intermediario (Hussain et al., 2016). 
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• El contrato de Ijarah es la versión de finanzas Islámicas de los contratos de 
alquiler y arrendamiento. Si bien en ambos casos el cliente paga una cierta 
renta fija, solo en este último se transfiere la propiedad al final del período 
especificado (Zaher y Hassan, 2001). 
En el capítulo 2, se revisa el concepto de GC y sus principales elementos. 
Posteriormente, se identifican los elementos singulares del GC en la banca 
Islámica.  
Los bancos Islámicos deben implementar un sistema de gobernanza 
Shariah, que el Consejo de Servicios Financieros Islámicos (IFSB) en Malasia 
define en los siguientes términos: 
"Sistema de gobierno de la Shariah se refiere al conjunto de arreglos 
institucionales y organizativos a través de los cuales una Institución que ofrece 
servicios financieros Islámicos garantiza que exista una supervisión efectiva e 
independiente del cumplimiento de la Shariah". 
Sus principales funciones son:  
• Proporcionan solo los productos y servicios aprobados ex-ante conforme a la ley 
Islámica; 
• Ayudan a sus empleados a cumplir con los principios morales en lugar de los 
intereses personales y la codicia. 
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• Promueven acciones colectivas de todos los interesados para mejorar la 
reputación del banco y beneficiar a todas las partes. 
Los miembros del consejo Shariah son académicos religiosos de la Shariah 
con experiencia en el campo de la contabilidad y las finanzas. Pueden emitir fatwas 
(opiniones legales) de acuerdo con la ley Islámica sobre transacciones comerciales 
(fiqh al-muamalat) dentro de la religión Islámica. El consejo Shariah se reúne 
varias veces al año. 
La Organización de Contabilidad y Auditoría para Instituciones Financieras 
Islámicas (AAOIFI), con sede en el Reino de Bahréin, y la Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB) en Malasia son los dos principales emisores de normas para 
las instituciones financieras Islámicas. Ambos organismos han recopilado una lista 
de principios rectores para la gobernanza de la Shariah. 
Tras la revisión de normas reguladoras de la gobernanza Shariah en los 
países de la muestra, hemos identificado dos grupos de países:  
a) Aquellos que siguen un modelo centralizado donde existe un Consejo Shariah 
a nivel nacional, adjunto al banco central o autoridad reguladora. Los consejos 
de la Shariah en este nivel juegan un papel importante en términos de 
armonización y estandarización de fatwas. Además, actúan como la máxima 
autoridad de la Shariah para las instituciones financieras Islámicas.  
Con carácter general, las principales responsabilidades del Consejo Shariah a 
nivel nacional son las siguientes: 
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1. Aconsejar al Banco Central sobre cuestiones relacionadas con la Shariah 
2. Emitir opiniones religiosas legales (fatwas) sobre asuntos financieros 
3. Revise y apruebe los productos financieros que cumplen con la Shariah 
4. Asistir a las Juntas de Supervisión de la Shariah en cada banco Islámico 
5. En algunos casos (Malasia, Pakistán e Indonesia), el Comité Shariah aprueba 
o recomienda nombramientos para las juntas Shariah de las instituciones 
financieras Islámicas. 
Cada banco Islámico tiene su propia junta de Shariah, pero debe cumplir con 
las reglas establecidas por la junta directiva de la Shariah del Banco Central. 
 Este modelo se utiliza en Malasia, Indonesia, Pakistán, Brunei Darussalam, 
Emiratos Árabes Unidos y Sudán. 
b) Países que siguen un modelo descentralizado donde no existe un Consejo 
Shariah a nivel nacional o macro. Sin embargo, como para el resto de bancos 
Islámicos, es obligatorio que el Consejo Shariah forme parte de los órganos de 
gobierno. 
La permisibilidad de los contratos y el cumplimiento con la Shariah de los 
productos financieros se deciden a nivel de estas instituciones por sus propios 




Este es el modelo típico implementado en algunos países del Consejo de 
Cooperación del Golfo y algunos otros estados. Tal modelo se puede encontrar en 
Kuwait, Arabia Saudita, Bahréin, Qatar, Omán, Bangladesh, Singapur, Tailandia, 
Jordania e Indonesia.  
Hay diferentes tamaños de Consejos Shariah en cada banco Islámico. El 
número más común es tres (en Malasia, Pakistán, Brunei Darussalam, Emiratos 
Árabes Unidos, Bahréin, Qatar, Kuwait, Omán, Jordania), en Indonesia, el mínimo 
es dos con un máximo de cinco, pero en los países restantes, el tamaño queda 
abierto a elección (Bangladesh) o no está especificado. 
Las juntas individuales de Shariah en cada banco Islámico tienen diferentes 
funciones relacionadas con los siguientes roles: 
• Informativo. En general, se solicita a la junta directiva de la Shariah que 
presente un informe anual sobre el cumplimiento de la Shariah del banco 
Islámico a la junta directiva. En el caso de Jordania, también deben informar a 
la asamblea general de accionistas. Indonesia, Pakistán y Jordania también 
requieren que la junta de la Shariah informe al Consejo Nacional de la Shariah 
o al Banco Central. 
• Supervisión. Por lo general, revisan y aprueban todas las políticas, 
procedimientos, productos, sistemas, contratos y acuerdos del banco para su 
cumplimiento con la Shariah. 
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• Asesoramiento. Brindan consultas sobre cuestiones relacionadas con la 
Shariah a todas las partes que se ocupan del banco, como auditores, abogados, 
asesores y clientes. 
• Jurisprudencia. En algunos casos, por ejemplo, en Indonesia, dan opiniones 
legales sobre asuntos financieros. 
En el capítulo 3 se identifican las principales teorías en las que se enmarca 
la investigación en Gobierno Corporativo, prestando especial atención a la teoría 
de la agencia, aunque algunos de nuestros resultados corroboran los postulados de 
la teoría del Stakeholder o Stewardship. 
Desde el punto de vista de la teoría de la agencia, en la que se enmarca esta 
investigación, el cumplimiento de la Shariah en las instituciones Islámicas 
desencadena una nueva relación principal-agente entre los gerentes y las partes 
interesadas en los siguientes términos: 
a. Divergencia de intereses principales-agentes: los clientes musulmanes y 
otras partes interesadas realizan transacciones de inversión y financiación 
con el banco Islámico sobre la base de que el banco es una institución que 
cumple con la Shariah. Los gerentes (agentes) pueden perseguir sus propios 
intereses y liquidar transacciones que sean más rentables pero que no 
cumplan con los principios de la Shariah, mientras que las partes interesadas 
actúan en el entendimiento de que están interactuando con una institución 
Islámica. Como afirma Hasan (2009), el éxito de la industria financiera 
Islámica se basa en la creencia de todos los interesados de que todos los 
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componentes del sistema financiero cumplen con los principios y reglas de 
la Shariah. 
b. Asimetría de información: los gerentes tienen acceso a toda la información 
interna relacionada con los servicios financieros prestados por el banco, 
mientras que las partes interesadas carecen de información sobre el 
cumplimiento de la Shariah de esos productos financieros. Dado que los 
gerentes son los únicos que tienen derecho a acceder a la información 
financiera, si los incentivos del agente no están alineados con los de los 
principales, los gerentes que controlan los activos de las firmas pueden optar 
por satisfacer sus ambiciones personales en lugar de los accionistas y otras 
partes interesadas (problema de riesgo moral). 
A continuación, se presenta una revisión extensa de las aportaciones 
teóricas y empíricas que analizan la relación entre los mecanismos de GC y el 
desempeño del banco. Ello sirve para sustentar las hipótesis de investigación que, 
de forma resumida, presentamos a continuación: 
• Las (buenas) características del consejo Shariah, en concreto el tamaño, 
su actividad y su educación influirán (positivamente) en el desempeño 
del banco Islámico. 
• La concentración y características de la propiedad influyen en el 




En el capítulo 4 se describe la metodología empleada para testar las 
cuestiones de investigación y la muestra de estudio. 
 
La muestra y la información financiera principal se obtuvieron de la base de 
datos Bankscope. Los datos relacionados con el consejo Shariah fueron 
recolectados en su mayoría manualmente de los informes anuales individuales de 
los bancos y, adicionalmente, de otras fuentes como las páginas web de los 
mercados bursátiles. 
Inicialmente, el período de estudio cubre desde 2008 hasta 2016. Sin 
embargo, carecíamos de datos financieros relevantes desde 2008 hasta 2010, 
posiblemente debido a la crisis financiera en la industria bancaria Islámica. Por 
ello, eliminamos 279 observaciones e investigamos el rendimiento de los bancos 
desde 2011 hasta 2016. Nuestra muestra final está compuesta por 50 bancos 
establecidos en 15 países que proporcionan 300 observaciones banco-año para el 
período 2011-2016. La mayoría de estos bancos se encuentran en países del 
Consejo de Cooperación del Golfo y países del sudeste asiático. 
Aplicamos el Método Generalizado de Momentos (GMM) de Arellano y 
Bond (1991), siguiendo a Arellano y Bover (1995); Blundell y Bond (1998) o De 
Andres y Vallelado (2008) porque los efectos no observables a nivel de panel 
derivados de los modelos lineales están controlados y la correlación con las 
variables dependientes rezagadas no hace estimadores inconsistentes. 
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La variable dependiente de nuestro modelo es el desempeño del Banco. En 
primer lugar, hemos empleado la medida más común, es decir, la Q de Tobin, 
basada en el mercado y que se estima mediante el valor en libros de los activos 
totales menos el valor en libros del capital ordinario más el valor de mercado del 
capital dividido por el valor en libros del activo total. 
También hemos utilizado enfoques basados en la contabilidad, como la 
Rentabilidad de los Activos (ROA) y la Rentabilidad de los fondos propios o del 
Accionista (ROE). Medimos el rendimiento de los activos como el ingreso neto 
dividido por los activos totales y, de manera similar, estimamos el rendimiento 
sobre el patrimonio como el ingreso neto dividido por los fondos propios totales 
(como en Grove et al., 2011; Adams y Mehran, 2012; Aebi et al. al., 2012). 
Nuestras variables exploratorias relacionadas con el consejo Shariah son, en 
primer lugar, el tamaño del consejo, es decir el número total de miembros (Grassa 
y Matoussi, 2014; Mollah y Zaman, 2015; Matoussi y Nomran et al., 2018). Para 
observar si existe una relación no cuadrática el modelo también comprende el 
cuadrado del tamaño del consejo Shariah. 
En segundo lugar, medimos la actividad del consejo Shariah a través del 
número de reuniones que han mantenido durante el año. 
En tercer lugar, hemos analizado la educación promedio del consejo 
Shariah, es decir, el número de miembros que tienen título en contabilidad y 
finanzas dividido por el número total de miembros del consejo. 
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El segundo conjunto de variables exploratorias está relacionado con la 
estructura de propiedad. En primer lugar, medimos la concentración de la 
propiedad, denominada tasa de control, como el porcentaje de acciones que posee 
el mayor accionista. 
Para estudiar el impacto del tipo de accionista mayoritario en el rendimiento 
del banco, empleamos la variable Estado que equivale a 1 si el mayor accionista 
es una entidad gubernamental y 0 en caso contrario. 
Además, utilizamos una variable denominada Banco que equivale a 1 si el 
mayor accionista es un banco y 0 en caso contrario. 
Controlamos, además, por otros determinantes potenciales de la variable 
dependiente que, agrupamos en variables de GC y variables macroeconómicas. En 
relación a las variables de GC, controlamos las características del consejo de 
administración que afectan el rendimiento de la empresa de acuerdo con los 
resultados publicados anteriormente. Así, incluimos como variable el tamaño y la 
actividad del consejo de administración, calculadas de forma similar al consejo 
Shariah. También consideramos la independencia del consejo medida a través de 
la fracción de miembros no ejecutivos. 
Además de las variables de GC, y limitados por las restricciones de 
disponibilidad de datos, también hemos considerado otros factores que 
demostraron estar significativamente asociados a la rentabilidad del banco: 
tamaño del Banco, calculado como el logaritmo natural de los activos totales; la 
edad del banco, es decir, el número de años desde su establecimiento hasta la fecha 
actual. Además, hemos observado el apalancamiento del banco, medido como los 
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préstamos bancarios en relación a los activos totales. Finalmente, hemos 
controlado por el país y por el año. 
Entre los determinantes macroeconómicos del desempeño del banco hemos 
incluido el nivel de ingreso por habitante, medida como el producto interior bruto 
per cápita y la inflación, que también ha demostrado influir en la rentabilidad del 
banco. 
En el capítulo 5 se presentan los resultados del análisis multivariante. 
Reportamos que las buenas características del Consejo Shariah influyen 
positivamente en el valor de mercado de los bancos Islámicos pero no en las tasas 
de rentabilidad contables. Respecto a las variables relativas a la concentración de 
la propiedad, ninguna de ellas parece tener una influencia significativa sobre el 
desempeño bancario. Únicamente el hecho de que sea el gobierno el accionista 
mayoritario, influye negativamente sobre el desempeño, pero consideramos que la 
evidencia aportada es débil.  
En este capítulo también se muestran los resultados de los análisis de 
sensibilidad a distintas mediciones de las variables y de los tests de robustez.  
En el capítulo 6 se presentan las principales conclusiones. Los hallazgos 
de la investigación identifican: 
Hay diferentes modelos de supervisión del Consejo Shariah: En concreto 
hay un modelo donde existe un Consejo Shariah a nivel nacional y otro modelo 
donde el Consejo Shariah sólo tiene presencia en los bancos. El grupo de países 
donde no hay un consejo de Shariah central exhibe un índice de Q 
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significativamente mayor que el otro grupo con un nivel de significancia 
estadística del 5%. La rentabilidad medida a través del ROA es estadísticamente 
más alta en los países con Consejo Central de Shariah, pero cuando se mide a 
través de ROE no hay diferencias significativas entre los dos grupos. Además, los 
resultados demuestran que, en promedio, los bancos Islámicos con sede en países 
que siguen un modelo centralizado tienen un consejo de Shariah que es más 
pequeño, pero más educado en finanzas y contabilidad que el otro grupo. 
Finalmente, en lo que respecta a las variables de estructura de propiedad, los 
bancos con sede en países con una junta central de Shariah muestran un porcentaje 
significativamente mayor en poder del accionista principal, y una mayor 
proporción de instituciones financieras es el principal accionista. 
En relación a las características del Consejo Shariah, concluimos que el 
tamaño presenta una relación cóncava con el desempeño del banco, en la misma 
línea que los hallazgos previos en el consejo de administración (De Andres y 
Vallelado, 2008, Crove et al., 2011). Estimamos que 12 miembros es el tamaño 
óptimo (máximo), a partir del cual el incremento de tamaño genera una reducción 
en el desempeño del banco. 
También revelamos una asociación positiva entre la educación promedio en 
contabilidad y finanzas del consejo Shariah y el desempeño del banco, consistente 
con la teoría del capital humano y evidencia previa (Nomran et al., 2018 y Farook 
et at.2011).  
Nuestros resultados avalan que el número de reuniones impacta 
positivamente en el desempeño del banco Islámico. Es decir, parece que las 
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reuniones son más proactivas (Andrés y Vallelado, 2008; Liang et al., 2013; 
García-Meca et al., 2015) que reactivas, lo que mejora significativamente el 
rendimiento de los mismos. 
En resumen, en el caso de los bancos Islámicos un consejo Shariah más 
grande, más activo y con mayor educación en campos financieros parecen 
estimular las ventajas (supervisión y asesoramiento), en detrimento de las 
desventajas (falta de coordinación y deficiencias en la toma de decisiones). Sin 
embargo, cabe señalar que estas asociaciones positivas son significativas 
únicamente en el caso del desempeño en términos de mercado, medido a través de 
la Q de Tobin. Los resultados relativos a las medidas contables, rentabilidad de 
activos y fondos propios, no resultaron significativos. 
Estos resultados sugieren que un buen consejo Shariah es percibido 
positivamente por los inversores porque confían en este organismo para garantizar 
el cumplimiento de los principios Islámicos y ello finalmente impacta en el valor 
de capitalización del mercado. 
Por el contrario, el hecho de que no encontramos ninguna relación 
significativa entre las características del consejo Shariah y las medidas contables 
(ROA y ROE) podría explicarse por el hecho de que la gama de transacciones y 
operaciones financieras está limitada por el consejo Shariah siguiendo los 
principios del Corán. En consecuencia, la rentabilidad derivada de las operaciones 
bancarias realizadas por el Consejo de Administración no es consecuencia de la 
intervención directa del Consejo Shariah. 
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Con respecto a la estructura de propiedad, exploramos la influencia de la 
concentración, es decir, el porcentaje de acciones que posee el accionista principal 
y la identidad de los propietarios más grandes. El porcentaje de participación no 
parece influir en nuestras medidas de rendimiento o rentabilidad (Thomsen y 
Pederson, 2000; Zouari y Taktak, 2014), pero los resultados sugieren que cuando 
el principal accionista es el Estado, ello no es bien percibido por los inversores. 
La razón podría ser que la actividad de monitoreo del gobierno es menos intensiva 
que la privada, lo que es consistente con la hipótesis de monitoreo eficiente de 
Demsetz y Villalonga (2001); Iannotta et al. (2007). 
Entre las limitaciones de esta investigación, necesitamos señalar que la falta 
de estudios empíricos en el campo de la CG en los bancos Islámicos hizo difícil 
encontrar buenas fuentes sobre las cuales basar la hipótesis. 
La falta de datos también limita la investigación de variables CG adicionales 
e interesantes (entre otros, la pertenencia a consejos de distintos bancos de 
miembros del Consejo Shariah o la edad de sus miembros) que podrían influir en 
el rendimiento de los bancos Islámicos. Además, no pudimos ampliar nuestro 
período de investigación porque carecíamos de datos financieros relevantes desde 
2008 hasta 2010. Esta falta de información probablemente esté asociada con la 
crisis financiera, que en el caso de la industria bancaria Islámica duró hasta 2011. 
Además, algunos de los bancos Islámicos no cotizan debido a las limitaciones del 
mercado de valores nacional y no pudimos ejecutar los modelos debido a la falta 
de valores de la relación Q. 
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La CG Islámica aún se encuentra en una etapa de desarrollo y se centra 
principalmente en los instrumentos financieros Islámicos. Por lo tanto, la ausencia 
de una institución única que emita estándares de gobernanza para las instituciones 
Islámicas ha dificultado la explicación e interpretación de los estándares de 
gobernanza de los bancos Islámicos y la comparación de los bancos Islámicos 
entre sí y con sus contrapartes convencionales. 
Finalmente, es necesario señalar que los bancos Islámicos actualmente se 
distribuyen principalmente entre los países del Golfo y del sudeste asiático. Por lo 
tanto, no pudimos compararlos con los bancos Islámicos con sede en otras partes 
del mundo para examinar la influencia de los problemas ambientales y 
contextuales. 
Respecto a las futuras líneas de investigación, consideramos que se 
deberían abordar los factores de motivación detrás del GC en los bancos Islámicos 
que mejoran el rendimiento bancario en términos de eficiencia. 
En esta investigación, nos enfocamos en el Consejo Shariah en los bancos 
Islámicos, pero una comparación de otros mecanismos de GC en los bancos 
Islámicos y convencionales podría ayudar a proporcionar una mejor comprensión 
de la diversidad en la industria bancaria. 
Por último, una mayor comprensión de las singularidades específicas de 
cada país y la forma en que dan forma al marco de gobernanza también sería 
relevante para el mundo académico y los organismos reguladores. 
Los resultados de este proyecto pueden ser de interés para: 
Resumen 
253 
• Los organismos emisores de normas, regulatorios y prudenciales podrían 
considerar la evidencia empírica proporcionada a través de este tipo de 
investigaciones. 
• Bancos Islámicos para mejorar sus mecanismos de gobierno corporativo. 
• Los emisores de códigos GC podrían beneficiarse de la evidencia empírica 
(Grassa, 2013) porque los sistemas de GC en las instituciones financieras 
Islámicas aún se encuentran en una etapa inicial y son heterogéneos entre países 
(Hasan, 2011). 
• Académicos, porque brindamos información adicional que puede ser 
considerada en investigaciones futuras.  
 
